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ABSTRACT
Tsar Nicholas XI of Russia abdicated on March 15,
1917.

For several months, Russian politics was in a

state of flux until Vladimir Ilych Lenin led the Bolsheviks
to power in November and established the first government
based upon Marxist Socialism.
America's initial reaction to the abdication was
one of extreme pleasure as the Americans expected the
Russians to establish a government similar to their own.
In addition, most Americans interpreted the events in Russia
as beneficial to the Allied cause.

Less than a month after

the abdication, however, the united States entered World
War I, and it soon became apparent that political unrest
in Russia might weaken her ability to continue as a belli
gerent.

President Wilson sent a Special Diplomatic Mission,

to Russia in the summer of 1917.

The nine-man Mission,

headed by former Secretary of State Eliliu Soot, was a
good-will mission and a fact-finding group whose work was
to determine Russia's material and financial needs and to
assess the political and military stability of the new
government.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine

the work of the Root Mission and to evaluate its accomplish
ments .
iv

in the preparation of this work, many unpublished
sources were used.

The state Department Records in the

National Archives contain hundreds of items, including
reports from each member as well as a detailed log of the
trip.

The private papers of seven of the men furnished

significant material and the detailed diaries of three of
the members were utilized.

These and other sources were

examined in an attempt to present an accurate account of
the Root Mission and its effect on American policy.

v

PREFACE
News of the March, 1917, revolution in Russia ar
rived in the united States at approximately the same time
that president Woodrow Wilson decided to enter World War
I.

Most Americans reacted favorably to the events in

Russia and were especially pleased with initial reports
that the provisional Government would probably be based
upon a political ideology similar to that of the United
States.

The overthrow of the Tsar was timely in that

Americans could now more realistically accept World War
I as a struggle between the forces of democracy and autoc
racy.

Americans soon began sending messages to congratu

late and encourage the new Russian government.

And many

began to suggest that the United States send a special
fact-finding Mission to Russia.
President Wilson accepted the idea, envisioning
the Mission as an elaborate goodwill venture as well as
a way to observe at first-hand Russia's military needs.
This Mission, headed by former Secretary of State Elihu
Root, was to be Wilson's most ambitious attempt to deal
with revolutionary conditions in Russia.

It departed from

Washington in May, 1917, and returned in August of that
year.

While in Russia, Mission members encountered events
vi

which were evolving so rapidly that even the most expe
rienced observers of the Russian political scene understood
and interpreted them with difficulty, if at all.
When Elihu Root departed for Russia, American
public opinion, as reflected by journalists, was that
the aged diplomat could effectively encourage political
stability in Russia and persuade that nation to continue
its role as an effective ally in World War I.

Historians,

however, view the Root Mission as a dismal failure.

Some

have gone so far as to suggest that both Allied and
American diplomacy during the period in which the Pro
visional Government ostensibly was in control in Russia
was based upon the false premise that the Russian government
could continue the war while consolidating its political
strength.

The Root Mission is a prime example of diplomacy

based upon this premise.
Historical judgment of the worthlessness of the
Root Mission is far more accurate than was contemporary
opinion of its value.

Most historians, however, have

reached this conclusion without a thorough study of the
Mission's activities in Russia.

I have sought to examine

in detail the Root Mission in an effort to determine why it
was sent, what was expected of it, what it accomplished
while in Russia, and what effect, if any, this Mission had
on United States-Russian relations during this critical
vii

period.
I did my research for this study almost entirely
in primary sources, many of which have never been fully
utilized before.

I undertook this work with the realiza

tion that the Root Mission, in all probability, contrib
uted very little toward establishing a significant Russian
policy by the united States Government.

I pursued it,

however, with the conviction that in historical research
and writing it is as valid to study policies and experi
ments which have failed as to peruse those which have had
tangible and lasting results.

viii

CHAPTER X
INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 1917,^* Tsar Nicholas II of Russia abdi
cated the throne from which his family has reigned for more
than three hundred years.

This event followed a brief

period of rioting in the Russian capital of Petrograd but,
nevertheless, came as a surprise to almost everyone.

The

causes for the Tsar's overthrow and subsequent abdication
were complex and, as is the case with most events of such
magnitude, resulted from many factors.
The underlying causes of the collapse of absolutism
in Russia had roots deep in the nineteenth century, but the
event which precipitated it in 1917 was Russia's involve
ment in World War I.

This first total war simply placed

unbearable strains on an already deeply riven (some would
say disintegrating) society.

The tsarist government enjoyed

a brief period of popularity at the beginning of the war.
Popular support declined, however, as the war began to go
^Throughout this work all dates cited will be
according to the Gregorian calendar.
The Gregorian calen
dar was thirteen days ahead v ? the Julian calendar which
remained in use in Russia until February 14, 1918,
Thus,
the term "February and October" Revolutions refers to
events which occurred in March and November according to
the Gregorian calendar.

2
against the Russians early in 1915.

on July 1, 1915, a

combined Austro-German offensive wiped out most of the
Russian gains of the previous year.

From that point on,

the military outlook was bleak and, with the exception of
a few brief reversals, the war continued to go against the
Russians.2
Because of the inability of Nicholas and his bureau
crats to mobilize efficiently Russia's resources for the
war, living standards for millions of Russian citizens
quickly plummeted.

The Russian peasantry, source of the

bulk of the manpower for the Army, found it Increasingly
difficult to obtain consumer goods,

industrial workers,

whose wage increases failed to keep pace with inflation,
were periodically confronted with bread shortages in the
cities.

As early as 1915, small numbers of industrial

workers began to strike in protest against these deplorable
conditions.

These early and isolated strikes did not
3
seriously threaten the government.
By the fall of 1916, however, expressions of dis

satisfaction with the situation in Russia arose from all
segments of the political- spectrum.

The inefficiency of

the government coupled with the incredible spectacle of
2Williara Henry Chamberlin,. The Russian Revolution
1917-1921 (New Yorks
The Macmillan Company, 1935), I,
66-70.

3Ibid., 66-67.

Rasputin, an ignorant, dirty peasant "holy man," manipu
lating the Empress and through her the weak-willed Tsar,
had destroyed the last vestige of respect for Nicholas'
regime,

indeed, wide popular credence was given to rumors

that the poor Russian performance in the war was due to
treason at the highest levels of the government.

The

situation did not improve at all when Rasputin was
murdered in December, 1916.

strikes continued, Duma (lower

house of the legislature) members were clamoring for respon
sible government, and, as winter progressed, the shortage
of food and fuel in the rear areas became acute.

And yet,

not many observers felt a major crisis was imminent,

in

February, 1917, an Inter-Allied conference was held in
Petrograd, and none of the delegates saw anything to indi
cate the grave events which were now just around the
corner.

4
During the first week in March, industrial strikes

began in petrograd.

At their height, these strikes involved

a quarter of a million workers and culminated in the fall
of the Tsar's government.

The two most important causes

of the strikes were the closing of the huge Putilov Muni
tions Works and rumored bread shortages in the capital.
4Robert D. Warth, The Allies And The Russian Revo
lution; From The Fall Of The Monarch To T h e .peace Of
Brest-Litovsk TBurham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1954),
19-22.

The Putilov factory was accustomed to labor problems and
had been plagued with a series of strikes in 1916.

on

March 3, 1917, however, workers in one department of the
factory demanded a fifty per cent wage increase.

When

their demands were not met, they went out on strike.

A

few days later, the remaining workersrjoined the strike
and the management closed the plant on March 7.

The Putilov

workers, approximately 30,000 strong, organized street
demonstrations for wage increases as well as for more bread.
The demands for more bread resulted from rumors circulating
throughout Petrograd that a serious flour shortage existed
and that the bakeries were selling a portion of their flour
on the black market.5

Tsar Nicholas was assured by A. D.

Protopopov, Minister of the Interior, that the demonstra
tions, peaceful in nature, could be handled easily, and
he left the capital on March 3 for the Russian Military
Headquarters at Mogilev.
On the day of the Tsar's departure, the demonstra
tors were joined by thousands of additional workers and a
bread riot ensued.

The riots became much more serious on

March 9, and many of the guards regiments, whose duty it
was to suppress the rioters, joined in the demonstrations.

g

5George Katkov, Russia 1917; The February Revolu
tion (New York: Harpers and Row Publishers, 1967), 359-61.
6warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 19-

22.

The riots in Petrograd continued, and the Tsar adjourned
the Duma for an indefinite period on March 11.

That body

met without his permission on March 12 and from its member
ship elected a provisional committee to fill the void
created by the adjournment.

Although the committee was

unable to alter in any way the course of events in Russia,
it is important because it became the Provisional Govern
ment following the Tsar's abdication.
By this time, there was virtually no support for
the Tsar in petrograd, and troops brought in to quell the
uprisings quickly joined the rioters,

on March 12, a group

of insurgents and radical intellectuals invaded the Taurida
Palace,7 occupied rooms not being used by the Duma, and
established the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies.

Tsar Nicholas tried to reenter Petrograd on

March 13 but his train was stopped and rerouted to Pskov
by troops loyal to the revolution.

When the extreme

gravity of the situation finally penetrated to the incred
ibly imperceptive monarch, military and political advisers
convinced him that he should abdicate in favor of his
twelve-year old son, Alexis, and a regency.

For personal

reasons, however, he decided instead to give up the throne
to his younger brother, the Grand Duke Michael, on March 18.
7The Taurida Palace was built for Prince Potemkin
of Taurida by Catherine the Great. In 1917, it became the
seat of the Provisional Government.

But the Grand Duke, after conversations with Duma repre
sentatives, decided it would be prudent to refuse the
Crown.

Thus, with less than half-hearted efforts to

preserve it, the monarchy which had dominated Russian
3
politics for centuries perished.
An event of such magnitude would be significant in
the history of any nation.

The downfall of the Russian

monarch, however, transcended purely internal considera
tions.

The Tsar's abdication, coming as it did in the

midst of Wbrld War I, presented the possibility of a
Russian withdrawal from the war because, as it turned out,
this was merely the opening act of a revolutionary drama
which tore the very fabric of Russian society asunder.
Before the year was over, Lenin and his Bolshevik party
had seized power in the name of Marxian Socialism —
event of lasting significance in world history.

an

But none

of this was foretold by the events of March; the immediate
problem facing Russia seemed to be the creation of a
government to replace the monarchy.
Overnight, Russia was converted to the most demo
cratic country in the world.

In this new freedom, a plethora

of political factions appeared.9

The history of political

8Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 92-98.
9When it became apparent that there was little if any
chance for a return to a monarchy, all those who normally
supported the Crown disappeared or went into hiding and
were of no significance during the next few months.

events in the capital between March and November of 1917
is basically the story of the struggle for power among
the three most important factions.
The most conservative of these groups were the
Kadets led by Paul Miliukov, who was a member of both the
last Duma and of the provisional committee, and who became
a power in the first provisional Government.

Prior to the

March Revolution, the Kadets were considered a liberalreform party.

The swiftly moving events during and after

March, however, soon relegated them to a position on the
right of the political spectrum, a result of the extreme
radicalization of politics within Russia.

The Kadets held

a party conference in early April, 1917, and issued a
statement advocating the creation of a western-style
democratic republic.

The party also strongly supported

the war against Germany and upheld the Tsar’s secret
treaties with the Allied powers.

The Kadets felt, however,

that substantive economic and social change should be
delayed until a constituent assembly could be held.

The

Kadets dominated the first cabinet of the provisional
Government but lost control as the Revolution overtook and
passed their leaders.
In the center of the political spectrum were the
Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries.

These two

parties furnished the leadership of the early Revolutionary
movement and controlled the Petrograd Soviet until shortly

before the Bolsheviks seized power in the November Revolu
tion.1*^

The Socialist Revolutionaries were the largest

party in Russia in March, 1917, but were hampered by the
lack of a comprehensive program.

While they recognized the

trend toward industrialization in Russia, they believed
that its economic backwardness called for a revolution
based primarily upon the peasantry.

Consequently, they

championed reforms, especially the confiscation of landed
estates, which would appeal to the p e a s a n t s . ^
viks were the largest Marxist party in Russia.

The Menshe12

They also

believed that the working class in Russia was too small to
revolt successfully.

Unlike the Socialist Revolutionaries,

however, they had little o^r no hope that the Russian peasantry would support a revolutionary movement.

13

The domestic

programs of both parties varied but both advocated the imme
diate convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

Their view

with regard to the war, however, was more consistent.

Unlike

the Kadets, both were unwilling to support the secret
^Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 359-61.
1LIbid., 39-41.
l2The Bolshevik-Menshevik division has been described
by one historian as "more temperamental than doctrinal."
Robert V. Daniels, Red October; The Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 20.
^Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 39.

agreements with the Allies.

They did not insist upon an

immediate peace, as did the Bolsheviks at a later date, but
supported the war only as a defensive measure until a
general peace could be arranged.

This would occur, hope

fully, when the masses in the belligerent countries forced
their governments to renounce imperialistic war aims and
accept a policy of "no annexations, no indemnities."
The last and most radical of the three major
political groups were the Bolsheviks.

At the time of the

Tsar's abdication, most of the Bolshevik leaders were living
in exile, and their role in the March Revolution was incon
sequential.

The Bolshevik program was the most extreme of

any of the revolutionary groups.

When Lenin returned, they

immediately advocated withdrawing support from the Provisional
Government, confiscation of land by the peasants without
waiting for the Constituent Assembly to meet, bread for the
hungry, and later, peace for the war-weary.

Even in his

April Thesis in which Lenin called for turning the im
perialist war into a revolutionary war, he did not yet
champion an immediate peace.

The Bolsheviks' position

with regard to the war, however, did lead to a separate
14
peace with Germany once they gained power.
The actual power in Russia was divided between two
bodies.

This situation is usually referred to by historians

14Ibid., 359-61.

10
as "dual power."

The provisional Government, as the

"legitimate" successor to the Tsar and political heir of
the Duma, was recognized as the legal head of state by
foreign governments,

in the first few weeks, it was

controlled by the liberal and moderate leadership of the
Duma.

Although the Provisional Government had the respon

sibility for conducting the government, it never had the
power to enforce its policies, a fatal weakness.
The other source of power was the Petrograd Soviet
of Workers1 and Soldiers' Deputies organized by a group of
revolutionary leaders who called themselves the Provisional
Executive Committee of the petrograd Workers' Deputies.
They patterned their organization after the St. Petersburg
Soviet of the Revolution of 1905.

At first, the Petrograd

Soviet was no more than a loose organization of selfappointed revolutionaries.

Later, a larger and more

representative group was obtained through the addition
of delegates from the factories and the petrograd Garrison.
The growing strength of the Petrograd Soviet was derived
from the increasingly revolutionary masses of soldiers,
workers, and peasants.

Whereas the Provisional Government

attempted to exercise power where none existed, the petro
grad Soviet soon had the power to act as a government but
did not choose to do so.

1R

Dominated by Mensheviks and

15Katkov, Russia 1917, 359-61.

XI
Socialist Revolutionaries, the Soviet resolved not to
participate in the Provisional Government.

This decision

was based on their concept of the Soviet as a class insti
tution whose task was to protect the toiling masses from a
"bourgeois" government, the inevitable product of the first,
or "bourgeois" revolution.

The time was not yet ripe for

the second, or socialist revolution, when they wauld wield
power.

Thus, the socialist parties were completely free

"to support or to oppose" without any responsibility.
The selection of the members of the Provisional
Government was done in an irregular fashion.

M. V.

Rodzianko, President of the Duma, and Miliukov determined
its membership after consulting the Executive Committee
of the petrograd Soviet on the night of March 13.

The

Executive Committee, however, did not wish to publicize
its role in the selection of the members of the Provisional
Government.

17

Most of the members of the provisional Government
were extremely conservative for petrograd in March, 1917.
Prime Minister Prince G. E. Lvov and Foreign Minister
Miliukov were members of the Kadets.

Alexander Guchkov,
IQ

the Minister of Navy and war, was an o c t o b r i s t . A
16Ibid., 388.
17Ibid., 393-94.
L8ln 1917, the octobrist party was considered
extremely conservative.

conservative Ukrainian businessman, M. X. Tereshchenko,
served as the Minister of Finance.

The only member of the

Provisional Government associated with a revolutionary
party was Alexander F. Kerensky who became the Minister of
19
Justice. Kerensky, a former Trudovik,
was now a Socialist
Revolutionary.

Another Socialist, N. S. Chkheidze, a Men

shevik, had been offered the position of Minister of Labor
but had refused.

His refusal was caused by the Soviet's

decision that none of its members should serve in the
Provisional Government.

As Deputy Chairman of the Soviet

of Workers' Deputies, Kerensky should have refused the post
in the provisional Government.

On March 15, however,

Kerensky addressed the petrograd Soviet and in an emotional
appeal to the members explained his decision to accept the
appointment as Minister of Justice.

Following his address,

he was carried by the members of the Soviet to the room of
the Executive Committee, an action which apparently indi
cated that he had the support of the Soviet.

Although

Kerensky retained both his Cabinet post and his position
as Deputy Chairman of the Soviet, it became increasingly
difficult to do so.20
19Prdor to 1917, the Trudoviks had a fairly large
following and considered themselves spokesmen for the
peasants. After March, 1917, roost found their way into
the ranks of the Socialist Revolutionary party.
^^Katkov, Russia 1917, 388-93.

13
Newspapers informed the inhabitants of Petrograd
of the membership of the new Provisional Government on the
morning of March 16.

The article appeared as a statement

by the Duma Executive Committee but was signed by the
newly appointed ministers of the Provisional Government
rather than by the members of the Duma committee,

included

in the announcement was an eight-point program Which was
the provisional Government's expression of faith in the
Revolution.

This program resulted from discussions between

the Duma committee and the Soviet Executive Committee and
may be interpreted as the price paid by the Provisional
Government for acceptance.

The eight-point program was

as follows:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Complete amnesty for all political and religious
offences, including terrorist attempts, military
mutinies and agrarian disorders;
All democratic liberties (of speech, of the press,
etc.) for all citizens, including the military
insofar as permitted by technical military con
siderations;
Abolition of all discrimination on grounds of
class, religion, and race;
immediate preparation of elections to the Con
stituent Assembly;
Replacement of the police by a popular militia,
with elected officers, subordinated to the organs
of local administration;
New elections on the basis of universal franchise
to all organs of local self-government;
Military units which took part in the revolu
tionary movement not to be disarmed or withdrawn
from Petrograd;
Extension of all civic freedoms to soldiers and
military personnel, subject only to the maintenance
of strict military discipline when on duty.21

21Ibid., 395

14
The willingness of the Provisional Government to
keep the mutinous garrison in Petrograd (point number
seven) has been seen as the cause of many of its later
problems.

Thus maintained in Petrograd was a large

military force which turned for leadership to the Soviet
rather than to the Provisional Government.

Years later,

Miliukov wrote that the decision to include point number
seven was made at a time when it was unclear whether the
regular military might attempt to suppress the Revolution.

22

The petrograd Garrison, however, had already been
assured of protection in Order Number One issued by the
Executive Committee of the Soviet on March 14.

The Order

was to apply solely to the petrograd Garrison but was
soon distributed to the troops at the Front who assumed
that it also included them.

It is usually accepted as

the most important factor leading to the deterioration of
the Russian Army as an effective fighting unit.

The Order

stated that all military and naval units should elect
committees to represent the enlisted men; that each
company should send a deputy to the petrograd Soviet, the
decisions of which would determine the political activities
of military units and take precedence over any orders of
the Duma Military Commission; that the committees should
be allowed to keep arms; that the soldiers should enjoy

22Ibid., 396.

15
all civil liberties conferred by the Revolution; and that
all soldiers should be treated with more courtesy and
equality by their officers.23
That this order was generally obeyed b y rank-andfile soldiers made it an executive act of overriding
significance; thus, it was apparent immediately that the
real power in Russia resided in the Soviets, if they
chose to grasp it, rather than in the provisional Govern
ment.

On March 22, less than one week after his appoint

ment as Minister of war, Guchkov admitted as much in a
letter to General M. V. Alexseev, the Russian chief-ofStaff:
The Provisional Government possesses no real power
and its orders are executed only insofar as this is
permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies, which holds in its hands the most important
elements of actual power, such as troops, railroads,
postal and telegraph service,
it is possible to say
directly that the Provisional Government exists only
while this is permitted by the Soviet of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies. Especially in the military
department it is possible now only to issue orders
which do not basically conflict with the decisions
of the above mentioned Soviet.
The "dual power" certainly did not bode well for
the future of liberal-democratic elements.

It is there

fore not surprising that the first Provisional Government
lasted approximately two months.

Too conservative to remain

23Ibid., 372.
24Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 101.

long In favor in Petrograd, the immediate cause of its
downfall was its position on war aims.

Upon assuming the

position of Foreign Minister, Miliukov notified the Allies
that the Provisional Government would honor all treaties
entered into by its predecessors.

A few days later, the

Petrograd Soviet issued a statement to the "peoples of
the world" in which it expressed strong opposition to a
war of conquest.

In an attempt to reconcile the two

positions, the Provisional Government published a statement
on war aims on April 9 which pledged to secure a peace
based on the "self-determination of peoples."

included in

the statement, however, was a pledge to support "all obliga
tions assumed toward our allies."

Miliukov approved pub

lication with reluctance and prevented its transmission
to the Allies as a diplomatic note.

25

Although the petrograd Soviet viewed the April 9
statement as a modification of war aims, Miliukov continued
to insist that Russia receive territorial concessions.

His

position was made public following an interview on April
22 by a reporter from the Manchester Guardian.

in this

interview, Miliukov's statement that he hoped to gain the
Dardanelles for Russia indicated that he was as favorable
toward receiving a share of the spoils as had been any of
the Tsar's advisors.
25warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 46-

49.

17
Three days later, the Soviet reaffirmed its sup
port of the Provisional Government's April 9 statement on
war aims and suggested a conference with ’’ranee and England
for the express purpose of denouncing all territorial claims.
On that same day, and without Miliukov's knowledge,
Kerensky announced that the Provisional Government might
inform the Allies of a change in Russian war aims as indi
cated by the April 9 statement,

Miliukov insisted upon and

received a retraction of Kerensky's announcement.
Kerensky, nevertheless, had forced the issue, and
the Soviet demanded that the Provisional Government send
26
the April 9 Manifesto to the Allied capitals.
The Cabi
net sent the Manifesto and an explanatory note to the
Allied governments on May 1, 1917.

The note, however,

included a pledge to "observe the obligations assumed
toward our allies" and was, therefore, unacceptable to
the Soviet.

Consequently, on May 3, 1917, thousands of

soldier3 and workers marched on the Mariinsky Palace to
demand the resignation of Miliukov.

The demonstrations

continued the following day, and a clash between supporters
of the Soviet and the Foreign Minister resulted in the
death of several persons.

General Lavr Kornilov, com

mander of the petrograd District, ordered that troops be
sent to the Palace Square but was ignored by the soldiers

26Ibid., 54-55.

18
who looked to the Soviet for leadership.

Order was finally
27
restored by the Executive Committee of the Soviet.
The demonstrations of May 3 and 4 made Miliukov's
position in the government untenable.

Leaders of the

Petrograd Soviet recommended that he be transferred to
the Ministry of Education.

This solution was endorsed by

a majority of the cabinet as well as the Executive Commit
tee of the Kadets.

Miliukov, however, preferred to withdraw

from the Ministry.

His resignation was submitted on May 16,

three days after the resignation of Minister of War
Alexander Guchkov, a strong supporter of the Foreign
28
Minister.
On May 18, a new cabinet was formed.

This cabinet,

usually referred to as the First Coalition, represented a
significant shift of power within the Provisional Govern
ment.

Whereas the first government had included only one

socialist, six of the sixteen members of the First Coali
tion were socialists.

Prince Lvov remained as Prime Minister,

but Kerensky, Who had replaced Guchkov as Minister of W&r,
became the real power in the government.

Miliukov was

replaced as Foreign Minister by Tereshchenko, a change
Which did not cause any noticeable difference in Russian
foreign policy.
2*7Ibid. f 56-59.

28Ibid., 61-63.
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Perhaps one of the major changes in the government
resulted from a new policy of the petrograd Soviet which
no longer instructed its members to refrain from partici
pating in the government.

Although the Socialist parties

still did not assume a position of responsibility for
governmental actions, leading Socialists served the government with their parties' blessings.

Victor Chernov, leader

of the Socialist Revolutionary party, became the new
Minister of Agriculture and Heracles Tsereteli, a Menshevik,
was named Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.
The First Coalition, led by Kerensky, became con
vinced that Russia needed a successful military offensive
to consolidate Russian opinion and persuade persons of many
diverse political viewpoints to support the government.
The Allies were pleased by the planned offensive, but the
decision was made primarily because of domestic considera
tions.

The offensive, which was directed against the

Austrian Army in Galicia, began on July 1, 1917.

It was

halted after two weeks, and the Russian troops were thrown
back in such disorder as to imperil the entire Russian line.
The political repercussions in petrograd caused by the
military defeat were general disorder and rioting on July
16 and 17, usually known as the July Days.
The July Days were probably the unorganized actions
of some of the companies of the petrograd Garrison.

Although

they apparently did not organize the demonstrations, the
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Bolsheviks decided to accept the responsibility for having
organized them.

If there was any theme of unity during the

July Days, it was that the petrograd Soviet seize control
of the government.

The moderate leadership of the Soviet

was not prepared to assume such power.

On one occasion,

the angry mobs came close to lynching Chernov, one member
of the group that they desired as leaders, and might have
done so had not Trotsky intervened.

The July Days demon

strated that the radicalized masses were repudiating not
only the Provisional Government but the moderate leadership
in the Soviet as well.
The frustration, anger, and repudiation of modera
tion by the masses of soldiers, workers, and peasants are
easy to understand.

Since the Revolution, absolutely

nothing had been done to satisfy their immediate demands.
Bread was still scarce, the inflationary spiral continued
to outrun workers' wages, the land had not been given to
the peasants, and, worst of all as time progressed, the
war dragged on with no end in sight.

The temper of the

masses grew more radical and the reaction following the
July Days turned out to be no more than a temporary pause
in the swing of politics to the left.
Beginning in the summer of 1917, the masses,
cautious at first, began to move of themselves.
seized factories in the cities,

Workers

in the villages, peasants

satisfied their age-old land-hunger and seized the estates

of noble landlords, often avenging the humiliations of
centuries by murdering their former superiors and burning
their mansions,

in the army, peopled largely by peasants

in soldier's uniforms, news of the "Black partition"
occurring back home prompted countless millions to "vote
for peace with the legs," as Lenin put it.

Needless to

say, these mass desertions had a devastating effect on the
morale of those who stayed in the army.

To the common

Russian in 1917, "law and order" had no positive influence;
popular spontaneity was producing chaos and anarchy.
Against this tide were swimming Kerensky, the Provisional
Government, and the moderate leadership in the Soviet—
therein lay their fatal weakness.

As Trotsky remarked,

the Bolsheviks alone chose to accept the masses as history
had made t h e m —

therein lay their great strength.

There

fore, as might be expected, the Bolshevik setback in the
wake of the July Days was only temporary.
In an attempt to counteract the growing influence
of the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government circulated
documents which purported to prove that Lenir was in the
pay of the Germans, Which in fact he was.

Gradually, a

trend which favored the government developed among moderate
elements and, on July 18, Bolshevik headquarters were
raided and a few leaders were arrested.

Most of the

leaders, however, went into hiding so as to be able to
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emerge at a more advantageous time.

29

Following the July

Days, the Bolsheviks renounced temporarily their slogan
of "All Power to the Soviets" as they realized that the
only way they could gain control of the government was
through violence.

Also, as a result of the July Days, a

new government, known as the Second Coalition, was formed.
The Cabinet was headed by Kerensky who now assumed Prince
Lvov's position as well as his power.

For the first

time, the socialists outnumbered the non-Bocialists in
the cabinet and held eleven of the eighteen posts, but
they were the "wrong kind" of socialists as far as the
Russian masses were concerned.
Kerensky realized that he lacked a power base and
tried to create support for himself and his new government.
In late August, he called for a meeting of persons who
represented all political viewpoints,

it was held in

Moscow and was called the Moscow State Conference.

All

political factions were represented except the Bolsheviks
who boycotted the meeting.

Kerensky had intended the con

ference as a means through which he could gather political
support,

one of the most significant results, however, was

a heightened interest in and support for the conservative
General Lavr K o r n i l o v . ^
29Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 166-90.
30Warth, The Allies and The Russian Revolution. 119-

21.
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In early September occurred the roost conspicuous
effort by the political right to seize power.

This

incident, known as the Kornilov Affair, grew out of the
conservatives' belief that Kerensky was unwilling to use
the force necessary to prevent anarchy and restore order.
In actuality, this meant that the Soviets had to be curbed.
General Kornilov, who had replaced General Brusilov on
July 31 after the ill-fated July offensive, did not hide
his willingness to disperse the Soviets by force, if
necessary.

Thus, he became the rallying point for advocates

of a restoration of order.

Kerensky, well aware of Korni

lov's increasing strength and the threat this posed to his
government, removed him as Commander-in-Chief.
then ordered troops to march on Petrograd.

Kornilov

Running

scared, Kerensky called upon all elements to save the
Revolution from this right-wing threat.
elements responded vigorously,

Revolutionary

it was the hastily illegal-

ized Bolshevik party, however, which emerged as the chief
benefactor from the "Kornilov Affair" because it was the
most ardent and vocal defender of the continuation of the
Revolution in the face of counter-revolutionary forces.
Consequently, as Kornilov's forces approached the capital,
they were isolated, worked on by revolutionary agitators,
and finally melted into the mobs shouting their allegiance
to the revolution.
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The threat of counter-revolution represented by the
abortive Kornilov coup was very real to contemporary
Russians.

This menace, beginning with the July Days and

continuing into September, galvanized mass support for
the most radical party in Russia and eroded completely the
increasingly untenable position of any moderates.

By

September, the masses had spoken in no uncertain terms:
the results were chaos and anarchy.

As the most radical

element, the Bolsheviks rode the wave of mass spontaneity
to power.

Shortly after the Kornilov Affair, Lenin's

party won a majority in both the Petrograd and Moscow
Soviets.

The old slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" was

revived and took on an entirely different meaning.
The Third Coalition, already foredoomed to failure,
was formed on October 8 after more than three weeks of
confusion,

in order to free himself from any suspicion

of collusion with Kornilov, Kerensky punished all persons
involved.

But all of this was futile.

Kerensky, like so

many others in Russia in 1917, was being swept away b y the
whirlwind of Revolution.

Just about a month after it was

formed, the Third Coalition was cast into the garbage-bln
of history by the Bc-lshevik Revolution.
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Thus culminated a frenetic eight months in which
the Russian government was completely transformed.

Prom

the revolution precipitated by the collapse of tsarism
3Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 192-222.
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issued a regime professedly based on Marxian socialism.
None of this was inevitable,

in retrospect# it is fairly

clear why the Provisional Government failed.

But at the

time, few perceived these causal relationships and fewer
still understood them.
The Revolution# coming as it did during World war
I# was of particular concern to the Allied nations.

For

some time# the Allied camp had felt, erroneously, that
German sympathizers in the Tsar's government had hampered
the Russian war effort.

Consequently# the immediate

reaction in the western European press was that the Revolu
tion was due in large measure to Russian liberals who
desired a more vigorous prosecution of the war.

Even the

London Times, at the time considered a government organ,
described the political upheaval as a "win the war move32
ment."
The Allied nations soon began to have second
thoughts about the positive effect of the Russian Revolu
tion on the war.

Nevertheless, they continued to view

events in Russia within this narrow frame of reference.
The result was that "immediate national interests became
the sole guide of ^ l l i e d 7 politico-diplomatic judgments
32Warth, The Allies and The Russian Revolution,

27.

and policy decisions."
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The March Revolution also had a significant bearing
on United States-Russian relations.

Shortly before the

nations of Europe became involved in Ttorld w ar l f the rela
tionship between the united States and Russia had deterio
rated drastically.

As a result of the Russian political

upheaval in 1905, thousands of Russians fled their homeland,
and a large number of these political refugees found asylum
in the United States.

Their presence soon led to problems

between the two nations.

The first crisis developed in 1908

when the Russian embassy in Washington sought to have Janov
Fouren, a participant in the Revolution of 1905, entradited
under the provisions of the Russo-American treaty of 1893.
The Ambassador explained that Fouren was accused by the
Russian Government of non-political crimes, but the American
public believed otherwise,

organized opposition to Fouren's

extradition developed immediately.

The American Jewish

community, along with Socialist and labor organizations,
spearheaded the movement, but support came from all parts
of the nation,

in October, 1908, a united States commissioner

33Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New
Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven: Yale university Press,
1959), 66? The Allies were unable "to believe that anything
other than the war in Europe could be of real importance."
George P. Kennan, Russia and the West under henin and
Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 17.
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in New York ruled that Pouren was guilty of the charges
brought against him and would therefore be extradited.
This decision was reversed the following year when another
commissioner ruled that, although Pouren had committed
the crimes in question, he had been acting as a revolu
tionary and was therefore not subject to the provisions
of the 1893 treaty.

Similar cases developed involving

Christian Rudewitz and Yevgeni Azev, and, as in the case
of Pouren, extradition was refused on the grounds that
34
their actions were of a political nature.
The anti-Tsarist feeling expressed in support for
Pouren and other Russian exiles was soon transferred to
a movement for the termination of the Russo-American
commercial treaty of 1832.

This long-standing treaty in

cluded the customary provision for the reciprocal right
of entry and travel for the citizens of each country.
This clause created no difficulties until the last few
years of the 19th century.

At that time, Russia began to

curtail the rights of Jewish citizens who, in turn, emi
grated in large numbers to Western Europe and the united
States in order to avoid persecution.

A problem soon

arose when these Russian Jews, now naturalized American
citizens, attempted to return to Russia for business and
^^Thomas Andrew Bailey, America Faces Russia;
Russlan-American Relations From The Early Tiroes To Our
Day (Glouchester, Mass.:
Peter Smith, 1964), 209-14.
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personal reasons,

in some instances, these individuals

were denied entry into Russia.

Even when allowed entry,

they were frequently subjected to the same restrictions
as jews of Russian citizenship.

To many Americans, non-

Jewish as well as Jewish, this was a flagrant violation of
the Treaty of 1832 and an affront to American citizenship.
The result was that by 1909 Congress had received numerous
requests for an investigation of this discriminatory treat
ment of American Jews.

These requests, coupled with the

furor created by the extradition cases, prompted Congress
to pass a joint resolution asking for renegotiation of
the 1832 treaty.

President Theodore Roosevelt signed the

Congressional resolution in March, 1909, just before he
left office.
For two years, the State Department attempted to
carry out the Congressional request but found the Russian
Foreign Office in no hurry to negotiate a solution.

By

1911, Congress began to consider resolutions calling for
the abrogation of the treaty.

The impetus for this move

ment came primarily from the Jewish community but, as in
the extradition cases, support was received from all seg
ments of the American public.
in December, 1911, the House of Representatives,
with only one dissenting vote, passed a resolution which
bluntly charged the Russians with having violated the 1832
treaty and requested president Taft to give formal notice
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of termination.

The President, after an unsuccessful

attempt to obtain from Russia a joint statement of abro
gation, informed the Russians that the treaty would be
35
terminated on December 31, 1912.
Although hostile on the surface, Russlan-American
relations did not deteriorate after 1912 as rapidly as
some had expected.

In fact, even in the absence of a

commercial treaty, trade between the two countries was
36
maintained at its former level.
For two years, the
United States had no ambassador in Russia.

As World War

I approached, President Woodrow Wilson remedied the situa
tion by the appointment of George

t

. Marye in 1914.

The

Russian government accepted the new Ambassador with reluc
tance.

By the end of his brief tour in petrograd, however,

Marye had gained the respect of the Emperor's Court.

When

Marye was withdrawn at his own request in March, 1916, the
Russian government considered the move an affront.

Thus

was created in Petrograd a climate of suspicion which
Marye1s successor, David R. Francis, found very difficult
37
to overcome.
35Ibid., 216-20.
36George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917
20; Russia Leaves The War (Princeton, N.J.;
Princeton
University Press, 1956), I, 33.
3?Marye gave poor health as the reason for his re
quest to be recalled.
Later, he said that "Political
combinations had arisen at home which affected me and . . .
I felt impelled to withdraw." Kennan, Russia Leaves The
War, 34.

Obviously, during the last few years of Tsarist
Russia's existence, Russo-American relations were in need
of improvement.

The opportunity for rapport came suddenly

in 1917 with the almost simultaneous events of the March
Revolution and American entry into World war I.
President Woodrow Wilson, who would play the
leading role in establishing a policy toward the Russian
Provisional Government, was an admitted novice in the area
of international affairs.

Shortly before he became presi

dent, he wrote to a friend, "it would be the irony of fate
if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign
38
affairs."
And yet, during the second half of his first
administration and throughout his second, Wilson found it
necessary to devote almost all of his time to an area in
Which he had little experience.

Historians agree that
39
Wilson was ill-prepared in this field,
and one, Who
found "no evidence that /ffilsor\7 ever studied the details
of any foreign issue," described the President as "woe
fully ignorant" of conditions Which brought war to Burope
38Arthur S. Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," Earl
Latham (ed.), The Philosophy And Policies of Woodrow Wilson
(Chicago: The university of Chicago Press, 1958), 147.
■^in preparation for the presidency, Wilson "gave
little thought to the conduct of foreign affairs." John
Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality
(Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1956), 84; "Wilson1 s
training as a diplomatist . . . was exclusively theoretical.
Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," 147.
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in 1914.
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Prior to assuming the presidency, Wilson had de

voted most of his attention to domestic problems,

in his

writings about governmental matters he had barely touched
upon foreign affairs.

After the Spanish-American war,

Wilson began to express more interest in this area, but a
leading Wilson scholar suggests that this was "superficial
and reflected more the faddish thought of the time than an
astute understanding of what was taking place."

Even

during the presidential campaign of 1912, Wilson never
discussed foreign issues unless they were also current
domestic issues.

41

Through the years, however, Wilson had studied
various governments and consequently brought with him
to the White House a concept of the nature of government
which he would use as the basis of his foreign policy.
A significant element in Wilson's view of politics and
foreign affairs was his devotion to Christian precepts.
Xn issues of "basic Christian faith," Arthur S. Link
judges that the President "was like a little child, never
doubting, always believing."
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He believed that moral

40William L. Langer, "Woodrow Wilson: His Educa
tion in World Affairs," Earl Latham (ed.). The Philosophy
And Policies of Woodrow Wilson, 167-68.
41Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," 151.

42Ibid., 150-51.

laws were applicable to nations as well as to men.

That

"God controlled history and used men and nations in the
unfolding of His plan according to His purpose," Wilson
had no doubt.

A Wilsonian idea which greatly affected

his attitude toward foreign affairs was his firm belief
that democracy constituted the "most humane and Christian
form of government."

The result was that he believed that

any society capable of establishing a government would, if
43
given a choice, select democracy.
Wilson, therefore,
visualized the role of the united States as that of fur
nishing moral leadership in order to assist the less
fortunate areas of the world in acquiring the desired
political institutions.
Wilson's tendency to emphasize ideals and princi
ples in his conduct of foreign affairs ultimately resulted
in pitfalls.

With respect to his attitude toward Russia

between the March and November Revolutions, Wilson's
policy was restricted by his belief that a responsible
and enlightened government would ultimately emerge as
44
the result of free elections.
Another important aspect of Wilson's conduct of
foreign affairs was his tendency to reserve for himself
the final responsibility for making decisions in foreign
43ibid., 152-54.

44Xbid., 155-59.
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affairs.

For all practical purposes, Wilson was "his own

Secretary of State."

45

This situation arose from his

idea that in the area of international relations the
powers of the president were almost unlimited.

As he put

it clearly in 1907, "The initiative in foreign affairs,
which the President possesses without any restrictions
whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolute
ly."4^

And Wilson applied this principle once he became

President, even to the exclusion of his own advisors.

47

Consequently, foreign diplomats frequently by-passed
Secretary of State Robert Lansing and dealt directly with
48
the President.
An additional basis for this attitude may
have been, as Link contends, Wilson's "awareness of his own
intellectual superiority over most of his associates, and,
45Kennan, Russia Leaves The W a r , 28.
48Quoted in Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist,11 160.
47Wilson "failed systematically to consult the expert
intelligence in the executive departments and the foreign
service." Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of
Morality, 85; 11/n / o President was ever in more complete
control of the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs
than Woodrow Wilson . . .
in the broad outline of his
foreign policy and the principal decisions implementing
it, Wilson was remarkably independent of his advisers."
Robert Endicott Osgood, ideals and Self-interest in America1s Foreign Relations; The Great Transformation Of
The Twentieth Century (Chicago;
The University of Chicago
Press, 1955), 172.
48Kennan, Russian Leaves The W a r , 30.

above all, in his urge to dominate."
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Historians who have described Wbodrow Wilson's
conduct of foreign affairs as "Missionary Diplomacy" have
generally agreed that Wilson attempted to impose his own
concepts of morality upon other nations.

An excellent

example of this tendency as well as Wilson's attitude
toward revolutions appears in the first diplomatic crisis
which confronted the new president.

On February 22, 1913,

Francisco I. Madero, a Mexican liberal whose government had
been recognized by president Taft, was executed by the
revolutionary forces of General victoriana Huerta.

Taft

decided to take no position with respect to the new govern
ment but would Instead allow Wilson, who would be inaugurated
within the week, to handle the problem.

Wilson refused to

acknowledge the Huerta regime, believing that to do so
might encourage government by assassination in other areas
of Latin America.

This strategy of non-recognition,

announced on March 11, 1913, reversed the historic policy
whereby the United States had extended diplomatic recognition to de facto governments.
in dealing with the Mexican problem, Wilson demon
strated little respect for or confidence in career diplomats
and relied increasingly upon "amateur diplomatists and
49Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," 160.
50Howard Francis Cline, The United States and Mexico
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 139-62.

special agents."

John Lind, one such agent in whom

Wilson placed great trust, was ignorant of Mexican problems, spoke no Spanish, and was anti-Catholic as well.
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This tendency to rely upon personal agents, most of them
amateurs in diplomacy, was coming to characterize Wilson's
efforts in international relations.

The Root Mission of

1917 would be a striking example.
Once Wilson determined his proper course of action
toward Mexico, he did not hesitate to use military inter
vention "to force the Mexicans to behave according to his
standard.11 In April, 1914, American naval forces bom
barded vera Cruz, and United States Marines then entered
the city, a move that soon forced the overthrow of the
Mexican government.

For the next four years Wilson

attempted to influence the course of events in the Mexican
Revolution through the support of various revolutionary
leaders.

As he confided to a British diplomat, "I am

going to teach the South /sic7 American republics to
52
elect good men."
Wilson apparently learned little from his ex
perience with the Mexican Revolution.

After years of

5•'■Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor; Woodrow
Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 31-32.
52William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Company,
Inc., 1959), 64.
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intrigue and intervention, the united states withdrew from
Mexico with no apparent success, and almost immediately
became involved in a much larger and more significant
53
revolution in Russia.
When news of the March Revolution reached the
United States, the President and most of the American
public welcomed it and anticipated the establishment of
a government similar to thoBe of Western Europe,

Both

Wilson and his Secretary of State had a very limited
knowledge of Russian history and institutions, and, un
fortunately, they received inadequate advice from the
so-called "Russian experts" in the United States.

This

deficiency prevented a realistic view of events in

,

Russia. 54
Wilson was also misled by the statements of the
leaders of the Provisional Government.

Their pledge to

hold a constituent assembly in the near future in order
to determine a permanent form of government led Wilson
^ T h e most succinct account of Wilson's inter
vention in the Revolution is in Howard Cline, The United
States and Mexico, 139-188; Robert Quirk, An Affair of
Honor is authoritative on the vera Cruz expedition.
Volumes ix through V of Arthur S. Link, Wilson (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956-1965), contain superbly
detailed chapters dealing with Wilson's Mexican policy
between 1913 and 1917.
For the 1917-18 period, see
Clarence c. clendenen. Blood on the Border; The United
States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York; The
Macmillan Company, 1969).
^4This lack of reliable information is discussed
in Chapter III below.
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to assume that the results would he a western-style demo
cracy.

in view of his own faith in human nature and his

unqualified acceptance of democracy as the best of all
forms of government, it was impossible for him to believe
otherwise.

The Provisional Government also issued

unqualified assurances of its intention to pursue the war
effort.

It was upon these assurances and Wilson's own

beliefs that he established his policy toward the Russian
Provisional Government:

to promote the stability of the

Provisional Government and to encourage Russia to retain
55
her position as an effective military force in the war.

5^Kennan, Russia.■ Leaves The W a r , 12-23? "in w a r 
time Russia, Wilsonians sought initially to buttress the
pro-Allied liberal-nationalistic regime of the March
Revolution, in order to save the moral and material
strength of a liberalized Russia for the anti-German
Coalition.'' N. Gordan Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson And
Wbrld Politics: America1s Response to War and Revolution
(New York: Oxford University press, 19687, 7.

CHAPTER II
DECISION TO SEND MISSION
On the evening of April 2, 1917, before a joint
session of the united States Congress, President Woodrow
Wilson requested a declaration of war against Germany.

In

the course of his message, Wilson directed the attention
of Congress to the recent revolution in Russia which he
described as "wonderful and heartening."

Wilson suggested

that Russia was now "a fit partner for a league of honour
/sic7."

The Russian people would now.be able to fight

more effectively for "freedom in the world, for justice,
and for peace."^
Wilson's reference to Russia indicated two ways
the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, might affect
American participation in World war I.

Coming as it did

immediately prior to America's entry into the war, the
Revolution strengthened Wilson's claim that the war was
a struggle between democracy and autocracy,

of more signi

ficance to Wilson was the possibility that the political
upheaval in Russia would increase its military effective
ness in the war.

in a few weeks, however, it became

^-George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves The W a r , 18.
38
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apparent that the exact opposite might occur, and many
Americans began to reconsider their enthusiasm for the
March Revolution.
During a cabinet meeting on March 20, 1917, less
than two weeks after news of the Tsar's abdication reached
America, Secretary of State Robert Lansing suggested that
the Russian Revolution made the European war a conflict
between the forces of democracy and absolutism, thus
making American entry into the war more acceptable.

Al

though agreeing that events in Russia had "in a way
changed conditions," the president explained to his
Cabinet that he "could not give that as reason for war."

2

The American people, however, were more willing
than their president to accept the Tsar's abdication as
further justification for entry into the war to end all
3
wars.
News of the Revolution occasioned in America a
kind of spontaneous rejoicing that Russia had overthrown
its monarch and joined the ranks of the world's democracies.

4

2Jbid., 14-16; E. David Cronon (ed.), The Cabinet
Diaries of Josephus Daniels 1913-1921 (Lincoln, Neb.:
University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 117.
^Leonid Ivan strakhovsky, American opinion About
Russia, 1917-1920 (Toronto: university of Toronto Press,
1961), 4-6? Robert D. Warth, The Allies And The Russian
Revolution, 27; and Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals
and the Russian Revolution (New York: Columbia university
Press, 1962), 14-16.
^Lasch, American Liberals and the Russian Revolu
tion, 21-22.
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Many Americans, who knew little of Russian history
and less of contemporary conditions, became keenly
interested in and sought additional information about
recent political developments.

George Kennan, a recog

nized authority and author of several works "on tsarist
Russia, recorded in his diary, "Since the first news of
the Russian Revolution our telephone has rung every twenty
minutes or so from morning to night, and letters and
invitations to speak have poured in on me faster than
I could answer them."

5

Mass meetings were held throughout the country to
express sympathy and encouragement for the new government,
one meeting, chaired by Alton B. Parker, was held in the
Manhattan Opera House in New York city and inc luded among
its sponsors former Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin,
the president of the American Federation of Labor Samuel
Gompers, New York Mayor John P. Mitchel, former Ambassador
to England Joseph H. Choate, and Charles Evans Hughes,
Presidential candidate for the Republican Party in 1916.
Following the meeting, the American Committee for the
Encouragement of Democratic Government in Russia was
formed.

Most of the committee's work consisted of encou

raging the governors and legislatures of the several states
5George Kennan, "Diary," March 19, 1917, George
Kennan Papers, Box 24 (Division.of Manuscripts, Library
of Congress).
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to send messages of support to the Provisional Government.
An American in Russia probably reflected public
opinion accurately when he explained,

"So long as Russia

was an autocracy we could see no essential difference
between either side . . .

But the moment there came the

wonderful news of your magnificent revolt all this began
to change.

We saw then that the conflict was between the

fundamental principles of autocracy and democracy."
Similar views were expressed by Russians.

7

George Kennan

was informed by a Russian friend that "we can /now/7 join
hands with your America and with all the free nations of
the world, not only in this war but in all our succeeding
life . . . without blushing for our country and A?lth7 a
feeling of real brotherhood."

8

A Russian newspaper con

cluded that there was "no doubt" that the Russian Revolu
tion "hastened the decision of the head of the great
8Charles R. Flint, Memories of an Active Life
(New York and London: G. P. Putnam's, 1923), 231-33.
^Charles Edward Russell, "Address of Charles
Edward Russell at the Demonstration in Behalf of the
Soldiers at Pavlosk-Voksal, June 30, 1917," Charles
Edward Russell Papers, Vol. 7, No. 1164, (Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
8Mrs. Ann Petrunkevitch to George Kennan, April
21/8, 1917, George Kennan papers, Box 3 (New York
Public Library, New York).

g
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transatlantic republic to break definitely with Germany."

q

This certainly exaggerated the significance of the Russian
Revolution in determining American foreign policy.

The

Revolution, however, made an already established policy
more acceptable to the American public.
Of far greater importance to the American govern
ment was whether the political upheaval in Russia would
affect the country's ability to continue the war effort.
Conservative Americans became increasingly aware that the
Revolution might weaken Russia's contribution and con
ceivably remove her as an active belligerent."1*0
Prom the outset, Secretary Lansing's policy toward
the Provisional Government was dictated primarily by his
estimation of its ability to continue the war.

Shortly

after the Tsar's abdication, David R. Francis, the American
Ambassador in petrograd, urgently requested that the united
States extend diplomatic recognition to the new government.
He explained that representatives of the government had
assured him that Russia would "vigorously prosecute the
^"Translation of Article from the oddeskiya Novosti,
Odessa Russia, May 30/June 12, 1917," enclosed in John A.
Ray to Robert Lansing, June 6, 1917, Document Number 861.00/
446, State Department Records (Record Group 59, National
Archives). A limited amount of the diplomatic corres
pondence pertaining to the Root Mission can be found in
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States;
Russia, 1918. 3 vols.
(Washington: Government
Printing office, 1931-32.)
■^Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 3-9.
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war."

Francis, overly optimistic about the political

situation, informed the State Department that there was
"no opposition to /the/ provisional government" and
"absolute quiet prevails here and throughout Russia. 11^
Lansing received Francis' request on the same day he
received assurances from Paul N. Miliukov, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the new government would
"continue to respect the international undertakings made
12
by the fallen regime."
The State Department reacted immediately.

Within

twelve hours after receiving Francis' request, authoriza
tion for the American Ambassador to extend diplomatic
recognition to the Provisional Government was on its way
to petrograd.

13

Less than an hour after receipt of

Lansing's telegram, Francis called on Miliukov and made
arrangements to be received by the President of the
Council of Ministers, George E. Lvov.

At 4:30 on the

■•■^David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, March 18, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/284, St. Dept. Lansing also received assur
ances from the American minister in Stockholm that the revo
lution had been "general throughout the Empire" and in
Petrograd and Moscow had been "entirely successful."
Ira
Nelson Morris to Robert Lansing, March 19, 1917, Doc. No.
861.00/285, St. Dept.
*-2paul Miliukov to Robert Lansing, March 19, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/285, St. Dept.
■^Robert Lansing to David r . Francis, March 20, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/284, St. Dept.
Notwithstanding the prompt
action of the State Department, Ambassador Francis sent two
additional messages urging prompt action; one undated and
received by the Department March 21, 1917, and the other
dated March 21, 1917.
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afternoon of March 22, 1917, Ambassador Francis, accompa
nied by his staff and military and naval attaches, read
to the Provisional Cabinet a statement extending full
diplomatic recognition to the new government.14
Two weeks later, Secretary Lansing pointed out to
President Wilson that the United States had recognized
the new government but had not “congratulated the Russian
Government or people upon the establishment of democratic
institutions."

He therefore proposed sending a message

through Ambassador Francis "going a little further than
15
we did in the telegram of recognition."
On April 6,
1917, Wilson approved Lansing's draft with only "a verbal
change here and there."

The message was liberally sprinkled

with such phrases as "new bond of friendship" and followed
the same pattern as those which had so recently emanated
16
from private sources in America.
Three days later, April 9, 1917, Secretary Lansing
suggested to the President that the United States take a
further step in its efforts to encourage Russia.

His

14David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, March 22,
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/294, St. Dept.,* and David R. Francis
to Robert Lansing, March 22, 1917, Doc. No. 861.00/296,
St . Dept.
■^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 5, 1917,
Robert Lansing, war Memoirs, (Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1935), 332.

16Ibid., 333.

action was prompted by a letter from William Phillips,
Assistant Secretary of State.

Phillips' concern grew

from a conversation he had on the sixth of April with
Lieutenant Zinori pechkov, the adopted son of Russian
novelist Maxim Gorky.

When asked how the united States

"could most help Russia," Pechkov suggested that Phillips
"ask the president to send to Russia at once a commission
of three men to speak to the Russian people."
a commission consisting of "an Intellectual"

He proposed
(and sug

gested Professor Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia univer
sity), a "prominent and vigorous lawyer," and "a man of
high rank, for example, an ex-ambassador."

Hie Russian

visitor felt that they should be joined by "two or three
younger men who could mingle with the young men of Russia."
To Pechkov, a commission such as this "would go far toward
creating a solid foundation of mutual understanding between
17
the two people."
The Secretary of State believed that
Phillips' letter contained "a suggestion which should be
carefully considered."

He reported to Wilson that the

proposed coromisdion "would encourage and strengthen the
new government and would create an atmosphere of friend
ship which would be very helpful in future negotiations."18
17William Phillips to Robert Lansing, April 7, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3799^5, St. Dept.
18Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 9, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3799^5, St. Dept.

The president made no response.
Two days later, Russian Ambassador George Bakhmetev
warned Lansing that the Provisional Government "will not
last" and that the Socialists "may get the upper hand and
make peace with Germany."

19

That same day the state

Department received from Ambassador Francis a dispatch
lacking his earlier optimism.

Describing the Russian naval

situation as "precarious" and that of the Army as "not
wholly satisfactory,” Francis suggested that "everything
possible be promptly done to strengthen /the7 situation,"
as there were elements in Russia "urging peace."

20

Lansing informed the President that the Francis
dispatch had caused him "serious concern" and repeated his
earlier request that a commission be sent to Russia, thus
enabling the united States to "do something to prevent the
socialist element in Russia from carrying out any plan
which will destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers."

21

Similar recommendations, Wilson replied, had reached him
from "a number of quarters," and the President was "inclined
to think that it would be a good idea to send one . . .
^ R o b e r t Lansing, "Desk Diary," April 11, 1917,
Robert Lansing papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library
of Congress).
20David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 10,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.
^ R o b e r t Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 11, 1917,
Doc. No. 3771, St. Dept.
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practically at once.'1

Lansing telegraphed to Francis

to "discretely /sic7 ascertain from Miliukoff" his views
about such a mission, whose purpose would be to "consult
with the Russian Government as to the best means of
cooperation /in the war effort/ and to convey a message
23
of good will from the United States."1
Within a few days, Francis replied that Miliukov
had "no objection" to the proposed mission, and that it
would be welcomed by the Russian government.
cluded his "personal view oh the subject."

Francis in
He suggested

that the group should direct its efforts "first and mainly
to successful prosecution of war . . .

be very discreet,"

and avoid "giving expressions to views concerning internal
affairs."

Although Francis did not object openly to the

mission, he emphasized that good relations had been estab
lished with the Provisional Government as a result of early
diplomatic recognition and suggested,

"We should be careful
24
to avoid anything likely to detract from a good record.11

His true feeling, however, was that the mission would make
his work in Russia more difficult.
family Francis wrote,

To a member of his

"I don't know what effect their

22Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
23Robert Lansing to David r . Francis, April 14,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4001A, St. Dept.
24David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 19,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4002, St. Dept.
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coming will have and sometimes wish that they were not
coining as my relationships with this Government are so
good now that I feel they will be injured rather than benefitted by the injection of any new element.1'25
Anticipating a favorable response from the provisional
Government, President Wilson and Lansing had already begun
selecting the members for the special diplomatic mission.
The group would ultimately consist of nine men representing
diverse elements of American society and be headed by an
aging leader of the Republican party, former Secretary of
State Elihu Root.
It is impossible to determine with any degree of
accuracy who first suggested sending the special diplomatic
mission to Russia.

When Lansing presented the proposal to

Wilson he was informed that the idea had already reached
Wilson from several sources.

Wilson would later name his
26
advisor Colonel E. M, House as an early sponsor.
oscar S.
Straus of New York played a prominent role in encouraging
interest in such a mission and has been recognized by

historians as well as contemporaries as the first to
25David R. Francis to Perry Francis, May 16/29,
1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "May 1917" (Missouri
Historical Society Library;
St. Louis, Missouri).
26Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
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suggest the idea.

27

But the idea of a mission had been

discussed in many circles.
As early as April 7, 1917, The New York Times
carried a story, datelined "London April 6," that Russian
sources indicated that "an American commission of national
character would be welcomed in Russia" and that "its co
operation with the new Government would be of inestimable
value now and for the future."

28

An American Army officer

attached to the Boot Mission recalled in his memoirs that,
at the time of America's entry into the war, "the word
'mission* had taken on a new importance for Americans."
French and British "missions" to the United States had
stirred the nation with excitement.

"The whole country

was in its first paroxysm of war-fever and everybody was
in a prodigious hurry to do something; do it at once, and,
above all, do it in Europe."

29

Perhaps the most important promoter of American
assistance to Russia and one who has been neglected or
ignored by historians was Stanley Washburn, an American
journalist who in 1917 had recently returned from Russia
27

"You originated the idea of a commission and
were the first to suggest it." George Kennan to Oscar
Straus, April 27, 1917, George Kennan Papers, b o x 8
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
28The New York Times, April 7, 1917, 1.
29T . Bentley Mott, Twenty Years As Military
Attach'^ (New Yorks oxford University Press, 1937), 194.
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where he had served as a war correspondent for The London
Times.

Washburn arrived in Washington on March 28, 1917,

and contacted Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad and Chairman of the Advisory Committee
of the National Defense Committee.

With Willard's

assistance, Washburn presented his ideas about railroad
assistance for Russia to the National Defense committee
30
three days later.
Washburn was concerned primarily with improving the
railroad system, particularly the Trans-Siberian road.

He

suggested that a commission of "eight or ten of the best
of railroad men in America" be sent to assist the re
organization of the railway system.

The group would make

recommendations to the provisional Government and "if
necessary suggest taking over the actual operations from
31
the Pacific to Moscow."
Washburn's suggestions impressed the National
Defense Committee, which included six members of Wilson's
Cabinet.

The chairman later stated that although "many

men of distinction" had appeared before the Committee,
30Stanley Washburn to Lord Northcliff, April 6,
1917, Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1 (Division of Manu
scripts, Library of congress).
3IIbid.; and "Minutes of Special Joint Meeting of
the council of National Defense- and Advisory Commission,
March 31, 1917," Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 451
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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“none of therp, not a single man, received the close atten32
tion which he /washburn,7 received."
Willard recognized
Washburn as the originator of the railroad commission and
wrote to him:
But for your own efforts to stimulate interest in
this particular matter, it is doubtful if such a
commission would have gone at all, and in any event
it would not have started at this time. The first
recommendation which was made to the Council of
National Defense /sic7 concerning such action by our
government, was based wholly upon your personal
appeal to me. I know, because I presented the
matter to the Council.33
Washburn also hoped that something could be done
to help stabilize the political situation.

Xn March,

Washburn had written his London publisher that things "seem
to be going extremely well and we must hope for continuity
of the present system of Government established by the
Revolution."

The Allies "must not overlook the possibility

of a reaction from this spasm in the form of a contrarevolution."

Washburn believed the political left

constituted an even greater threat to the military
effectiveness of the provisional Government.

"This

sweeping democratic movement may become so top-heavy that
32Josephus Daniels, "Diary," March 31, 1917, Josephus
Daniels Papers, Box 3; and Ann W. Lane and Louise H. Hall
(eds.), The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, personal and
Political (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), 243; and Daniel
Willard to Mrs. Stanley Washburn, April 10, 1917, Stanley
Washburn Papers, Box 1.
33Daniel Willard to Stanley Washburn, May 6, 1917,
Stanley Washburn papers. Box 1.
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fanatic radicals will over-rule the moderate and if the
German drive should develop successfully on the Russian
front we may again see talk of an independent peace.
Washburn felt that the only effective method of
assuring pro-Allied sentiment in Russia was by reaching
"the hearts of the common people."

He saw

"an enormous

increase of pro-ally publicity" as the best method of
assuring this relationship and of counteracting the
potentially dangerous radical influence in Russia.

He

emphasized the need for immediate action:
Now while the Russian Government is with us is
the time to develop and push every form of publi
cation which can reach the common people in Russia
so that in case this Government by misadventure is
weakened or over-thrown we have not lost the oppor
tunity of reaching the heart of Russia which would
ultimately dominate foreign relations.
Finally, Washburn expected a "difficult summer."

Any

"serious reverse" in the Russian military situation "would
at once create the background for a reactionary attack on
the present government and an equally dangerous radical
demand for cessation of the war."

35

Washburn's role as one of the first, if not the
first, to create interest in aiding the Allied cause through
assistance to Russia has been neglected.

Not only was he

^ S t a n l e y Washburn to Lord Northcllff, March 23,
1917, Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1.
35lbid.
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directly responsible for suggesting the Railroad Commis
sion, but his ideas about publicity make him one of the
first to envision an expanded diplomatic mission to
Russia in the summer of 1917.
On May 22, 1917, Secretary Lansing instructed
Ambassador Francis to inform the Russian Foreign Minister
that the Root Mission was being sent "primarily to manifest
to the Russian Government and people the deep sympathetic
feelings which exist among all classes in America for the
36
adherence of Russia to the principle of democracy."
President Wilson described the Mission's purpose as an
attempt "to convey to the Provisional Government of Russia
the congratulations of the Government of the united States
on the formation of the new Government and to arrange for
the cooperation of the two Governments in matters in which
37
they are mutually interested."
Thus, in their official
statements, the secretary of State .and the President
limited the objectives of the Mission to good-will and
fact-finding.
In addition to the stated purpose, other considera
tions prompted the decision to send the Mission to Russia.
36

Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, May 22, 1917,
found in Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (eds.),
The Russian Provisional Government, 1917; Documents (Stan
ford:
Stanford university Press,1961), II, 113.
37Woodrow Wilson to Provisional Government of Russia
/no date/7, Elihu Root Papers, Box 136 (Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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Originally, Lansing had suggested that the group he used
to "prepare the way to negotiate a new treaty with Russia
which will secure satisfactory commercial relations after
the war is over."
abroad.

38

The possibility did not go unnoticed

Post Wheeler reported from Tokyo that the Japanese

press viewed the proposed mission as an attempt to establish favorable economic relations with the new government.

39

Wilson, however, decided to exclude any such task from
the Mission's duties, and the members were instructed to
refrain from any discussions on the topic of a commercial
treaty.

40
Many Americans, among them some of Wilson's closest

advisors, felt that another goal of the Mission should be
to assist the Provisional Government in preventing the
41
takeover by more radical elements.
The possibility of
a movement toward a separate peace sponsored by persons
referred to as "radical," '^socialistic, " or "anarchist"
38Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 9, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3799%, St. Dept.
39Post Wheeler, charged d'Affaires ad interum, Tokyo,
to Robert Lansing, May 5, 1917, Doc. NO. 763.72/4959, St.
Dept.
4°see below.

Chapter on Finance.

^ o s c a r Straus, one of the first to suggest the Mis
sion, told George Kennan in a telephone conversation that
the purpose of the proposed Mission should be to help the
Provisional Government in all possible ways and "particu
larly in its struggle with Socialists and radicals." George
Kennan, "Diary," April 9, 1917, George Kennan Papers, Box
24 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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seemed to be the most dangerous threat to the Russian war
effort.

Many observers warned Lansing of this danger.

On

March 20, 1917, he received a message from the American
Ambassador in Stockholm that if the present "moderate
party" remains in power the results of the recent political
changes would be beneficial.

If, however,

"control passed

into the hands of /the? extremist party /the7 outcome is
42
more doubtful."
Francis also warned that elements in
Russia were "urging peace" and suggested that "everything
43
possible be promptly done to strengthen situation."
On the same day that Wilson approved the Root
Mission, Henry Morgenthau requested that something be done
to "prevent any internal disturbance in Russia at this
44
time."
The idea of helping Russia and the Allied war
effort by preventing a radical takeover in Russia was
fairly common in the American press.

45

It is, therefore,

not surprising that some analysts in the united States
42

Ira Nelson Morris to Robert Lansing, March 19,
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/285, St. Dept.
43David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 10,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.
44

Henry Morgenthau to Robert Lansing, April 12,
1917, Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 26, No. 4532.
45Strakhovsky, American opinion About Russia, 6-9;
*3316 New York Times quoted Count Ilya Tolstoy, son of the
Russian literary figure, as suggesting, "The only thing I
fear . . . is that the Socialists of the.extreme left will
be too radical." The New York Times, April 28, 1917, 12.
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viewed the Root Mission and Root's role in particular as
that of offering "wise counsel" in order to "stem the
current of the forces of radicalism."

4-6

There can be no doubt that Lansing envisioned the
Mission as a way to prevent the possibility of a "radical"
overthrow of the Provisional Government,

in his request

for a Mission on April llf 1917, he stated,

“I wish we

could do something to prevent the socialistic element in
Russia from carrying out any plan which will destroy the
47
efficiency of the Allied powers."
President Wilson was.^not as direct as his Secretary
of State but no doubt shared Lansing's opinion.

When

Charles R. Crane, upon his departure for Russia immediately
after the March Revolution, asked Wilson if he had any
message to convey to the Russian people, Wilson replied,
"Oh, no, I do not know much about their problems and they
probably understand what is needed."

He added, however,

"People are much controlled by political habit and if the
Provisional Government can accomplish the essential things
they are after and hold old forms they would probably get

12 .

4®Editorial in The New York Times, April 28, 1917,

^7Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 11, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.
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on easier and make more progress."^*8

When asked by a

leader in the suffragette movement to give assistance to
the women in Russia, Wilson replied that he was in sym
pathy with the movement but felt that any "political
guidance on our part" would be resented.

The Russians

would react in a way "that would be detrimental to the
interest of the country and to the relations of Russia
49
and the united States."
There is no indication that Root or any member of
the Mission received any instructions to try to prevent
a radical coup,

in fact, they were cautioned to refrain

from any statements Which could be interpreted as inter
ference in Russia's domestic politics.
One way in which Root and his group could have
played an important role in American-Russian relations
would have been by a clarification of American war aims.
Root, however, was specifically instructed to avoid any
Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 203,
Charles r . Crane papers (Columbia University Library, Mew
York). The view that Wilson did not hesitate to use
American military and economic power in an attempt to
create a new world political order is found in N. Gordon
Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and Wbrld Politics; America's
Response to War and Revolution (New York; oxford univer
sity Press, 1968). See also Arno J. Mayer, Political
Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Havens Yale
university Press, 1959).
48Woodrow Wilson to Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, May
8, 1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64B
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

discussion of the topic, since the president was reserving
this problem for himself.

Wilson's dilemma over the

question of war aims stemmed from what many Russians con
sidered a shift in policy by the United States following
its entry into the war.

Wilson's "peace Without Victory"

speech before the united States Senate on January 22, 1917,
was translated in Russia into the slogan "no annexation, no
indemnities."

Miliukov, whose foreign policy differed in

n o great degree from that of the Tsar,

50

felt compelled

to explain Wilson's statement to his countrymen.

Stating

categorically that "peace without victory, proposed by
President Wilson is inadmissable for the Allies," Miliukov
explained that the phrase was being used incorrectly and
out of context with the President's broader views.

When

"all the ideas" of Wilson were examined it could be seen
that "the president's statements imperiously demand the
very continuation of the war by the Allies to a victorious
end."

"peace without annexation" would be acceptable only

if the word annexation were interpreted as "conquest.'.'

But

in the same statement, Miliukov talked of "fixing the map
of Europe on lines that will exclude every possibility
of a new international catastrophe," "the settlement of
national historical questions" and "the fixing of frontiers
in

accord with national endeavors" as examples of "broad
50warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 48.

59
international questions" suitable for consideration by
the Allies once the war was over.

51

At this point,

President Wilson's position on war aims was closer to
those of the soviets than to those of Miliukov.
President Wilson was informed by several advisors
that an official statement on American war aims was
desirable.

Lansing forwarded to the President an urgent
52
request from Francis,
who had recently conferred with
the officials of the Provisional Government,

afre Ambassa

dor explained to the state Department that these officials
"contend that wrong construction is being placed on /the/
President's utterances."

Francis agreed and reported

that a "workmen's committee" had been using Wilson's
"Peace without Victory" speech to justify its own formula
for peace.

Even the French Minister of Munitions suggested

the possibility of a conference in petrograd in order to
issue a "joint reply" to the Russian Government.

Francis

opposed such a conference due to the "absence of /a7
definite understanding between ourselves and other
51"Translation of an interview accorded b y the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the petrograd press,"
David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 9, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5547, St. Dept.
52Robert Lansing to Wtaodrow Wilson, /po date7,
Doc. No. 861.00/361, St. Dept.

countries fighting Germany."
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The Secretary of State also forwarded for the
President's consideration the view of a leading pro-war
American Socialist that "immediate renunciation of no
annexation no indemnities program by President may save
54
Russia nothing else will."
Lansing later received the
same advice from George Kennan, a man whose knowledge of
the Russian situation he respected.

Kennan suggested,

"If we can make a breach in the dogma of 'no annexation
and no indemnities'

...

we shall greatly weaken their

position."55
Secretary Lansing, convinced that Wilson must
issue a statement to the Russians concerning war aims,
pointed out that "certain phrases uttered by you are
being used by the radical socialists (probably under
German influence) to force the Provisional Government to
declare a policy which will remove the chief incentive to
53David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 11,
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/356, St. Dept.; Three days later,
Francis relayed to Lansing a request from the Russko
Slavo, a Moscow daily with a circulation of over one
million and described by Francis as "perhaps the most
influential Russian Journal," for a statement from
Wilson on war aims.
David R. Francis to Robert Lansing,
May 14, 1917, Doc. No. 861.00/361, St. Dept.
54William English Walling to Frank K. Polk, May
16, 1917, Frank K. Polk Papers, Drawer 85 (Yale Univer
sity Library, New Haven, Conn.).
^ G e o r g e Kennan to Robert Lansing, May 30, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/422%, St. Dept.
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Russian offensive operation."

He interpreted this as "an

insidious and ingenious plan to win over the Russian
people to the idea of a separate peace . . .
danger"

a very real

and suggested that Wilson send a personal mes

sage clarifying war aims to the Provisional Government to
56
he published in Russia.
Wilson delegated the actual
drafting of the statement to Lansing and approved the
57
draft with "only a few verbal changes."
The statement
contained nothing that was new and was transmitted to
58
Francis on May 22, 1917.
During this period, Miliukov was finding it in
creasingly difficult to maintain his position on the war.
Throughout April and into the first week of May, various
attempts were made to reconcile Miliukov's position on
foreign policy with that of the soviet.

This task proved

impossible and a cabinet crisis resulted in the resigna
tions of both Miliukov and Guchkov by May 16.

A new

cabinet known as the First Coalition was formed.

Michael

Tereshchenko assumed Miliukov's position, and Kerensky
58Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 17, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/361, St. Dept.
57Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 19, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5078E, St. Dept.; and Woodrow Wilson to
Robert Lansing, /no date, May 19, 19177, Doc. No. 763.72/
5078E, St. Dept.
58Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, May 22,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5171A, St. Dept.
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became the new Minister of WSr.59
When Tereshchenko accepted Wilson's note, he in
quired whether certain passages could he "changed or
60
altered."
Although Francis had been instructed to
deliver Wilson's message in the form of a "verbatim copy,"
he, along with Tereshchenko, felt that alterations were
possible.

When inquiries were made, Lansing directed him

to explain that the president's message was "in no sense
a reply to anything" but was a "wholly spontaneous and
independent communication" and "not subject to any
61
change."
Tereshchenko's fears were not without foundation,
as considerable opposition developed in the Russian Press
when Wilson's original message was published on May 28.
The president's statement contained lengthy passages of
a high moral tone.

This caused one Russian critic to

59warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution,
55-56.
®°0ne passage in question stated:
"The war has
begun to go against Germany*” The Foreign Minister felt
this would be used by some Russians to argue that further
offensive military efforts on their part would no longer
be required.
Tereshchenko also pointed out that Wilson's
use of such phrases as, "The day has come to conquer or
submit" and "That status /power of the imperial German
Government/ must be altered" would suggest a "dictated
and annexationist peace." Browder and Kerensky, Provi
sional Government Documents, II, 1109.
61David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 31, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5173, St Dept.; and Robert Lansing to
David R. Francis, June 3, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5173, St.
Dept.

observe that "as should have been expected" Wilson's
message "contained nothing new" and differed with the
remarks of other Allied powers only in that the true
meaning of the President's words had been "camouflaged"
62
by the use of "peace-loving sounding words."
The editor
of a large Odessa daily, socialist but non-Bolshevik,
stated:

"President Wilson is renouncing the principles

he proclaimed only a short while ago."

The author also

noted that with American entry into the war, Wilson could
"no longer pose as a superarbiter," and Russians "can no
longer have any faith in the impartial objective judgment
of President Wilson."®"^
Wilson's message of May 28 was his last attempt to
state clearly American policy and aims until his signifi
cant "Fourteen Points" were issued in January, 1913,
following the Bolshevik victory in November.

Two years

later, Arthur Bullard, who was assigned to Russia by the
American Committee on Public information, wrote:
We will not know until men still young write their
memoirs in their old age why the Allies refused to
define their war aims,
if Mr. Wilson could have
formulated his fourteen terms in July instead of
January there would have been some hope. But the
62S. D. Maslovskil, "Wilson's Response," pel
Naroda, May 30, 1917■, p. 1, quoted in Browder and
Kerensky, Provisional Government Documents, II, 1110.
63Clipping from the odesskiya Novostl, Odessa
Russia, May 30, 1917, translated, John A. Ray to Robert
Lansing, June 16, 1917, Doc. NO. 861.00/446, St. Dept.
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refusal of the Allies to even discuss the Russian
proposals were fatal as far as Russia was concerned:
it dampened the ardor of all our friends and it gave
a new and tremendous weapon to our e n e m i e s .
Bullard probably overemphasized the possible effect of a
statement by Wilson on American war aims.

He was correct,

however, in the assumption that Russia was tired of the
war by the summer of 1917 and was unwilling to continue
in pursuit of the objectives agreed upon by the Tsar and
the Allied Powers.

Consequently, the objectives of the

Mission, although frequently visualized as broad and
comprehensive, were never more than Wilson had originally
intended.

These objectives were to congratulate the new

Russian government and to determine how the United States
could materially assist Russia in the two countries'
united war effort.

64Arthur Bullard, The Russian Pendulum: Autocracypemocracy-Bolshevism (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 66-67.

CHAPTER III
SELECTION OF MEMBERS
The process of selecting members of the Mission began
as soon as the decision to send a group to Russia was made.
Wilson informed his Secretary of State on April 12, 1917,
that the Mission should be sent "practically at once" and
that "the important, perhaps the all-important thing is the
p e r s o n n e l . M i s s i o n members should be "men of large view,
tested discretion, and a sympathetic appreciation of just
what it is they have been sent over for . . . and it is
necessary, besides, that they should look the part."
added that "they must not all be Democrats."

He

in fact, it

was not necessary that "any of them be Democrats."

The

group "should all be genuinely enthusiastic for the suc2
cess of the Russian revolution."
Wilson also desired the selection of men Who repre
sented a cross-section of the American ptblic.

Ambassador

Francis was instructed to inform the Russian government
that the men were "selected by the president with the
Hfoodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St.. Dept.
2Ibid.
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special purpose of giving representation to the various
elements which make up the American people."

3

Thus began

the process of selecting members of the Mission, a task
4
which would not be completed until May 10.
in early April, when the idea of a Mission was
first suggested to the State Department, it was decided
to include a man of high rank in order to lend prestige
to the effort.

As England and France had sent Cabinet

members to Russia, the united States could scarcely do
less.

At first, Lansing favored William G. McAdoo, Secre

tary of the Treasury, and suggested him in a Cabinet
meeting on the afternoon of April 13 following a conference with Frank L. Folk, State Department counselor.

5

Apparently, former Secretary of State Elihu Root's name
was mentioned at the same cabinet meeting, as Secretary
of the interior Franklin K. Lane wrote his brother of
the plans to send a Mission to Russia "possibly headed
g
by McAdoo or Root."
^Robert Lansing to David
Doc. No. 763.72/5078E, St. Dept.

r

. Francis, May 22, 1917,

^Vtoodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, May 10, 1917,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case File 64 B.
5Robert Lansing, "Desk Diary," April 13, 1917,
Robert Lansing Papers. Hereinafter referred to as,
"Lansing Desk Diary."
^Franklin K. Lane to George W. Lane, April 15,
1917, in Lane and Wall, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane,
248.
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On the evening of April 16, Secretary McAdoo
called on Lansing at his home, where the two discussed
the Mission to Russia.7

Evidently it was in this conference

that McAdoo and Lansing decided to support Root for the
position.

On the following day, McAdoo wrote Wilson that

Root's appointment would be "highly regarded by the entire
country" and that he would be a good choice if he were
found to be "in full sympathy" with the administration's
8
plans.
McAdoo repeated his recommendation in a cabinet
meeting on the same day and was given strong support by
g
Lansing.
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, was the
only member of the cabinet who objected to the choice.
He believed the selection of Root would be a mistake,
although he agreed there was "no abler man in America"
for the task.

President Wilson replied that politics

should not be a factor in their choice.
to clarify his position:

Daniels attempted

He explained that his objection

did not stem from Root's Republicanism but resulted from
Root's reputation as a conservative, which might bring
7 "Lansing Desk Diary," April 16, 1917.
8William G. McAdoo to Woodrow Wilson, April 17,
1917, Woodrow Wilson papers. Box 84, case File 64 B.
^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 17, 1917? and Josephus
Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of war and After, 1917-1923
(Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press,
1946), 57-58.
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him undue criticism.

Daniels suggested Theodore Roosevelt

or William Jennings Bryan, who "were known in Russia as
liberals," as possible alternatives.

Daniels' argument

had no apparent effect, and he later recalled that neither
"Wilson nor any member of the cabinet agreed with me.
Lansing and McAdoo rebuked me, and Wilson agreed with
them."10
The only restriction placed upon Root's selection
was that his position on Russia be determined prior to
informing him of the appointment.^^

Wilson instructed

Lansing to determine whether Root could be considered "a
12
real friend of the Russian Revolution."
After conferring
with Root, Lansing found him to be acceptable. Root agreed
13
to accept the position on April 24
and met with President
14
Wilson to discuss the Mission two days later.
It is difficult to determine the motives behind
the selection of Root.

Discussions about the minor members

^Daniels, Years of war, 57-59.
^■^William G. McAdoo to Woodrow Wilson, April 17,
1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
■^Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 24, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4031^, St. Dept.
■'■■^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 24, 1917; and Lansing,
War Memoirs, 334.
^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 25 and 26, 1917; and
Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (New
York; Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939), VII, 37.
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of the Mission were recorded in correspondence between the
President and his Cabinet members.

Root, however, was

evidently discussed in conversations that went unrecorded.

15

Perhaps those who favored Root were later reluctant to
claim credit for the selection of a 'man whose work was so
16
soon discredited.
There are, however, several factors
which may explain the selection.

Root was a Republican,

a man of international stature, and, perhaps most impor
tant, a man who had given strong and open support to the
President's war policy.

Root had impressed both Wilson

and Lansing with his willingness to suppress partisan
feeling and, in a sense, had offered to join their team.
in the months immediately preceding America's
entry into World War I, Root publicly as well as privately
supported the President's preparedness campaign.

In

Washington on January 25, 1917, Root delivered a speech
entitled "America's Present Needs" to a gathering of the
Congress of Constructive patriotism held under the aus
pices of the National Security League,

in his address,

the former Secretary of State made a strong emotional
appeal for universal military service, which he saw as the
^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 12-26, 1917.
16In
decided that
tant mission
War Memoirs,

his memoirs, Lansing stated, "it had been
Honorable Elihu Root should head this impor
if he was willing to accept the post." Lansing,
334.
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surest way to protect the vital interests of the nation.

17

Following Wilson's request for war. Root congratu
lated the President and offered his support.

Wilson replied

that Root's "generous letter" had given him "real gratifi
cation."

He was especially pleased that Root considered

his action a reaffirmation of traditional American foreign
18
policy rather than an abrogation of it.
A week later. Root once more expressed support for
Wilson and his war policy at a gathering of the Republican
Club in New York city.

The man who was considered by many

the elder statesman of the party told his fellow Republi
cans that partisan considerations would have to be shelved
for the duration of the war.

He added that there was no

need for a coalition cabinet, and the President's adminis
tration should be supported "as if every man there was a
Republican."1,9
R o o t 's early support for preparedness did not pass
unnoticed,

on April 11, the same day the decision was

made to send a mission to Russia, Secretary Lansing com
plimented Root on his New York speech:

"There has been

no utterance by any man which surpasses it in patriotism
■*-7Elihu Root, "Speech, January 25, 1917," Elihu
Root Papers, Box 220.
^ W b o d r o w Wilson to Elihu Root, April 7, 1917,
Elihu Root papers. Box 136.
^ T h e New York Times, April 10, 1917, 3.
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or in sound practical means of helpfulness to the Govern
ment."

Lansing assured Root that his speech would discou

rage those persons who heretofore had been unable to
"divorce their public responsibilities from partisanship
and the petty things in politics."

20

one of Wilson's

Cabinet members later recalled that the president's
"former harsh opinion" of Root changed "when Root rang
21
clear on war measures."
When news of his selection became public. Root re
ceived many congratulatory letters from varied elements
of American society and from members of both major political parties.

22

A letter from Root's personal friend,

former President of the United States William Howard Taft,
illustrated the reaction for which Wilson had hoped.
Expressing surprise "that Wilson would be wise enough to
select the best man in the united States to go to Russia,"
Taft confessed that "the president's selection of you has
20Robert Lansing to Elihu Root, April 11, 1917*
Elihu Root papers, "Box 136.
21*Daniels, Years of w a r , 58; Root's former chief,
Theodore Roosevelt, was "utterly sick of the gush about
supporting the President." He expressed surprise and
disappointment that "Taft, Hughes, and even Root take
part in the general idiot cry which aligns us behind the
President." Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge,
March 18, 1917, quoted in Elting Elmore Morison (ed.), The
Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.;
Harvard
University Press, 1954), VIII, 1183.
^ E i i h u Root Papers, Box 136.
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heartened me more than any other thing that has happened—
23
It means everything for the country."
Although the President's selection was well
received by most of the American press, significant
opposition was voiced in the Socialist New York Call and
the New York Russian-language newspapers Russkoye, Russky
Golos, and Novy Mir.

Socialist Congressman Meyer London

of New York's Twelfth Congressional District asked Wilson
"to revoke the appointment" if it could "possibly be done."
He felt that Root was "the last person in the world to
command the confidence of that awakened country."

The

Russians would look upon the appointment as "a calamity."

25

On that same day, Wilson was asked by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise
of New York to reconsider the appointment.
that prior to Root's selection,

Wilson replied

"I convinced myself that

, he was genuinely and heartily in sympathy with the revolution in Russia."

26

22William Howard Taft to Elihu Root, April 28,
1917, Elihu Root Papers, Box 166.
2^Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 11-14.
25Meyer London to Woodrow Wilson, April 28, 1917,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, case Pile 64 B. Senator
Hiram W. Johnson would later express a similar view. Hiram
W. Johnson to Mrs. Raymond Robins, July 17, 1917, Raymond
Robins Papers, b o x 12 (State Historical Society of Wiscon
sin, Madison, Wisconsin).
26Woodrow Wilson to Stephen S. Wise, April 28, 1917,
Baker, Wilson Letters, VII, 42.
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Most of the criticism came from Socialists and
jews and, to a lesser extent, from naturalized Americans
of Russian birth and Russians living in America.

Professor

Alexander petrunkevitch of Yale university disapproved of
Root's appointment and discussed it with George Kennan
and oscar Straus.

27

In a speech in New York, petrunke

vitch stated that the decision to send a mission to
Russia was "fraught with danger" which "lies in the
selection of the members of the commission."

He did not

openly oppose Root's appointment but urged his audience
to persuade Wilson to add to the commission "men acceptable to the Russian Social Democrats."

28

two

days later.

Representative Abraham Shiplacoff introduced a resolution
in the New York State Legislature asking the President to
reconsider Root's appointment.

His resolution, however,

was "hooted down" by his colleagues and "all record of it
29
. . . expunged from the Journal."
In addition to public
expressions of displeasure, many persons privately dis
approved of the appointment,

included among them were

Ambassador Francis and Oscar Straus who had played a large
27George Kennan to Oscar Straus, April 27, 1917,
George Kennan papers, Box 8 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress); and Oscar Straus to George Kennan,
May 2, 1917, George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
28The New York Times, May 2, 1917, 1.

29Ibid., May 4, 1917, 7.

part in promoting the idea of the Mission.
Wilson did not anticipate the objections that the
appointment created and probably regretted his choice
even before Root departed.
critic,

On April 28 he wrote to a

"I believe, all things weighed together, j/that7 my

choice has been the wise one."
ever, Wilson wrote,

31

A few days later, how

"I am trying to put men on the commis

sion whose popular sympathies and catholic view of human
rights will be recognized
of them)."

32

(at any rate, in the case of most

Although Wilson did not name him, Root must

have been the member to whom he referred, as no other
member had aroused any controversy.
Years later, one of Root's friends, Colonel T.
Bentley Mott, suggested that Wilson had sent Root to
Russia “to get rid of him" and to avoid utilizing him in
33
a more responsible capacity."
This accusation, which
Mott admits was only "ray hypothesis" based upon nothing
"I have heard Mr. Root assert," cannot be borne out by
the existing records.

All available information indicates

30

Oscar Straus to George Kennan, May 2, 1917, George
Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of
Congress); and David R. Francis to Edward B. Lilley, May
1/14, 1917, David R. Francis papers. Box "May 1917."
3 ^-Woodrow Wilson to Stephen S. Wise, April 28,
1917, Baker, Wilson Letters, VII, 42.
32Woodrow Wilson to Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, May
8, 1917, Waodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case File 64 B.
33Mott, Twenty Years, 192.
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that everyone involved in the selection of the personnel
felt that they had selected a man who could accomplish
34
the Mission's objective.
if Wilson did have second
thoughts about appointing Root, his removal would have
been politically impossible.

The choice of Elihu Root,

was a decision for which the president was responsible
and one which he ultimately regretted.
Historians usually restrict their attention to the
factors and motives leading to the selection of Root and,
in general, have neglected the other eight members.

This

is understandable in view of Root's prominence in American
politics and his subsequent exclusion from the Paris peace
Conference.

35

it is important, however, to examine the

other members selected.
Colonel House recommended to Wilson that the
group consist of Samuel Gompers, Willard Straight,
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, and Oscar Straus to represent
Root would later write his biographer that "Wilson
didn't want to accomplish anything.
It was a grand-stand
play. He wanted to show his sympathy for the Russian
Revolution. When we delivered his message and made our
speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he wanted." Elihu
Root to Phillip C. Jessup, September 16, 1930; quoted in
Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New YorK: Dodd, Mead and
Co., 1938), II, 356.
35Root's most recent biographer suggests that it
was Root's performance in Russia which led Wilson to ex
clude Root from the Paris Peace Conference following
World war I. Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Con
servative Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954),
119.
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American labor, business, education, and Jewry, respec
tively.

Prom this group Wilson eliminated Wheeler, whom

the President considered "a bit too ladylike."

Wilson

then submitted for Lansing's consideration the names of
the other three along with those of Charles R. crane, a
wealthy Chicago businessman, who was already in Russia,
and professor Samuel Harper, whom Wilson considered
36
"widely known and trusted in Russia."
Of the four originally recommended by Colonel
House, Lansing approved only of Samuel Gompers,
able a man as we could get."
himself.

"as avail

Gompers, however, eliminated

Straus was eliminated by Lansing who questioned

the "advisability of sending another jew" and felt there
was "a measure of danger in overplaying the jew element."
Straight was also rejected by the Secretary of State as
was Wheeler, already excluded by the President.

Lansing

approved the President's choice of Crane but opposed
Professor Harper with the explanation that "I have heard
from several different sources that he is not as popular
as x had supposed in Russia."

37

in addition to Gompers

and Crane, Lansing suggested that the Mission include
John R. Mott

(President of the Y.M.C.A.), Cyrus McCormick

36Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
37Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 12, 1917,
Doc. NO. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
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or Harold Elliot as a representative of American business,
Samuel

. Bertron
38
prominence."
r

(a New York banker), and "a lawyer of

Crane had for many years expressed a keen interest
in Russia and the furthering of Russian and Slavic studies
in the United states.

He had established a lecture series

in Slavic studies at the university of Chicago and had
invited Miliukov and others to the University.

He had

also subsidized the work of Professor Harper and had made
it financially possible for him to visit Russia several
times prior to Wbrld war I.

39

He had, moreover, encou

raged Harper to travel to Russia as advisor to Ambassador
40
Francis in 1916.
Crane maintained his interest in
Russia throughout this period, although he refused to
accept the position of Ambassador to Russia when Wilson
41
offered it to him in 1913.
As soon as news of the March Revolution reached
42
the united States, Crane left for Russia.
Before

3aB>ia.
39hasch, American Liberals And The Russian Revo
lution , 5-7.
40Paul V. Harper (ed.), The Russia I Believe i m
The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper (Chicago:
University of
Chicago Press, 1945), 91.
4'
LLasch, American Liberals And The Russian Revolut ion, 5.
42Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 203,
Charles R. Crane Papers.
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departing, he asked Colonel House to inform the President
that if he were needed in any capacity,
make a sign."

43

"You have only to

a?hus, when members of the Mission were

being chosen, Wilson personally included Crane in the
group.

44

No open opposition to Crane's appointment was

expressed, although Kennan privately criticized the choice
because crane was not a "level-headed thinker and although
he has been in Russia many times he doesn't know the
45
psychology of the Russian people."
Cyrus McCormick was chosen as a representative of
American business because international Harvester Company
was "very popular in Russia."

46

However, McCormick and

the President were also personal friends, and McCormick
corresponded with the President on a first-name basis.
This no doubt enhanced his availability for such a post.
During the time names were being considered, McCormick
wrote the President and offered his services.

47

4^Charles R. Crane to Edward M. House, April 4,
1917, Charles R. Crane Papers.
44Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
^ G e o r g e Kennan to Oscar Straus, May 16, 1917,
George Kennan Papers, Box 8 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
4^Lansing, War Memoirs, 334.
47Cyrus M. McCormick to WOodrow Wilson, April 22,
1917, Vfoodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
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Samuel Bertron, described by one of his colleagues
as an unusual banker in that he was a Democrat,

48

was

named to the group by Lansing although Bertron thought
his appointment was due to the influence of Colonel
House.

John R. Mott, who was included for the "reli50
gious and social betterment" of Russia,
was attached
51
to the Mission following a suggestion by Crane.
perhaps
the least controversial of all the men to serve on the
Mission, Mott impressed one extremely critical Russian
observer as a "very pleasant, mild-mannered man, very
much like a clergyman of a well-to-do parish," a man who
52
was "genuinely anxious to help Russia."
Wilson soon decided that the Mission should in
clude representatives of the Army and Navy.

Major General

Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff,of the United States Army,
was chosen to represent the army.

This selection was

somewhat surprising since the united States had just
48

William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, May
22, 1917, William V. Judson papers, Box 4 (Newberry
Library, Ch icago).
49Samuel R. Bertron to Edward M, House, April 28,
1917, Edward M. House Papers, Drawer 3 (Yale university
Library, New Haven, Conn.).
50Lansing, war Memoirs, 334.
^Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 185,
Charles r . Crane Papers.
52D. Fedotoff White, Survival Through War and
Revolution in Russia (Philadelphia: university of Penn
sylvania Press, 1939), 140.
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declared war, and It would appear that the nation could
ill afford the absence of its ranking military roan for
such a long period of time.

To prevent any "misunder

standing" concerning Scott's detachment from duty at
this time, Newton D. Baker, secretary of war, explained
that Scott had been selected "in order that the people
of Russia may realize from the dignity of his office the
full compliment and cordiality of our great mission to
53
them."
Scott's appointment was first mentioned in a con
versation between Secretaries Lansing and Baker on April
26, at which time they also discussed sending General
Samuel

b

. M. Young.

The matter was settled, however,

when Baker informed Lansing that the president favored
Scott.

When told of the President's decision by secre

tary Baker, Scott replied that he did not wish to leave
the country at that particular time but would accept the
decision since he was "at the disposition of the President
55
and would do cheerfully whatever he wished."
Thus, of
53The New York Times, May 12, 1917, 9.
34"Lansing Desk Diary," April 26, 1917? The fol
lowing day Root was told of the choice and was "delighted
at the idea of Gen. Scott's going." Ibid., April 27,
1917.
55Hugh L. Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 2,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box.84 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress). Hereinafter referred to as Scott,
"The Russian Revolution."
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all the men in the Mission, Scott joined most reluctantly
and was the most pessimistic about the possibility of
success. 56
The choice of the naval representative was dele
gated to the Secretary of the Navy.

Daniels discussed

the appointment with Lansing, and they both felt that in
view of Scott's rank the naval representative should be
57
a junior officer.
Daniels recommended, and the presi
dent accepted, Rear Admiral James

h

. Glennon, who was

described by Daniels as "a handsome man of commanding
CO
presence" and an "expert in ordinance."
The question of including a Jew on the Mission
was perhaps the most explosive.

Prom the beginning,

President Wilson, following the advice of Colonel House,
had wanted Straus to be the representative of American
eg
Jewry.
Lansing had no objection to the appointment of
58 "I greatly fear we rre too late . . . I start
out with very little hope of any successful results."
Hugh L. Scott to General Elbert Wheeler, May 15, 1917,
Hugh Scott Papers, Box 29 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress); "it looks very much as if Russia
is breaking up and we will be too late." Hugh L. Scott
to Mrs. H. L. Schelling, May 15, 1917, Ibid.
^7josephus Daniels, "Diary," May 10, 1917,
Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 3; and."Lansing Desk Diary,"
May 10, 1917.
58Josephus Daniels to Vfoodrow Wilson, May 10,
1917, WOodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
59Woodrow Wilson to Robert LanBing, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800*5, St. Dept.

82
a jew, but he assumed that Gompers would represent Labor,
and, therefore, thought It Inadvisable to send another
jew.^°

On April 14, Lansing instructed Francis to

"discreetly ascertain" from the Russian Foreign Minister
"whether it would be wise to have a prominent Hebrew a
member of the Commission " and if his being "orthodox or
unorthodox" were important.

6X

Following a discussion

with Miliukov, Francis informed the state Department
that there were no objections from the Russian Foreign
Office and that "either kind" was "equally acceptable."

62

tfhe President, after learning of Gompers' reluc
tance to leave the country for such a prolonged period,
was faced with the task of finding not only a Jewish
representative but a labor leader, as well.

By April

24, Wilson had decided upon Eugene Meyer, Jr., of New
York and notified Lansing of this decision;

63

Almost as

soon as the decision was made, the Secretary of State
began to reconsider the desirability of sending any jew
to Russia, since the State Department had received
60Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800*5, St. Dept.
61Robert R. Lansing to David r . Francis, April 14,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4001A, St. Dept.
62

David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 19,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4002, St. Dept.
6 3Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 17,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4031*5, St. Dept.

dispatches which suggested the possibility of an antiSemitic movement which might disrupt the Provisional
64
Government.
Other persons began to fear that the
Russians might interpret the appointment of any Jew as an
indication that America was more interested in securing
political rights for Jews than in assisting the pro
visional Government in its war effort.

Bertron wrote

Colonel House that he had been advised by persons "best
posted in reference to the Russian affairs" that a Jew
should not be sent on the Mission.

gc

Professor Harper

reminded the State Department that "the revolution was not
put through to give the Jews rights."
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Secretary Lansing then received a further opinion
from Ambassador Francis.

Following his conversation with

Miliulsov, Francis had discussed the question with other
members of the Russian Government.

He informed Lansing

that "another minister . . . cautioned against Hebrew
being chairman or vice chairman" of the Mission and that
"while no objection to such membership on commission
®4David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 17,
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/407, St. Dept.; and Madding Summer,
American Consul Moscow, to Robert Lansing, March 20, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/337, St. Dept.
6 ^Saftiuel R. Bertron to Edward M. House,April 30,
1917, Edward House papers, Drawer 3.
®^Samuel N. Harper to Richard Crane, April 20,
1917, Samuel Harper Papers, Envelop 9 (university of
Chicago Library, Chicago).

84
/exists7 he should not be conspicuous but discreet."^7
Becoming increasingly concerned over the possi
bility of jeopardizing the effectiveness of the Mission,
Lansing, following a discussion with Stanley Washburn on
68
April 30,
wrote to Wilson at length about Washburn's
views on the matter.

He considered Washburn “very closely

in touch with Russian affairs," a man whose “Knowledge
and judgment as an observer entitle his opinion to careful
consideration.11 It was Washburn's view that “it would be
a great mistake to send any Jew at all on the commissio.n
to Russia."

The appointment of a jew, he felt, would

"cause popular suspicion on the purpose of the commission
and very materially impair its usefulness."

The Secretary

of State then directed the president's attention to Ambassa
dor Francis' telegram and recommended that Meyer be asked
to withdraw.
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on the following day, after conferring

with Wilson about the Mission, Lansing was undoubtedly in70
structed to ask Eugene Meyer to withdraw.
On May 2, Secretary Lansing discussed the situation
with justice Louis D. Brandeis.

Meyer arrived in Washington

87David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 20, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4003, St. Dept.
6 8 "Lansing Desk Diary," April 30, 1917.
^ R o b e r t Lansing to Wbodrow Wilson, April 30, 1917,
Doc. No..763.72/4386%, St. Dept.

70“Lansing Desk Diary," May 1, 1917.
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on the following day and was met by Brandeis, who ex
plained the situation to him. The two men then met with
71
Lansing.
Following the conference, the Secretary of
State informed President Wilson that Meyer "was very
pleasant about it and at once declared his willingness
to withdraw his acceptance."

He cautioned the President,

however, that it would be difficult to explain why no Jew
had been included.

He felt that this "delicate question"
72
would require "very careful handling."
Shortly after the Root Mission had departed for
Russia, Judge Aaron J. Levy of New York interviewed
President Wilson and published an account of the interview
in the jewidhDaily Wfrrheit.

Readers were given the im

pression that the President's decision to withdraw the
Meyer appointment had resulted from a suggestion by the
Russian Provisional Government.

Reuben Fink, Washington

correspondent for The Day, a rival of the Daily W&rheit
in New York, interviewed both Joseph Tumulty, the Presi
dent's secretary, and Secretary Lansing for clarification
of Judge Levy's article.
7W

,

73

Both men forwarded Fink's

May 2-3, 1917.

7^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%A, St. Dept.
7^Reuben Fink to Joseph Tumulty, May 26, 1917,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, case File 64 B.
In for
warding the letter to Wilson, Tumulty attached a note;
"The Secretary thinks there is dynamite in it."
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questions to the president, who expressed considerable
displeasure that Levy had published an account of the
interview and stated that nothing in his conversation had
indicated that he had received a request from the Russian
government to exclude jews from the Mission.74

Although

there were no serious political repercussions, Prince
Lvov, the Provisional Prime Minister, issued a categori
cal denial that he or any member of his government insti75
gated Wilson's decision.
Another major segment of American society which
would be represented on the Mission was organized Labor.
Shortly after the creation of the Provisional Government,
Francis cabled the state Department to suggest that
Samuel Gompers and other American labor leaders use their
influence to encourage Russian labor to support the new
government.7®

Similar requests reached the Secretary of

State from other Americans.77

Gompers had in fact already

telegraphed congratulations and pledges of support to the
revolutionaries,

in a second message he reminded the

74Woodrow Wilson to Joseph Tumulty /no date7,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case File 64 B.
75The New York Times, May 30, 1917,

3.

76David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, March 23,
1917, Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85? also found in Doc.
No. 861.00/299, St. Dept.
77Henry Morgenthau to Robert Lansing, April 12,
1917, Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 25? and Flint, Memories,
234.

Russians in more conservative tones that "freedom . . .
cannot be established by Revolution only— it is the pro78
duct of evolution."
Subsequently, when the appointments
to the Mission were being made, there was no question that
Gompers would be chosen as the representative
if he so desired.

79

of Labor

A request was made by Joseph H.

Coate that there be two labor representatives, one
Socialist and one non-Socialist.

Wilson and Lansing felt,

however, that one representative would suffice, and that
he should be a non-Socialist so as :to more broadly repre
sent American labor.

It was important, however, that the

delegate not be regarded by the Russians as "an active
80
opponent of Socialism."
William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor, approached
Gompers on the question of his joining the Mission but
found that the Labor leader felt he could not leave the
country at that particular time because of America's entry
into the war.

Wilson accepted the decision, and Gompers,

7®Samuel Gompers to N. S. Chekhleiji, March 21,
1917, and Samuel Gompers to Nscheidge, April 2, 1917, Doc.
No. 861.00/299, St. Dept.
79Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 11, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.; and Woodrow Wilson to
Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917, Doc.No. 763.72/4008%, St.
Dept.
®^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 19,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4029A, St. Dept.; and Woodrow Wilson
to Robert Lansing, April 24, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4031%,
St. Dept.

in turn, offered to recommend a delegate.
he recommended two names to Lansing:

81

on May 4,

James Duncan, First

Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor, and
James Lord, President of the United Mine Workers,
described by Gompers "as representing the constructive
Q2
radical element in this country."
After further dis
cussion with Gompers, Lansing recommended that Duncan be
selected.

The President then extended the invitation,

which Duncan accepted.
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The decision to include an

American Socialist in

the Mission to Russia was made after the other members
had been chosen.

In the early correspondence concerning

the Mission there is no indication that President Wilson
or Secretary Lansing wished such a representative, and,
as late as April 30, Wilson apparently was still unde84
cided.
The fact that both the English and French
governments had sent Socialists to confer with leaders
of the Provisional Government may have encouraged Wilson
8iSamuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor
An Autobiography (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1925), 398.
82Samuel Gompers to Robert Lansing, May 4, 1917,
Doc. NO. 763.72/4391%, St. Dept.
8 8 "Lansing Desk Diary," May 5, 1917; and James
Duncan to Woodrow Wilson, May 7, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/
4670%, St. Dept.
84
William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, April 30,
Doc. No. 763.72/4386%, St. Dept.
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to do so.

It is also possible that Socialist opposition

to Root encouraged the President to include a Socialist
in order to counteract the conservative image the Mission
had acquired.

Regardless of his reasons, Wilson had

decided to include a Socialist in the group by May 3, and
the search began for an acceptable representative.

S5

The first Socialist recommended by Secretary of
Labor Wilson was William English Walling of Greenwich,
Connecticut, who had been criticized by the American
Socialist Party because of his strong support of the
86
American war effort.
Soon after his recommendation
of walling. Secretary Wilson received from him a lengthy
87
letter which he forwarded to the President. ' in his
letter to the Secretary of Labor, Wailing stated that
"none of the official leaders of the Majority now in
control of the American Party can be trusted."

It would

be preferable not to include a Socialist as "the American
Federation of Labor should represent our working people."
walling appraised several leaders in the socialist Party
and indicated those he thought had promoted policies
85

Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, May 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
86William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, April 30,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4386%, St. Dept.
87William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, May 4,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
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detrimental to the interests of the united States.

He

also nasntd several, among them Charles Edward Russell,
who opposed the position of the majority in the Party.

Op

After examining Walling's letter, the president
reported to his Secretary of State that it "seems to me
to show that Mr. Walling is the man we want."

89

Lansing

was asked by the President to examine Walling's book, The
Socialist and the w a r , which was published in 1915.
Lansing informed the President that the work was "a
compilation of the views of other socialists" but that it
failed to indicate Walling's own position.

After examining

the opinions of several American Socialists on the war,
Lansing explained to Wilson that "of these I find that
the ideas of Charles Edward Russell are more in accord
William English walling to William B. Wilson, May
2, 1917, Doc. NO. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept. Walling's state
ment that none of the party leaders could be trusted was a
reference to the official party attitude toward World war
I. In March, 1917, the Socialist party called an Emergency
Convention to decide the party's position if America should
enter the war. By the time the convention met, war'had
been declared. The delegates voted on three resolutions
and overwhelmingly accepted one drafted by Morris Hillquit
of New York which was known as the St. Louis proclamation.
It not only condemned the war but also suggested a sevenpoint program of opposition to it. When the Socialist
party adopted this position, many of its members left the
party.
In addition to Walling, other prominent members
were Charles Edward Russell, W. J. Ghent, Upton Sinclair,
J. G. Phelps Stokes, A. M. Simons, and John Spargo. David
Shannon, The Socialist Party of America (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1955), 93-100.
®®W0odrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, May 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
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with what I conceive to be the best suited to influence
90
Russian Socialists.11
Lansing then discussed the appointment of a
Socialist with Frank L. Folk, who suggested W. J. Ghent,
91
but the secretary of State still favored Russell.
Root,
who had made few suggestions about the personnel of the
Mission, then wrote to Lansing suggesting walling.

On

the following day, Lansing sent Root's letter to the
President with the comment that "Walling was very
92
possibly the man who should be selected."
Walling,
consulted by Folk, informed the undersecretary that
although he would accept the appointment if it were
extended, he felt someone else would be more effective
in view of his split with the majority in the American
Socialist Party,

walling then recommended A. M. Simons,

John Spargo, and Charles Edward Russell to Polk, who
relayed the message to Lansing.
Lansing's earlier opinion of Russell was now
reinforced by Walling's recommendation, and he therefore
recommended that Russell be the choice,

on May 8,

QA

Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
Q1
"Lansing Desk Diary," May 3, 1917.
92Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, May 3, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/4524%, St. Dept.; and Robert Lansing to Woodrow
Wilson, May 4, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4524%, St. Dept.
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President Wilson instructed Secretary Wilson to extend
the appointment to Russell,

on May 10, Russell accepted

the position and was sent a letter of appointment from
93
the president.
As walling had anticipated, the majority
of the Socialist party objected to Russell's appointment
and requested that he refuse with the explanation that
94
he did not represent the American Socialist party.
According to Russell, his acceptance of the appointment
95
led to his expulsion from the Party.
The selection of a staff for the Mission took con
siderable time.

Colonel William Judson, the Mission's

Military Attach^, had served as Military Attach^, to
Russia during the Russo-Japanese war.

While in Russia,

Judson had met Alexander Guchkov, a mild liberal and
leader of the octobrist party, who, after the March Revo
lution, was elevated to the position of Minister of War.
Judson's personal acquaintance with him was now an asset
and led to his being included in the group.

Postmaster

Albert S. Burleson first suggested Judson for the post.
93William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, May 9,
1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, case Pile 64 B; and
Woodrow Wilson to Charles Edward Russell, May 10, 1917,
Charles Edward Russell Papers, vol. 6.
94The New York Times. May 16, 1917, 2.
95Charles Edward Russell, Bare Hands and Stone
Walls: Some Recollections of
Side-Line Reformer {New
York: Charles Scribner's, 1933)” 294.

93
President Wilson relayed the recommendation and his
96
approval of it to his Secretary of War.
Colonel R. E.
Ii. Michie was assigned as aide to General Scott and
Lieutenant Alva D. Bernhard as aide to Admiral Glennon.97
Holton C. Curl, a navy doctor, was attached to the group
98
as the physician.
Root requested that Lt. Colonel T. Bentley Mott
be included in the group.

Colonel Mott had served Root

in London in 1903, when the latter was negotiating a
treaty to determine the boundary between British Columbia
and Alaska.

Shortly after his selection as head of the

Mission, Root met Mott in Washington and asked him to join
him on the trip to Russia and Mott agree d . "

on April 28,

Root requested Mott's appointment as a military aide and
the appointment resulted.100
The selection of the clerical staff was assigned
96William V. judson, "Memorandum As To Alexander
Guchoff Now Minister of w a r ," William V. Judson Papers,
Box 4; and Wbodrow Wilson to Newton D. Baker, May 3,
1917, Woodrow Wilson papers. Box 84, Case Pile 64
B.
97Josephus Daniels to Lt. A.
1917, Woodrow Wilson papers. Box 84,

D. Bernhard, May
Case Pile 64 B.

14,

"josephus Daniels to Holton C. Curl, May 9,1917,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case pile 64 B.
99Mott, Twenty Years, 122, 190-91.
^"Newton D. Baker to Elihu Root, April 30, 1917,
Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.

94
to Breckenridge Long, Third Assistant secretary of State.101
This task, wrote Mott, gave "more trouble than all else,"
since "the private secretaries of half the members of the
House and Senate wanted to go with us."

102

Basil Miles,

in Petrograd at the time, was finally selected as Secre
tary to the Mission after Ambassador Francis was consulted
103
on his appointment.
Stanley Washburn, who had earlier been named to the
railroad commission which he had interested the government
in sending to Russia, now requested a transfer to the
Root Mission since he felt he would be more useful to that
104
group.
Overruling the objections of John F. Stevens,
Chairman of the Railroad Commission, Secretary Lansing
cabled the American consul at Vladivostok to advise Stevens
that Washburn had been reassigned to the Root Mission.

105

■L01"Lansing Desk Diary," May 12-14, 1917.
^^Mott, Twenty Years, 193; The papers of the mem
bers of the Mission as well as the State Department files
contain hundreds of applications for positions on the
Mission.
103David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 12, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4602, St. Dept.; and Robert Lansing to Basil
Miles, May 12, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4692A, St. Dept.
104Stanley Washburn to Daniel Willard, May 10, 1917,
and Stanley Washburn to Newton D. Baker, May 10, 1917,
Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1; and Stanley Washburn to
William Phillips, May 10, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4693^,
S t . Dept.
l05John F. Stevens to Robert Lansing /no date/, Doc.
No. 763.72/5103, St. Dept.; and Robert Lansing to American
Consul Vladivostok, May 17, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4781B,
St. Dept.
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As civilian aide and interpreter to the Mission,
the State Department selected p. Eugene Prince.

Born and

educated in Russia but now a naturalized American citizen,
Prince was employed by Willys-overland, Inc., of Toledo,
Ohio, and was stationed in petrograd.

With his employer's

approval, Prince was attached to the Mission for the
duration of its stay in Russia.
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The staff consisted of nine additional persons;
James P. McKenna, chief clerk and Disbursing officer;
six clerks, Clyde S. Stilwell, James F. O'Rourke, jay
Keegan, Duane E. Washburn, Walter W. King, and George D.
Gregory; one messenger, George Long; and one valet, James
_ _
107
Dooley,

10®David r . Francis to Robert Lansing, May 13, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4609, St. Dept.; Robert Lansing to Willysoverland, May 14, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4609, St. Dept.;
and Willys-overland to Robert Lansing, May 15, 1917,
Doc. NO. 763.72/4657, St. Dept.
107The names of the twenty-six men composing the
Mission and their official titles are found on pages 1-2
of the "Mission Log" in Box 192 of the Elihu Root Papers.

CHAPTER IV
WASHINGTON, D.C., TO VLADIVOSTOK
The Mission held its first meeting on the morning
of May 14 at the state Department.

All members were

present except Cyrus McCormick, who would meet the group
in Seattle, and Charles R. Crane, who would join them in
Petrograd.

A brief session with President Wilson was

followed by a luncheon given by Lansing.1
The Mission had little time to receive a proper
briefing from the state Department.

Root had already

spent several days in Washington in an attempt to gather
as much information as possible.

2

it is doubtful, how

ever, that information available in Washington was of
much help to the group.

At that time, the jtate Depart

ment was understandably preoccupied with problems related
to America’s entry into World W&r I.

There was also much

confusion about events in Russia, and, more important,
even as information was received and decisions were made,
changes in Russia made the policies outdated.
The State Department's major source of information
^‘"Lansing Desk Diary,” May 14, 1917.
2Ibid., May 9-14, 1917.
96

97
In Russia, Ambassador Francis, proved unreliable and per
haps prevented the State Department from developing a
more realistic evaluation of the Russian situation.
Francis' major fault was his overly optimistic evaluation
of the strength of the Provisional Government.

In the

early days of the Revolution, Francis sent encouraging
reports,

in a dispatch to the State Department dated

March 24, 1917, Francis reported that the Provisional
Government was "in absolute contrdl" and that the autho
rity of the government was "loyally recognized by the army
and navy and by every municipality and province in Russia."
On the following day he reported that "the situation is
improving daily and I am encouraged to look for a
4
favorable outcome."
Francis was not alone in his un
realistic view of the political stability of the Pro
visional Government.

Lansing later recalled that no one

in Washington "appreciated the real menace . . .
5
establishment of a Republic" in Russia.

to the

Tttie Secretary of State also sought advice from
Americans he considered informed on Russian affairs, such
as Charles Crane, Samuel Harper, and Stanley Washburn.
3David R. Francis to Frank L. Polk, March 24, 1917,
Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85.
4David R. Francis to Frank L. Polk, March 25, 1917,
Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85.
^Lansing, War Memoirs, 331.

,i— o
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98
Lansing found them "optimistic as to the success of the
moderate or constitutional Democrats and of their ability
to control the situation."

Crane had returned to Russia

soon after receiving news of the Revolution.

He was in

tellectually and emotionally attached to the leaders of
the provisional Government, most of whom he knew personally.

7

Soon after arriving in petrograd, crane wrote

his son, Lansing’s secretary, that the revolution was
"purely Russian and very characteristic."

He also stated

that "practically the whole population took part in it
so there is absolutely no class feeling and no bitterness
or resentment."

8

Professor Harper, described by one historian as
Q
"an inveterate optimist by temperament," also failed to
understand clearly the significance of the Russian Revo
lution.

When asked by the State Department to evaluate
6 Ibid.

^Lasch, American Liberals, 5-6; and Charles r .
Crane, "Memoirs, Russia, 1917," p. 174, Charles r . Crane
Papers.
8Charles R. Crane to Richard Crane, May 4, 1917,
Hugh Scott Papers, box 1 (Princeton university Library,
Princeton, N.J.). Copies of this letter were found in
several sources, and it appears to have been widely cir
culated at the time. When sent a copy of Crane's letter,
George Kennan advised his correspondent, "Don't trust
what Crane says." George Kennan to David Fairchilds, May
16, 1917, George Kennan papers, Box 8 (Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
9Lasch, American Liberals, 6.

the situation, Harper replied that the aim of the revolu
tion was "to create conditions that would make it possible
for Russia to bring into force all her strength."

This

would result in "more effective prosecution of war and war
until victory. "10

Later, in a speech before a group of

American businessmen, Harper said,

"One of the reasons

for the final success of the political movement /in Russia
is7 that the businessmen of Russia finally organized to
support

/

T

t

Three weeks later, he remarked that "the

situation in Russia is clearing up" and that he had "not
12
been anxious for a single moment."
Washburn, the third
person to whom Lansing turned for advice, was also quite
sanguine,

in fact, he had been warned earlier by his

editor on The London Times that his reports were too con
fident.13
Eventually, Lansing received more realistic evaluations, both from Russia

14

and from sources in the united

•^Robert Lansing to Waodrow Wilson, March 16, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/297A, St. Dept.
■^"Resum^ of Speech Made at Luncheon of AmericanRussian Chamber of Commerce, March 27, 1917, by Samuel N.
Harper," Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject File Russia
1917-20, (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin).
l3Samuel N. Harper to Roger H. Williams, May 17,
1917, Charles R. Crane Papers.
l3Lord Northcliff to Stanley Washburn, /potetej?
Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1.
14Especially the reports of North winship, Ameri
can Consul in Moscow.
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States.

On May 20, Lansing wrote to George Kennan, a man

he considered "the highest authority in America on
Russia,"15 and asked his opinion "as to the meaning of
events and their effect upon the conduct of the great
war."

L6

Kennan sent lengthy letters of advice and copies

of articles he was preparing for publication in The out
look.

He was concerned about the growing power of the

Soviets and fearful that the war effort would be damaged
if something were not done to counter the "no annexation,
17
no indemnities" policy.
As subsequent events would
demonstrate, Kennan had a clearer understanding of the
potential power of the Soviets, but even he thought of
events in Russia only in terms of their relationship to
the war effort.
The group departed from Washington by train on May
14, at 6:15 p.m.

The four-day trip across the country

15Robert Lansing to George Kennan, May 20, 1917,
George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
16Robert Lansing to George Kennan, May 28, 1917,
George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
17Robert Lansing to George Kennan, May 20, 1917,
May 28, 1917, and June 1, 1917, George Kennan Papers, Box
4 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress)* George
Kennan to Robert Lansing, May 23, 1917, and May 30, 1917,
George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress)> George Kennan to Robert Lansing,
May 22, 1917, Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 27; and George
Kennan to Robert Lansing, May 30, 1917, Doc. No. 861.00/
422^5, St. Dept.

offered an excellent opportunity for the members to ex
change ideas about the situation they would encounter upon
reaching Russia.

Professor Harper had been advised of the

Mission's route by Richard Crane who suggested that Harper
accompany the group and give its members the benefit of
his knowledge.

L8

Harper joined the train on its route to

Chicago and spent one day presenting his "interpretation
of the revolutionary situation" and descriptions of the
current Russian leaders.

19

He provided a list of news

papermen living in petrograd and offered comments about
their recent dispatches.

His major criterion in evaluating

the reporters appeared to have been their willingness to
transmit news favorable to the Provisional Government,
in assessing an Associated Press reporter. Harper pointed
out that he wrote of the sensational aspects of the revo
lution and neglected to point out "the constructive side
of the events."

Another reporter's dispatches, used by

The Chicago Tribune and The Hew York Times, were described
by Harper as "excellent because they have emphasized the
20
constructive side."
^ R i c h a r d Crane to Samuel N. Harper, May 15, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4865c, St. Dept.
19Harper, Memoirs, 99.
20"May 14, 1917 Newspapermen working in Petrograd
Who Have Been Covering the News Services Prom Russia These
Last Months," Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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Harper’s influence on the members of the Mission
perhaps created unrealistic reassurance.

The professor

felt that his study of Russian newspapers had given him
the "true picture" of the revolutionary situation, and he
was confident that the government would be able to "with21
stand the friction that developed at petrograd."
The group arrived in Seattle at 2;30 a.m. on May
20 and was joined by McCormick and captain A. W. Hinds,
Commanding Officer of the u. £J. £S. Buffalo which had been
provided for their passage to Vladivostok.
During the first day of their voyage, McCormick
pointed out to Senator Root the advantage of holding
conferences during which the members could exchange in
formation and views pertaining to Russia.

At first. Root

felt that such conferences wauld be of little value,
since conditions in Russia would dictate the Mission's
course of action.

The following day, after discussing

the idea with Mott and Bertron, both of whom favored
his recommendation, McCormick again suggested the idea
to Root.
afternoon.

Root agreed and arranged for a session that
22

During the next twelve days, members of the

2LSamuel N. Harper to Roger H. Williams, May 17,
1917, Samuel N. Harper Papers, Cabinet I, Drawer I,
Envelope 9.
22Cyrus H. McCormick, "Diary," May 20-21, 1917,
Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject Pile "Russia 1917-20".
Hereinafter referred to as "McCormick Diary."
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Mission found ample time to discuss, and, In general, plan
their activities In the Russian capital.

The practice of

holding such sessions continued after their arrival In
petrograd.

Root used them to hear the informal reports

from various members and to discuss and approve official
dispatches to the State Department.
In the first conference aboard ship. Root began by
summarizing the verbal instructions which President Wilson
23
had given them on the day before their departure.
Root
reminded his colleagues of the "three general objectives"
of the Mission, first and "most important" of which was
their duty to "express to the Russian people the deep
sympathy which the American people and their government
have for the Russian nation and for the new Republic."24
The second objective was to ascertain the financial needs
of Russia and to present the American government with
information to be
that country,

jed in designating further loans to

it was Root's understanding that future

loans to the Allies would depend on the "real needs" of
each, a matter to be determined by which country was
23

There appear to have been no written instructions
for the Mission.
In a speech several months later, how
ever, Cyrus H. McCormick referred to "sealed orders,"
opened after their departure from the.United States..
"McCormick Speech to Chicago Literary Club," cyrus
McCormick Papers, Subject File "Russia 1917-20".

24"McCormick Diary," May 21, 1917.
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"doing most to win the war."

25

Hie third objective,

described by Root as "a negative one," was to avoid the
appearance of a strong nation dictating to a weaker one.
He emphatically cautioned his colleagues against insisting
on any particular course of action; in all discussions the
representatives of the Russian government were to initiate
26
specific programs.
Most of the discussions on the Buffalo were pro
voked by questions directed to Senator Root. Usually,
they were attempts to secure information on current
conditions in Russia, of what the Mission might expect
to find upon arrival.
was also discussed.

The question of American war aims
The topic had already come up in a

conversation between Root and Russell while they were
still in the united States.

Walling had suggested to

Lansing that the President should publicly denounce and
condemn the "no annexation, no indemnity" concept.

After

Root received this advice, he sought the counsel of
Russell, who said he not only agreed with walling but had
already written to Lansing endorsing this position and
suggested Root do the same.

Root disagreed, feeling that

sufficient information was not available to make such an
important decision, but that, of course, Russell was free
25Ibid.

26Ibid.

LOS
to express his views to the secretary of State.

27

In one of the shipboard conferences, James Duncan,
Labor's representative, stated that the united States
should "join with Russia on a platform of pursueing /sic7
the war for the highest principles of humanity, and say
publicly that there is to be no indemnity and no acquisi
tion of territory," since this would place the united
States "in a fine position with the new Russian government."

2R

The information available to Root indicated

that the term "no annexation and indemnity"
"German origin."

was of

Perhaps because of his experience as

Secretary of State, Root realized that such issues as
the war aims of the united States, not to mention those
of the Allies, were far beyond the scope of the Mission
he headed.

Root agreed that president Wilson in his

speech to Congress on April 2, 1917, had stated that the
United States sought no compensation and indemnities
from its entry into the war.

This did not, however,

exclude the possibility of compensation to other nations.
The united states might join with Russia in denouncing
any compensation, but "there are quite likely to be some
occasions arising in the future for demanding from Germany
27Charles Edward Russell, "Diary," May 18, 1917,
Charles Edward Russell Papers, Box.3. Hereinafter
referred to as "Russell Diary."
28"McCormick Diary," May 29, 1917.
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large payments for the damage she has done."

29

Lest there be any question regarding Wilson’s
statement. Root read to the members of the Mission that
portion of the President's Address to Congress.

Wilson

had "weighed very carefully his words," and Root warned
his colleagues against trying "to improve" upon the
President's statement.

He advised members of the

Mission to avoid, if possible, any discussion of war aims
so as not to be misunderstood and reminded them, "This
jArar aims/ is no part of our errand."
On several occasions, discussion turned to the
topic of the socialists in Russia and potential problems
which could arise concerning them.

Russell ventured his

opinion of the socialist role in the revolutionary move
ment and suggested several factors that would make the
work of the Mission more difficult.

There were, he said,

several factions or groups of socialists in Russia who
"hate each other more than all of them together hate
31
those who are not socialists."
He added.
There is no use disguising the fact that the large
class of socialists in Russia believe that there is no
essential difference between the political government
of the United States and the autocratic rule of old
Russia.
They believe that the United States is not
a democratic republic, but is a Republic in form
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31,1McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
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only, and in reality the wealthy classes rule every
thing and make all the laws.32
Russell remarked that socialists who "would probably be
hostile to the United States" would control a majority of
the delegates to the Constituent Assembly, which was to
determine the permanent plan of Russian government.
Therefore, it would be desirable for him to establish
contact with the socialists, and he had brought his "old
33
clothes'* for just this purpose.
Russell was Incorrect
in his evaluation of the Russian socialists' view of
America.

At this time, the socialists who held the view

he described were mainly Bolsheviks and Mensheviks who
had this opinion of all capitalist countries.

They were,

however, a small minority and not the "large class of
Socialists" to which Russell referred.
Russell also informed his colleagues that the
political stability of Russia could be injured greatly
by the activities of groups he referred to as "radicals"
or "reds."

This element, according to Russell, was similar

to the "I. W. W . t h e

united States, and consisted of

“trouble-makers" who could be counted on to oppose the
Russian government regardless of its form.

But, despite

what Americans in general and the Mission in particular
^"McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
33Ibid.
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might think of them# "they are an Influential body of
men in the new Russian Government, and their views and
their force must be reckoned with."

34

Russell considered one of the major tasks of the
Mission to be that of persuading the Russian people that
the united States was in fact a democratic nation.

He

indicated three major stumbling blocks in the path of
reaching an understanding with the Russian socialists.
The first was an effort by socialist elements in the
United states, described by Russell as "strong, resource
ful,

persistent, and ingenious," to do everything possible

to discredit and hinder the work of the Mission.

Russell

named Morris Hillquit as the leader of this movement and
explained that Hillquit had already begun a campaign of
letters to his friends in Russia to undermine the work
of the Mission.

35

The second obstacle was "pro-German

socialist propaganda," described by Russell as an
attempt to gain a separate peace treaty between Germany
and Russia along the lines of "no annexation— no indera36
nity.”

The last barrier was the practice by "Germans

and misguided men in Russia" of translating for publica
tion in Russia articles originating in the united States
34,1'McCormick Diary," May 21, 1917.
3 3 »McCormick

Diary," May 26, 1917.

^"McCormick

Diary," May 28, 1917.

109
which, in Russell's opinion, presented a distorted and
inaccurate view of the influence of the capitalist element
in controlling American politics.

37

Russell was, he indi

cated, only repeating what was accepted by most Americans.
Hillquit openly opposed Russell as the representative of
American Socialists and Russell assumed that he had so
notified "his friends in Russia."

All attempts to dis

credit the united States in Russia or to end the war with
a separate peace Russell considered part of a "German
plot."
Strangely, there is little evidence of lengthy
discussions among the Mission relating to the actual
situation in Russia,

ifrus, it is impossible to evaluate

accurately the Mission's views prior to their arrival in
Russia.

On the few occasions when Russian political

institutions were mentioned, the comments were usually
vague if not inaccurate.

When Admiral Glennon requested

a clarification of the relationship between the Duma and
the zemstvo. Root replied that the Duma and the Cabinet
were "the highest authority in the land," and the zemstvo
38
was "as influential . . . as the duma."
Whether through
ignorance of the current political situation or simply
omission. Root failed to indicate that the Duma was a
37£McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
38"McCormick Diary," May 25, 1917.

110
national institution whereas the zemstvo was primarily a
local agency.

No one on the Mission mentioned the

Councils of Vforkers' and Soldiers' Deputies, or Soviets,
even though these had received considerable attention in
the American press,

39

Another topic which received scant attention in
the conferences was the importance of organized labor in
Russia.

James Duncan's major task would be to explain the

American labor movement to Russian workmen.

Duncan told

the Mission that the workmen of Russia were unwilling to
do anything to aid the German cause and would do every
thing possible to secure a democratic Russia.^0

He antic

ipated, however, temporary problems which might result
from the Russian workers' almost certain insistence upon
the right to strike.

Duncan hurriedly assured his

colleagues that workmen given this right would not be
too likely to exercise the power.

Senator Foot inter

jected his understanding that there were two types of
strikes in use in Russia at the time.

There were grievances

either "real or fancied" in one, but the other was a
"purely political affair."

Duncan agreed and explained

that the first type resembled strikes common in the United
States, whereas the latter was associated with the Russian

"McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.

Ill
Socialist parties, which used the strike as a political
weapon.

Duncan proposed to differentiate between the two

types with the aid of Russian workers who had returned
from the United States and were familiar with the system
there.

Root gave no indication of his reaction to Duncan's

explanation of the right to strike but pointed out that
"it must be made clear" to the Russian worker "that
industrial development along economic lines is very
different from the political movements which are just
41
now in such a very unsettled state."
in addition to discussions of problems which would
confront the Mission while in Russia, questions frequently
arose as to routine procedure.

It was agreed that Root

would serve as spokesman for the group In official statements as well as in interviews with newsmen.

42

Root

frequently warned his colleagues about their public
statements and suggested that they be especially cautious
when talking with reporters.

He felt that Russian re

porters and the foreign correspondents in petrograd would
"require quite different treatment" from that accorded
43
American newsmen.
Consequently, during his stay in the
4 1 "McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.
4 2 "Russell Diary," May 17, 1917; and "McCormick
Diary," May 21, 1917.
4 3 "McCormick Diary," June 1, 1917.
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Russian capital, Root held separate press conferences for
Russian and foreign correspondents.
Another issue which received frequent attention
was the proposed agenda.

Root explained that questions

as to the schedule of receptions would probably be
answered by Basil Miles, the Secretary of the Mission,
who would join them in Vladivostok.

McCormick suggested

limiting the official receptions, and Root agreed that
they would discreetly inform the appropriate officials
that the Mission did not expect elaborate entertainment.

44

Secretary Lansing had anticipated the burden which would
be placed on the Russian Government by such a large group
and had already instructed Ambassador Francis that only
the members of the Mission and their "immediate personnel"
were to be considered as "guests of the Russian Govern
ment."

By excluding clerks and interpreters, the "guests

of the government" were limited to approximately fifteen
persons.45
The members of the Mission also discussed the
length of their stay in Russia, since the State Depart
ment had placed no time limit on their journey.

Root

explained that their departure from Russia would depend
44

"McCormick Diary," May 24, 1917.

45Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, May 31,
1917, Doc. NO. 763.72/5079A, St. Dept.

entirely upon their ability to gather the required infor
mation but suggested they keep the visit as brief as
possible,

it would be far better to anticipate a tour

of ten days rather than a month# since they could always
extend their stay if it became necessary.

This would have

a much better effect than cutting the trip short after
announcing a lengthy stay# thus giving the impression
there was not enough business to.keep them occupied.
"Nothing would be more embarrassing than to have the
Russian people or the government feeling that they had to
entertain us after we have finished our business."

46

Colonel Judson later wrote his son that Root felt the
Russians might suspect they intended to "watch them" if
the Mission remained too long.

Judson, however# believed

the time proposed was too short to make any adequate
observations# and he hoped to get permission "to stay
behind long enough to get some real dope."

47

McCormick mentioned that a Russian commission
bound for the united States might be in Vladivostok when
they arrived and suggested a meeting with the group.
Root# however# thought that the Americans should not
"make any attempt to delay or meet them."

In his opinion#

^"McCormick Diary," May 24, 1917.
47William V. Judson to clay Judson, June 2# 1917#
William V. Judson Papers, Box 4.
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it was unfortunate that the two missions should be working
simultaneously, but it would be up to the State Department
48
to "reconcile any matters that arise."
McCormick wanted
to invite officials of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to meet
with them during their journey from Vladivostok to Petro
grad and furnish them with information pertaining to local
conditions.

But Root, while conceding that the Mission

could "receive them politely and hear what they have to
say," thought it incorrect to "request interviews or
information from anyone until we have presented ourselves
to the government at petrograd."

49

Inevitably, the question arose as to their relation
ship with Ambassador Francis.

Root explained that Francis

had been the first to recognize the Provisional Government
in "a very dignified and emphatic way" and should be given
due consideration during their stay in Russia.

The Ambas

sador would probably present the members of the Mission
to the Russian Ministers on the occasion of their first
meeting.

After that, more informal conferences would be

conducted "without his presence."

warning his colleagues

that "special missions, as a rule, are not looked on with
favor by regular ambassadors," Root suggested that "it is
quite important that we must show that we feel well-satisfied
48

"McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.

49Ibid.
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with the good impression he has already made."

50

Root was accurate in anticipating Francis' atti
tude.

Although the Ambassador cabled Lansing that he

welcomed the Mission, he expressed misgivings in a
letter to his daughter.

Francis admitted that he was

“looking forward to its /fission *s7 arrival with some
concern" as it might 'interfere with the pleasant rela51
tions I have established."
Since little of the time aboard ship was devoted
to formal conferences, the Mission occupied its waking
hours in other fashions.

Many read material which they

hoped would prepare them for the task that lay ahead.
Root mentioned reading Russia and Reform by Bernard
Pares.

Mott, oddly, read two volumes of Elihu Root's
c2

published addresses.3

Movies were usually shown during

the evening, and on one occasion the members of the
Mission and the crew of the Buffalo were treated to a
53
film on "how to care for and dress a little baby."
Most of the men played deck golf, introduced by John Mott,
or tossed a sand-filled football, provided by Colonel
50"McCormick Diary," May 23, 1917.
53-David r . Francis to Jane Francis, May 8/21, 1917,
David R. Francis Papers, Box "May 1917."
52"McCormick Diary,". May 26 and May 30, 1917.

53"McCormlck Diary," June 2, 1917.
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Mott.

54

McCormick mentioned frequent "dog trots" around

the deck.

Most of the men made the crossing with little

ill effect.

General Scott, however, suffered from sea

sickness during most of the voyage.

After a week at sea

he wrote to his wife that she never need worry that he
55
would "turn pirate and take to the sea."
From the first days of their journey, the members
of the Mission established close personal relationships
which were not predictable in view of their diverse
backgrounds.

Although selected for various reasons, all

the members demonstrated strong support for the war
effort and a feeling that the Mission had an important
role to play in winning the war.

There appears to have

been a genuine feeling of camaraderie.

Years later.

Colonel Mott noted in his memoirs, "we went out a happy
family and came back united."
Each man had a rich background in his own chosen
field which the others respected and found interesting.
While crossing North Dakota and Montana, General Scott
told stories of his youth in the Indian country which
54,,The Log," 4-5, Elihu Boot Papers, Box 192.
Hereinafter cited as "Mission Log."
55Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manus
cripts, Library of Congress).
56Mott, Twenty Years, 195.
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fascinated the others.

57

Russell, engrossed in the ex

ploits of the old Indian fighter, filled pages of his
diary with Scott’s stories.

These excerpts indicate a

nostalgia for the frontier completely unexpected in a
53
leader of the socialist movement.
Due to seasickness,
Scott spent much of the day relaxing in a deck chair, but
he recalled that each morning McCormick brought a blanket
on deck and ninsist/ed7 upon tucking me into my chair and
59
wrapping up my feet."
Every man in the group who recorded his reaction
to the Chairman of the Mission expressed respect and
admiration for Senator Root.

Colonel Judson found Root

to be "most affable and frank" and possessing "a sense of
60
humor I did not suspect."
Two weeks later he remarked,
"Mr. Root grows on me . . .
to him."

it is a treat to be so clos-3

Scott described Root as "a very great man"

and considered himself "roost fortunate to be associated
57"Mission bog," p. 2.
58"Russell Diary," May 15-18, 1917.
59Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
60William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson,
May 17, 1917, William V. Judson papers. Box 4.
®^William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson,
May 31, 1917, William V. Judson papers, Box 4.
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with him."

62

Later, when writing of the Mission and what

it had meant to him personally, Scott stated that the
"greatest advantage" had been the opportunity to know
Root at "close range" and noted that Root always appeared
in "good humor" with "something kindly to say to every
body."

Scott believed he "had had the rare privilege of

close association with the most far-seeing, wisest, and
sagacious man I had ever seen, and hereby classify him-to my mind— the foremost citizen of the Republic."®2
Colonel Mott credited Root's "wisdom" and "the charm of
his nature" with preventing the Mission from breaking up
into "quarreling groups" and felt that the members
"truly fed out of his hand."
On one occasion, Mott told Root that he had read
two volumes of Root's published addresses and compli
mented him;

"in going quite carefully

over these

addresses my conviction has been made stronger than ever
as to your own absolutely unique and exceptional qualifi
cations for the presidency of the united States."

As

important as the presidency was, Mott believed there was
still another position for which Root was "qualified as
® 2Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manu
scripts, Library of Congress).
®2Scott,

"The Russian Revolution," 30.

®4Mott, Twenty Years, 195.
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no other living man in this or any other country," namely
the "leading part" he could play in the peace negotiations
at the end of the war.

McCormick agreed and said that he

had had several conversations along these lines with
65
others in the Mission.
This great admiration for Hoot
clearly illustrates the political conservatism of most of
the Mission members.
On the last day on board the Buffalo, Hoot again
warned his colleagues to be careful that any statement
was not misunderstood and stressed the "absolute necessity
of discretion."

He also repeated President Wilson’s

instructions that the Mission was to "bear a friendly
greeting . . .

to find out Russia’s needs" and to refrain

from giving "any advice or direction as to how to conduct
Russia's affairs in the present crisis."

66

On the afternoon of June 2, the coast of Russia
became faintly visible.

At 5:30 a.m. on the third of
67
June, the U. S. S. Buffalo steamed into Vladivostok.

^ 5,,McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
6 6 "McCormick Diary," June 2, 1917.
^ " M i s s i o n bog," 4-6.

CHAPTER V
VLADIVOSTOK TO PETROGRAD
Although Captain Hinds had signaled and also used
the ship's wireless to notify the port of his arrival, no
official met the vessel to assign it anchorage.

The

Captain of the Buffalo, therefore, selected an anchorage
and waited.1" On their first encounter with Russia, the
Mission had confronted the confusion that prevailed.
the Army Chief of Staff later recalled,

As

"Here was a ship

of a foreign navy coming into a port in war time and
receiving no notice from anybody.
had abandoned their duty."

2

Evidently all officia3~

perhaps one reason for the

less than routine port procedure was the fact that the
Mission arrived on the day of the Russian Feast of
3
Trinity or Whitsuntide.
Unwilling to accept the service of the Russian
navy's small boats which swarmed around the vessel in
search of passengers, the group remained on board to
await some Russian official.

After an hour, the vessel

■^"Mission Log," 6; and "McCormick Diary," June 3,

1917.
^Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.
3 "Mission Log," 7.
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w a s b o a r d e d by L i e u t e n a n t y e s t r e b e v ,

an a i d to the Cora-

tnander of the Russian fleet stationed at Vladivostok.

4,

Later, the American Consul in Vladivostok, John K.
Caldwell, came on board along with Major Stanley
Washburn, assistant secretary to the Mission, Lieutenant
E. Francis Riggs, military attach^ to the American Embassy
at Petrograd, Eugene Prince, a Mission interpreter, Hugh
A. Moran, a Y. M. C. A. official, Charles S. Smith,
Associated Press correspondent in Peking, and Lieutenant
General Krylov, Commander of the Post of Vladivostok.

5

The American consul explained that he had expected the
Mission to arrive on Monday, June 4, and had received a
telegram informing him of the arrival only after the
6
vessel was in port.
Nevertheless, the special train
provided for the Mission would be ready to leave at 2:30
7
that afternoon.
Lieutenant Riggs had accompanied the Bakhmetev
Commission bound for Washington, D.C., as far as
Vladivostok.

This group, headed by Boris Bakhmetev, was

composed of men who would supervise purchases made with
money already loaned the Provisional Government by the
4 Ibid., 6.
5Ibid., 6-7.
6 "McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.

7Ibid.
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United States.

Eugene Prince had left the Russian capi9
tal two days after Riggs' departure.
Smith joined the

Root Mission in Vladivostok and obtained permission to
travel with the party to Petrograd.

Lansing let Root

decide whether Smith could accompany the Mission but
indicated his own approval in a wire which stated that
Smith was known to the State Department as a correspond
ent of "fine character and discretion.
August Held, the general agent for International
Harvester in Vladivostok, also boarded the Buffalo soon
after it docked and gave his interpretation of conditions
in Russia.

He was perhaps the first of many persons who

informed the Mission that discipline in the Army since
the Revolution had almost disappeared.

He attributed

many of the problems confronting Russia to the radicals
who were "gradually winning converts to their views."
Many of the "loud talkers" were those who had recently
returned from the United States.

in Vladivostok, this

element had attempted to discredit the Mission and had
attacked Root, labeling him a representative of the
capitalist class.
«

i
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Heid felt, however, that the mass of
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j

8warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution,
106-07.
8David r . Francis to Robert Lansing, May 18, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4792, St. Dept.
^ R o b e r t Lansing to Elihu Root, May 28, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5121A, St. Dept.
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the Russian people were friendly toward America and that
the situation could he improved greatly if this element
could be reached.

He suggested that the Mission in some

way institute a "propaganda of publicity" which through
"stirring messages" could persuade the people to support
the war effort.

'The view that adequate "propaganda"

could persuade the Russians to support the war effort
was perhaps the most universally held opinion of Mission
members and persons with whom they consulted during their
trip.

At times it appears that they saw it as a cure-all

for the problems of Russia, a naive and Unrealistic
appraisal of the true state of affairs in that country.
At two in the afternoon of June 3, the group
boarded two launches for the pier.

3*hey were met at the

landing by the "local Executive Committee" of Vladivostok,
representatives of the Soldiers* and Workers* Soviets,
Captain V. M. Yakouborsky who represented the city of
Vladivostok, and two young girls who presented a bouquet
of flowers to Root.

N. P. Matveov, spokesman for the

group, described by one of the Americans as a "typical
Russian" with a "full beard and bald head,"

11

welcomed

the Mission to Russia and inquired as to its "aims and
purposes." "it is our aim," Root replied, "to convey to
the Russian democracy the good will of America, her sister

H"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
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democracy? to seek to establish closer cooperation and
friendship between the two nations, and to learn what
the needs of Russia are and to assist her in every way
12
possible."
Matveov responded that he hoped the Mission
would meet with success and that "cordial and friendly"
13
relations between the two nations would continue.*
Although the Mission learned that there had been
some unfavorable discussion about its composition and
objectives,

14

neither the diaries nor the official report

indicates any significant attempt to prevent their land
ing or delay their departure for Petrograd.

Bertron later

wrote that some "agitators" attempted to stage a protest
but that it was "ineffective."

15

General Scott recorded

that upon arriving in Vladivostok they were uncertain if
*
they would be allowed to proceed to Petrograd without
l2"Mission Log#" p. 7.
■
L3lbid., 7-8; Three days earlier, when the
Stevenb Commission arrived, one of the members drew
political implications from a similar reception. The
reception was headed by a representative of the "Council
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies" and "following in
his wake" were the Military Governor of the Province,
the Mayor of Vladivostok, and a General "all looking
cowed and mortified at their part in the performance."
George Gibbs, "Russian Trip Notes," 8, George Gibbs
papers (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin). Hereinafter referred to as Gibbs, "Russian
Trip Notes."
14"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
3-5samuel R. Bertron to Edward M. House, June 18,
1917, Edward M. House Papers, Drawer 3.

125
some attempt to "blow up the Train."

16

More important is

the fact that on their first encounter with Russia, the
members of Root's Mission failed to recognize the power
of the local Soviet, which prevented any hostile demonstration.

17

At any rate, less than an hour after leaving the
Buffalo, the party was comfortably quartered on a special
train provided by the Russian government; and under the
supervision of Vladimir Gorbatenko, an official of the
Chinese Eastern Railway, they began their trip across
Russia.

The train consisted of seven cars powered by

two wood-burning locomotives.

Root was assigned the

private car of the railroad's general manager.

The

other members were provided with two bedrooms.

Their

first meal as guests of the Russian Government was in
keeping with their accommodations.

McCormick described

it as 'fe most delicious affair" which included cavier,
crab, St. Germain soup, a rice dish with chopped eggs,
fish, potatoes, and roast lamb as well as other "tid
bits."18
Notwithstanding their excellent accommodations,
the Mission observed with unanimous concern the obvious
^Scott,

"The Russian Revolution," 5.

■^White, Survival, 142.

^"Mission Log," 8; and "McCormick Diary," June 3,
1917.

126
inability of the Russian railway system to relieve the
port of the tremendous amount of material awaiting ship
ment inland.

Russell described the city of Vladivostok

as containing between seven and eight hundred tons of
freight that the Russians were unable to ship inland.
Many of the crates had been broken open, their contents
exposed to the elements.

Russell saw "munitions of war,

guns, shells, explosives, food, steel, hospital supplies"
and, in fact, "everything that Russia needs" gradually
ruining in the streets or in poorly protected warehouses
in Vladivostok.

He felt that this collection of material

was "a monument to the hapless incapacity of the Russian
government.II,L
Gibbs, Who was with the Railway Commission, was
also shocked at the large amount of material stored in
Vladivostok.

He estimated that the stockpile included

150.000 tons of chemicals, 86,000 tons of barbed wire,
100.000 tons of railway material,

160 bales of cotton,

and 50,000 tons of munitions and explosives,

unlike

Russell, however, Gibbs thought that "most of these

materials have evidently been systematically cared for,
considering the circumstances, and the result reflects
credit upon the industry of the port authorities."
^ "Rus s e l l Diary," June 3, 1917.
20Glbbs,

"Russian Trip Notes," 11.

20
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Gibbs added, however, that the situation illustrated a
complete lack of "forethought and co-ordination on the
part of the government."

He described as a "crime" a

situation which allowed material to continue to be brought
in after there was no possibility of its reaching its
destination.21
This unfavorable impression of the Russian rail
way system was later underscored by interviews with
Russian officials, who constantly mentioned the need for
locomotives and all types of railway supplies.

The

Mission considered improved transportation so essential
to the successful prosecution of the war that its final
report, while acknowledging this to be an area specifi
cally assigned to the Stevens Commission, placed great
22
emphasis on this problem.
The special, train arrived in Harbin about twentyfour hours after leaving Vladivostok and was met by
General Dmitri Horwarth, commander of the Chinese
Eastern Railway.

Horwarth retained his position held

under the old regime and was described by the socialist
member of the Mission as a "typical Russian officer,"
very tall and impressive in his elaborate uniform and

21Ibid.

22

"Mission Report," Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
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"autocratic to his finger tips."

23

The group was also met

by a delegation of three Chinese officials headed by wa
Wang Tingva, a representative of the Foreign office in
Peking, which was to greet the Mission and accompany the
24
train through Chinese territory.
Stevens and Charles K. Moser, American Consul in
Harbin, also greeted the Mission.

The Stevens Commission

had left Vladivostok at approximately the same time the
25
Root Mission arrived.
its members had already spent
several days in Russia and were very aware of the confusion and poor condition of the Russian railway system.

26

The two official American groups, appearing in
Russia at the same time, could have worked at cross
purposes.

The Railway Commission was created before the

decision to send the Root Mission and sailed from Vancou
ver for valdivostok the day before Root and his party left
Washington.

27

Stevens had asked Lansing to give his group

diplomatic rank, but Root strongly opposed this, ex
plaining it would be awkward to have two diplomatic
missions in the same country at the same time.

During

2 3 "Russell Diary," June 4, 1917.

2 4 "Mission Log," 10..
2 5 "McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.

26Gibbs,

"Russian Trip Notes," 9-11.

2^Browder, Provisional Government Documents, II,

702.
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their stay in Petrograd, a certain amount of ill-feeling
developed between the two groups, due primarily to what
Stevens considered- interference by members of the Root
Mission.

At least one member of the Railway Commission

believed that his group received inadequate consideration
in such matters as hotel accommodations due to the Pro
visional Government's preoccupation with the Root
Mission.
Be that as it may, there was some feeling of
rivalry from the two groups' first encounter.

Russell

recorded that the departure of the Stevens Commission
from Harbin ahead of the Root Mission "occasioned some
comment."

He, however, was impressed with the personnel

of the Stevens Commission and said that he had "never
seen a body

of men likely to inspire one with greater

confidence . . . .

_7T7he government has the pick of the
29
best railroad ability in America."
During the brief time they were together, Stevens
briefed Root on the situation.

He explained that it was

neither the congestion in Vladivostok nor the lack of
terminals that was hindering the movement of freight.
Although there was a "great lack" of rolling stock, the
major problem resulted from the "organization of the

28Gibbs,

"Russian Trip Notes," passim.

2 9 "Russell Diary," June 4, 1917.
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railway."

"A change in the personnel is absolutely nec

essary if there is to be any success in getting a movement
30

of freight.11

He thought the subordinate workers were

efficient but the "supervising authorities" were "wholly
incapable."

31

The same opinion was expressed by another

member of the Railroad Commission who thought that the
major problem was a "complete lack of authority" with
subordinates "moving in circles . . . ignorant of the
general plans of operation."

32

The Mission was also met in Harbin by a second
Chinese delegation, this one representing the Chinese
Government.

It was headed by Wang Lin-goh, a member of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and personal representa
tive of Wu Ting-fang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
33
acting prime Minister of the Peking government.
Wang
presented a letter of introduction from the acting Prime
Minister which welcomed the group to Chinese Territory
and also extended them an invitation to visit Peking
before their return to the United States.3^

Root1s letter

3 0"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
3LXbld.
32"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
33"Mission Log," 10; "Russell Diary," June 5,
1917; and "McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
34Wu Ting Fang to Elihu Root, May 10, 1917, Elihu
Root Papers, Box 192.
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of reply to Wu, whom he addressed as "my old friend,11
stated that he and the other members would be pleased to
visit Peking, but that the nature of their duties would
not permit it.33

Wang and the other Chinese officials

boarded the train in Harbin and traveled with the Mission
until they reached the limits of Chinese territory the
following day.33
The Mission later considered visiting Peking.
They were strongly advised to do so by Charles S. Smith
37
who had just come from that city.
Political develop
ments which occurred in Peking while they were still in
Petrograd prevented any possibility of a visit.

38

The Mission was detained briefly in Harbin.

The

party was to board the special train which only a few
weeks before had been the personal train of Tsar Nicholas.
In fact, for the next few days the group would be cross
ing Russia in the very car in which the last Autocrat had
penned his abdication.

The train, nine cars in all,

included dining cars, a salon, and even a rolling
33Elihu Root to Wu Ting Fang, June 5, 1917, Elihu
Root papers, Box 192.
36"Mission Log,'1 10.
■^"McCormick Diary," June 6, 1917.

33"Mission Report," 4. in July, Peking was the
scene of an armed clash between the supporters of the
C h 1ing Dynasty and those who favored a Republic thus
making any diplomatic visit impossible.
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slaughterhouse.

one member o£ the Mission remarked that

the train included '’everything that can be thought of for
the comfort of the traveler."

one feature that provoked

much comment was the amply supplied game area which con
tained almost every conceivable gambling device.

Root sent

his daughter Edith a letter written on a score pad from a
40
card table in the Tsar's sitting room.
Colonel Mott
"ransacked" the drawers of the card tables and found a
bridge score card bearing the name "Nicky."

41

The long trip across Russia was pleasant.

After

the first night, McCormick awakened from a "sound sleep"
in "the most comfortable bed I ever had on a sleeping
42
car."
Compared to American railroads with their
"banging and hammering;' Russell considered the transSiberian like a "sleigh upon ice."43

Colonel ortel, who

had been in charge of the Tsar's train for fifteen years
and still remained in that capacity, occasionally told
the group of his memories of the Tsar and his family.44
39"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917; William V.
Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, June 5, 1917, William
V. Judson Papers, Box 4; and "Russell Diary," June 5, 1917.
40jessup, Elihu Root, II, 361.
41

Mott, Twenty Years, 196.

4^"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
43Charles Edward Russell, unchained Russia (New
York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1918), 181-182.

44"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
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At almost every stop there were brief speeches.
Gorbatenko would usually explain briefly to the Russians
at the station the purpose of the Mission and introduce
Senator Root.

Root would then make a few remarks,

usually pertaining to the friendship which existed be 
tween the two countries, and would then refer to the
need for both countries to vigorously pursue the war.

45

The members of the Mission seldom left the train and then
only for a few minutes in the various stations.

Thus,

most of their personal observations were restricted to
the geography of the region through which they passed.
They were impressed by the large number of persons, both
civilian and military, present at all stations.

The

apparent lack of disorder and violence re-enforced their
opinion that the great mass of Russians were lawabiding.

46
The eleven days required to reach the Russian

capital offered the Mission a second opportunity to con
sider their situation in Russia and how best to fulfill
their purpose.

The time spent on board the Buffalo had

been used to exchange views on Russia, but no one on
board the vessel had been in Russia since the overthrow
^ " M i s s i o n Log," passim; copies of several similar
speeches are found in Box 136, Elihu Root Papers.
"McCormick Diary," passim; "Russell Diary,"
passim; and "Mission bog," passim.
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of the Tsar^ and most of the men realized that their
knowledge of Russia was wholly inadequate.

The second

leg of their lengthy trip, however, was one in which the
members began to receive impressions and form opinions
which were to be reflected in the final report which they
submitted to the Wilson Administration.
One superficial source of information was personal
observation, if only from the window of the Tsar's train
and from railway stations.

More important were the many

hours of conversation with Americans who had been in
Russia during the past few months, other Americans, not
officially attached to the

Mission, frequently met the

train and offered the party information and interpreta
tions.

Many Russians who accompanied the group also

contributed to the opinions formed by the Mission members
prior to their arrival in Petrograd.
Although the Mission had a keen interest in a
multitude of topics, their major concern lay* in two areas*
the events of the past few months which had led to the
creation of the Provisional Government, and the chances
of its survival.

They were equally interested in the

Russian war effort and the

chances of Russia's staying

the war.
General Scott, later describing the Mission's
arrival in Vladivostok, made a point of the fact that

in
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during wartime a vessel of a foreign nation had entered
the port without the knowledge of the commander of the
port.

47

For the first few days after the Mission left

Vladivostok, there was little to change this first im
pression of Russian negligence and disorganization.

The

Mission was constantly confronted with trains loaded with
soldiers traveling away from the Front.

48

on their first

full day of travel, McCormick observed that the "predom
inant feature" of all the railroad stations they passed
was the large number of soldiers "without any apparent
reason for their being there."

This led him to believe

that the Russian soldiers were apathetic toward "all the
49
issues of the war."
After almost a week of travel, a
troop train was finally seen going toward the Front.**0
One member of the Mission described this event as "the
first real good sign we have had since reaching Russia."51
Root remarked that "the saddest thing as I see it is
the apathy of the Russian soldiers.

They seem to have

47Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.
4 3 "Russell Diary," passim; "McCormick Diary,"
passim; and Hugh L. Scott, "Diary," passim. Box 71
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). Herein
after cited as "Scott Diary."
4 9"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
50"Mission Log," 16.
51"scott Diary," June 11, 1917.
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no snap, no objective and to be generally taking things
,.52
easy."
This pessimistic view came not only from the
Mission1s own observations but also from its discussions
with persons who had been in Russia during the past few
months.

Heid believed that Russia’s future would be

determined by the military.

He painted a pessimistic

picture of the Army:
At present they are entirely without disci
pline. The soldiers come and go as they please
and take no orders from the officers except as
such orders may be approved by the soldiers'
committee. They get up at 9 or 9:30, have no
drill, walk about the streets, . . . and, in
short, seem to be enjoying a complete vacation
from all military duties,
lhis atmosphere
pervades everything else, and there is no
discipline anywhere.53
Lieutenant Riggs, who joined the Mission in
Vladivostok, also furnished information about Russia's
military strength.

He informed John Mott and McCormick

that Russian troops were "about ready to lay down arms"
prior to the Revolution and would have done so had not
the united States entered the war.

The Russian troops

found the war "a very distasteful cause" and America's
entry into the war was the "only influence" capable of
54
keeping the Russian soldiers in the war.*'
52"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
53"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
54"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.

No evidence
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substantiates this observation, which probably resulted
from America's distorted opinion of the effect of its
entry into the war.
Riggs estimated that “fully 12 or 15 percent" of
the Russian troops along the front had deserted.

There

had also been cases of fraternizing between the Russian
and German troops,

if the Germans wished to make an

advance, they would be able to “go through the Russian
lines like a circus rider through' a paper hoop. "

Riggs

felt, however, that the German armies were waiting quietly
in the hope of winning over the Russian troops by "in55
action and generosity."
Riggs was quidk to point out that the situation
in the army resulted primarily from conditions which had
existed— and which he had personally observed— prior to
the Revolution.

Army discipline and conditions were so

harsh and inhuman that one could not expect the common
soldier to react in any other manner.

After the Revolu

tion, soldiers and citizens were intoxicated with their
new-found freedom.

"All discipline had stopped" and they

were "enjoying a grand holiday."

56

Riggs then explained

Ibid. Lieutenant Riggs was wrong in his esti
mate that American entry into the war had maintained
military discipline in the Russian Army. He was apparent
ly unaware of the primary cause of the collapse of army
discipline; neither he, nor any other observer, mentioned
"Soviet Order No. 1."

56Ibid.
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to the Mission that if Russia were to leave the war# the
United States would be the "next nation in line” to supply
troops for the Allied cause.

He therefore emphasized that

everything possible should be done to keep Russia in the
war even if it was only "an appearance of continuing the
war."

57

Reuben H. Smith# an interpreter who had joined
58
the Mission of June 8 at Krasnoyarsk#
gave essentially
the same evaluation as Riggs.5®

At least one observer

believed that the crisis in the Army had passed,

it was

Vladimir Gorbatehko's opinion that many soldiers had
returned home expecting an immediate division of the
land.

When they found that this was not forthcoming#
60
they began the return to their units.
Gorbatenko's
view was completely erroneous.
During their first fdw days in Russia# the mem
bers of the Mission came to believe that the military
situation was far from satisfactory.

They unanimously

voiced the urgent need to persuade the Russian people to
pursue the war vigorously.

From both Russians and

Americans living in Russia, the members heard that oppo
sition to the war was largely the work of German
57Ibid.
58"Mission bog#" 15.
5®"McCormick Diary#" June 9, 1917.

80"McCormick Diary#" June 10, 1917.
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propagandists and that a propaganda bureau would be the
most effective for fighting this technique.

Members of

the Root Mission were so ignorant of the deeply rooted
desire of most Russians to end the war that they assumed
that anyone who tried to halt the fighting must be a
German sympathizer or under the influence of German
propagandists.
In addition to their concern over military prob
lems, the Mission demonstrated an intense interest in
the political situation.

Not only had the entire Tsarist

governmental structure been overthrown, but there had
already been a shift in the membership of the Provisional
Government.

The new government, known as the First

Coalition, was created at approximately the same time
the Root Mission left the united States.

The change

resulted from Miliukov's failure to alter Russia's ex
pansionist war aims.

Although non-socialists were still

in the majority, the new cabinet contained six socialists
whereas the first had had only one.

As events were

occurring so'rapidly, the Mission engaged in very little
discussion of current politics prior to their arrival in
Vladivostok.

After their coming, however, they fre

quently analyzed the shifting political scene.
Basil Miles, the Mission Secretary who along with
Lieutenant Ramsey of the Russian Foreign office joined the
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group at Ekaterinburg on June 11, attempted to brief the
Mission on current political trends.

He requested the

American Consuls in Vladivostok and Harbin to secure
newspapers for the use of the Mission.

fi1

After he

joined the group, he frequently read articles from
62
Russian newspapers which dealt with politics.
But,
as with military affairs, the Mission's greatest source
of information seems to have been conversations with
Americans and Russians who traveled with them across
Russia.
Without exception, persons who had been in Russia
during the past few months and had expressed an opinion
felt that politics would not become stable for several
63
weeks or even months.
Heid was one of the first to
give,, an evaluation of the political situation.

He

pointed out that the Revolution had brought general
instability and little if any direction.

A major cause

for this, said Heid, were the Russian "anarchists" who
recently returned from the united States.

This element,

an extremely small minority of the Russian people,
albeit the most active element, was "gradually winning
Basil Miles to American Consul, Harbin and
Vladivostok /^no date7, Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
62"McCormick Diary," passim.
63-ihis view was expressed by Heid, Eitikoff,
Katterfield, Smith, and Brittenham.
"McCormick Diary,"
passim.
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converts to their view."

Heid believed that the Mission

could render a "great service" if it created an agency
to persuade the "large middle class of quiet thinking
people" to exert an influence on Russian political life.
in Held's opinion, the situation had "improved somewhat
under the coalition government," which he predicted
64
"will succeed."
Heid's reference to the existence
of a large middle class and its potential influence on
politics was obtuse, if not stupid.

Advice of this

caliber prevented the Mission from acquiring a realis
tic view of the situation in Russia.
Another impression that the Mission received
from these discussions was that the recent cabinet
changes strengthened rather than weakened the Provisional
Government.

Lieutenant Riggs, who described former

Minister of War Guchkov as "a man of autocratic tem
perament," considered Kerensky an improvement who would
"be able to do more with the materials at hand."
Tereshchenko would "do just as well" as Miliukov, whom
Riggs described as a "student and idealist."

65

This

opinion of Miliukov was also held by Eltikov who told
Duncan that the Russian leader had "lost his standing
with the people" as he had been "too opinionated, too
^^"McCorroick Diary," June 3, 1917.

"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
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idealistic, too impracticable."

66

Smith was optimistic

about the recent changes in the cabinet and pointed out
that Kerensky had made speeches which had "strengthened
the soldiers very much."

He described the new Minister

of War as "a man of purpose" who would try to "bring
order out of the chaos that surrounds his department."

67

In expressing their reactions to the recent cabinet
changes, the observers made no mention of the party or
ideological affiliations of Guchkov, Miliukov, or
Kerenksy, nor did they mention that the changes increased
the power of the socialists.
Another viewpoint was that the unstable politi
cal situation would probably change several times
before a period of stabilization developed.

This led

some observers to suggest the possibility of a takeover
by a dictator, a development which might be desirable.

68

At least one member of the Mission appears to have
accepted this view.

Samuel Bertron wrote Colonel

that a takeover by a dictator who

House

would remain in power

until a constitutional assembly met "may be a good
69
thing."0
6 6 "McCormick Diary," June

5, 1917.

^"McCormick Diary," June

9, 1917.

6 8 "McCormick Diary," June

5 and 9, 1917.

®^Samuel K. Bertron to Edward M. House, June 18,
1917, Edward M. House Papers, Drawer 3.

143
Although there was considerable discussion by
the Mission of "radicals'* and "anarchists," there is no
evidence that the members, any more than others in
Russia at that time, were aware of the Bolshevik threat
to the Provisional Government.

Perhaps the only specific

reference to the Bolsheviks came from Gorbatenko, who
informed the Mission that "the only menace to the new
Republic is at Petrograd."
group of extreme socialists.

The danger came from a small
Led by Lenin, who possessed

"cleverness in planning" and an "unscrupulous character,"
they were able to exert far more influence than their
numbers would indicate,

Gorbatenko's solution to the

problem would be to arrest Lenin and "put him where he
70
cannot communicate with the outside world."
in view
of later political developments, Gorbatenko*s fears
were well-founded,

in May, 1917, however, few persons,

and certainly no member of the Mission, recognized that
threat.
It is apparent, therefore, from conversations
and interviews with persons who had been in Russia
during the past few months, that Mission members received
a fairly hopeful view of the political situation.

Air*

though all observers had agreed that there would be a
period of considerable political unrest, no one seemed
70"McCormick Diary," June 10, 1917.
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to doubt that the Provisional Government would stay in
power.

Obviously, such advice proved to be incorrect.

Perhaps the most noticeable error was the inability of
the observers to discern the division of power between
the provisional Government and the petrograd Soviet,

in

fact, the petrograd Soviet was not even mentioned.
On June 13, 1917, at five in the afternoon,
after approximately one month of travel, the Mission
reached its destination.

The train bearing Ambassador

Root and his colleagues arrived in a "dingy and far from
imposing" Petrograd station, where they were joined by
Charles R. Crane, the remaining member of the Mission.

71,1'Russell Diary," June 13, 1917
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CHAPTER VI
OFFICIAL RECEPTIONS
The Mission was welcomed at the Petrograd rail
road station by a Russian delegation headed b y Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs M. I. Tereshchenko, American
Ambassador Francis, members of the Embassy staff, mili1
tary advisors, and members of the consular corps.
The
Mission did not record any displeasure at their recep
tion.

A young Russian naval officer who was present,

however, recorded in his diary that the whole affair had
been "sloppily managed."

He suggested that the Mission

failed to notice the Russian Honor Guard because the
dingy khaki uniforms "blended perfectly with the dirty
yellow walls of the station."

The reception did not

include a military band due, no doubt, to its refusal
"to be bothered."

2

Following a few brief remarks and a good deal of
confusion,

the group was assigned to automobiles and

driven to the winter Palace where quarters had been
L,,Mission Log," 17-18.
2White, Survival, 138.
3 "McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917.
145

146
provided for their stay In petrograd.

4

Ambassador Hoot

and General Scott were assigned adjoining rooms on the
second floor overlooking Palace Square.

The other members

were assigned rooms on the third floor with a view of the
Winter Gardens.

5

Those who recorded reactions to their accommoda
tions were impressed with the tremendous size of the
structure.

Russell compared the distance from his bed-

rooto to the dining area to the "distance from 27th to
32nd Street on Broadway."

Anyone unfamiliar with the

"maze of intricate corridors, passages, stairways and
£
twisting and twining" needed a guide.
McCormick ob
served more precisely that the distance from his room to
7
the front exit required "440 steps."
Other impressions of the Winter Palace tended to
reflect the personality and past experience of the in
dividual.

General Scott, who occupied a suite once

used by Catherine the Great, commented on the "heavy and
expensive" furniture.

He was more impressed with the

Palace's almost fortress-like structure and described in
4Charles Russell commented that during the trip
across Petrograd,'"tense crowds filled the near-by streets
and stared upon us.but without the least ripple of a
cheer."
"Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.
5 "Mission Log," 18.
6 "Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.

7 "McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917.
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some detail the walls three feet thick and the doors
g
covered with steel plates.
McCormick complained of having
to share a hath.

Russell did not know the "imperial para

site" who had formerly occupied his suite but suspected
"for reasons to be mentioned delicately if at all" that
g
it had "housed a woman."
On the afternoon of June 14 the Mission was formally
presented to Tereshchenko by Ambassador Francis, who had
been temporarily delayed by a conference with the Stevens
Commission.^

The group walked the short distance to the

Foreign Ministry in "solemn state and long-tailed coats."11
In his introductory remarks, Francis stated that the pur12
pose of the Mission
was to bring "good will and sympathy"
from the oldest democracy to the youngest.

13

Tereshchenko

made appropriate remarks of welcome in excellent English
which impressed the Mission members.

He referred to the

war only once.
8 "Scott Diary," June 13, 1917.
^"McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917; and "Russell
Diary," June 13, 1917.
^"McCormick Diary," June 14, 1917.
llMRussell Diary," June 14, 1917.
12prancis consistently referred to the group as a
"Commission" rather than a "mission." White, Survival,
143.
13"McCormick Diary," June 14, 1917. This reference
to the youngest and oldest democracies was a favorite
clich£ among the Mission.
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Senator Root then explained to the Foreign Minister
that the Mission brought friendship and sympathy and was
prepared to "show our sympathy in stronger ways than words."
He continued, "We will bring you money, we will help you
with commodities . . . and we will help you with men."
Plans were made to present the Mission to the remaining
members of the Provisional Government on the following
day.14
The Mission gathered at 9:30 p.m. on June 15 in
the Gold Room of the Winter Palace.

Accompanied by aides

and others who were attached to the Mission, they pro
ceeded to the palace of the Council of the Empire where
they were joined by Ambassador Francis and his staff.

15

Foreign Minister Tereshchenko greeted the men and escorted
them into the Council chamber.

Ambassador Francis intro-

duced Senator Root, who then read his prepared statement.

16

Root's address may well be considered the most
significant message the Mission delivered.

He began by

complimenting the Russian people on their recent revolu
tion and explained that news of the revolt was greeted
^"McCormick Diary," June 14, 1917.
15"Mission bog," 21-22.
16A copy of Root's speech had
chenko in order that he could prepare
had been translated into Russian, and
net followed Root’s remarks in copies
"McCormick Diary," June 15# 1917.

been provided Teresh
a reply. The Address
members of the Cabi
available to each.

with "universal satisfaction and joy" in America,

in an

obvious attempt to emphasize the reluctance of the Ameri
can government to interfere with the course of the Revolu
tion, Root assured his audience that "America knows little
of the special conditions of Russian life which must give
form to the government and to the laws which you are
about to create."

Turning to the war, Root expressed a

view which he and other members of the Mission repeated
on several occasions;

"The triumph of German arms will

mean the death of liberty in Russia."

In order to save

the Revolution, Germany must be defeated.

Root left no

doubt as to his government's desire for more active
military participation:

"We are going to fight . ... for

your freedom equally with our own, and we ask you to
fight for our freedom equally with yours."

Root con

cluded by stating that Mission members wanted to discuss
"practical and specific methods" for cooperation between
17
the two governments.
The Russian Foreign Minister's reply to Root was
also couched in generalizations, and reference was again
made to the "oldest and newest republics in the Vforld."
Tereshchenko read long passages from the American Declara
tion of Independence and noted numerous similarities
^"Root's Address to the Council of Ministers,
June 15, 1.1917," Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
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between the two nations.

With regard to the war, Teresh

chenko pointed out that the Russians had "no wish of
conquest or domination and are opposed to those ideas in
others."

He emphasized that this change "in our inter

national relations and in our international policy" had
18
come as a result of the Revolution.
The Americans were obviously disappointed in
Tereshchenko's reply.

McCormick observed that it was

"most general" and made no reference to "the very impor19
tant points made by senator Root."
General Scott com
mented that the speech "failed to put the emphasis on the
fighting of Germany" and observed that, if Germany were
not defeated,

"all these other airy superstructures of

the freedom of Russia will go by the board."

20

The members

of the Mission might have been more sympathetic toward the
Foreign Minister had they known the degree of anti-war
sentiment.

Even as Tereshchenko made his reply to Root,

one member of the Provisional Government requested that a
Russian officer attached to the Mission explain that "we
18"Address of Minister Tereshchenko of Foreign
Affairs At Reception of Special Diplomatic Mission From
America, June 2/15, 1917," Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
One million copies of Root's address and Tereshchenko's
reply were printed and distributed. David R. Francis
to Robert Lansing, June 7/20, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/
6073, St. Dept.
19»McCormick Diary," June 15,1917.
2 0 »scott Diary," June 15, 1917.
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are tired of this war /7 we are7 weary of the long and
21

bloody struggle."

Following the formal addresses, members of the
Mission held short conferences with officials of the
22
Cabinet.
During these informal discussions Russell
thought he detected a reluctance to accept the necessity
of vigorous prosecution of the war.

In conversations with

the Minister of Food Supplies and the Assistant Minister
i

of Agriculture, both of whom were moderate socialists,
Russell stated that it was necessary to pursue the war
"for the sake of democracy."

Although they agreed with

Russell, they "admitted it in a manner perfunctory and
juiceless."23
McCormick found that "the personality of the
ministers was most interesting."

prince Lvov he charac

terized as "a quiet looking, rather shabbily dressed,
silent man, who did not appear to have the knowledge and
executive ability which his record credits him with."
McCormick's concern with Lvov was unnecessary, for he
was merely a figurehead by this time.

McCormick described

the Minister of Foreign Affairs as "easily the leading
figure among the ministers."

He found Minister of War

2lWhite, Survival, 144.
2 2 "Mission Log," 22.
2 3 "Russell Diary," June 15, 1917.
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Kerensky to be "forceful, persuasive and persistent . . .
Were it not for his inexperience and his strong socialis
tic tendencies, he would be one of the strong leading
figures in the ministry."
Kerensky was erroneous.

McCormick's assessment of
Kerensky was still very much a

socialist and was perhaps the strongest member of the
Provisional Government.

Minister of Finance Shingarev,

with whom he would be most directly concerned, impressed
McCormick as "a man who is trying to do his very best under
a difficult situation," but he doubted that medical
training "fitted him for such a position as he now holds."

24

The group returned to the Winter Palace after
approximately one hour with the Provisional Cabinet.
Having presented the united States' formal greetings to
the Government, each member of the Mission began to con
centrate on his individual area of interest and to hold
interviews and conferences with appropriate Russian
officials to gather information for his report.
During the trip across Siberia,. Root had cautioned
the Mission that Ambassador Francis might resent their
coming and suggested that the group do nothing which
might complicate their relationship.

Root knew that the

regular Ambassador might view their presence as an enfringement on his authority, and he was correct in that assumption.

24"McCormick Diary," June 15, 1917.
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When Francis first heard of the creation of the special
mission he entertained serious reservations as to its
effectiveness.

The Ambassador knew most of the members

of the Mission, and when their names were announced from
Washington, objected only to the chairman.

In Francis'

opinion, Root was a "partisan Republican," and this might
25
influence his actions.
Following his first meeting with
the Mission, Francis still felt that their coming was a
mistake which would burden him with additional work.

26

In fact, throughout their stay in Russia, Ambassador
Francis was occupied with the task of introducing Root
and the others to the members of the provisional Govern27
ment.
His feeling of suspicion soon disappeared, how
ever, and Francis established an extremely cordial
relationship with the group.

As early as June 18 he

wrote that he was "getting along very pleasantly" with
2ft
the Mission.
Shortly before the time of the Mission's
25David R. Francis to Edward B. Lilley, May
1917; and David R. Francis to Willoughby Smith, May
1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "May 1917."
26David R.
13,1917, David
R.

1/14,
1/14,

Francis to Jane Francis, May 31/june
Francis Papers, Box "June 1917."

27Francis' appointment book indicated that he
had appointments or lunch with one or more members of the
Mission almost every day.
"1917 Appointment Book," David
R. Francis papers, b o x "Miscellaneous 1917."
28David R. Francis to Perry Francis, June 18, 1917,
David R. Francis Papers, Box "July 1917."
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departure, he reported to the State Department that his
relationship with "Senator Root and every member of the
29
Mission" was "exceedingly pleasant."
His doubts about
the Mission's effectiveness, however, remained unchanged.
The presence in Petrograd of the American Rail
road Commission headed by Stevens was another area of
potential conflict for the Root Mission.

Root wanted

the railroad group attached to his Mission in some way,
but Wilson denied this request.

Since any request for

large-scale loans to aid the Russian railroad system had
to come through Root's Mission, this led to problems.
The two groups met from time to time and, for the most
30
part, they attempted to coordinate their efforts.
Shortly before the Mission's departure from Petrograd,
Stevens developed the feeling that his work was being
hindered by interference from Root and his colleagues.
This conclusion was also expressed by the diplomatic
group.

This conflict, however, in no way affected the

Mission's view that assistance to the Russian railroad
system was perhaps the most vital service that Americans
29David R. Francis to Frank I,. Polk, July 13,
1917, Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85. This is also
expressed in personal correspondence.
"My relations
with them were pleasant and there was no friction what
soever." David R. Francis to Perry Francis, July 3/16,
1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "July 1917."
30"McCormick Diary," June 17, 19, and July 3,

1917.

could render.
Members of the Mission hoped that they would be
able to "stir up enthusiasm" for the war effort in Russia.
They thought that this could be accomplished by visiting
several Russian cities.

31

in a discussion of this topic

on June 18, the Mission mentioned the cities of Msscow,
32
Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinostav, and Kharkov.
Russian
officials were asked their views of such a tour.

The

Minister of Finance told McCormick that it should be
avoided unless the Mission was prepared to explain the
33
extent of American financial aid,
and Kerensky appeared
"cold but polite" when General Scott described the pro34
posed travels.
peshchechonov. Minister of Food
Supplies, concurred with his colleagues, explaining that
the proposed tour might be misinterpreted by "a certain
part of the Socialist circles."

35

in view of these

reactions, the Mission dropped the idea of an extended
tour.

The only other city it visited was Moscow.
Shortly before midnight on June 21, the Mission

left Petrograd by special train for the ancient capital.
33-"Scott Diary," June 13, 1917.
32,,McCormick Diary," June 18, 1917.
33,’McCormick Diary,” June 19, 1917.
34”Scott Diary," June 20, 1917.

35"McCormick Diary," June 20, 1917.

Russell and Colonel Judson remained in Petrograd.

The

former had “little taste . . . for sight seeing at a
time when hell is popping" and felt that it was more
important to try to make contacts in the Petrograd Soviet.
The latter preferred to remain in Petrograd in order to
gather further information and noted that he had "seen
37
the sights" of Moscow before.
The others arrived in Moscow early on the after
noon of June 22 and were met by the Mayor of the city,
Nicholas I. Astrov.

Root addressed a group of approxi

mately seventy-five members of various organizations in
Moscow later in the afternoon.

3ft

At 8:30 that evening

the Mission attended a meeting of the Moscow Duma for
their official welcome.

Members of the Mission had been

provided a translation of the Mayor's address but were
unable to follow the addresses given by other members of
the Duma.

One member of the Mission observed that "no

adequate preparations" had been made to provide sufficient
interpreters.

39

Root's reply* to the welcome was optimis

tic and emphasized Russia's ability to govern itself at
36"Russell Diary," June 22, 1917.
3^William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson,
June 24, 1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4.
38"Mission Log," June 22, 1917.

88"McCormick Diary," June 22, 1917.
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the local level.

40

As there were no provisions for housing

the Mission, they returned to their special train for the
night.

They continued to live on board while in Moscow.
On the next day, Root spoke to four groups before

lunch.

41

For the most part his remarks were general in

nature, but While addressing the War Industries Committee
he referred to the willingness of American Labor to sus
pend the eight-hour day for the duration of the war, a
remark which no doubt was intended to suggest a possible
42
course of action for the Russians.
Before a meeting
of the Bourse, Root made the only public speech which
can be interpreted as a recommendation in the area of
domestic politics.

He described to his audience the

safeguards to property written into the United States
Constitution and explained that a person had the
assurance that his property "cannot be taken away from
him."

"We shall," he said "look with the greatest in

terest to the work of your Constitutional Convention to
see how far you find it desirable, or find yourselves
able to include guarantees and safeguards, against
40America1s Message To The Russian People;
Addresses By The Members Of The Special Diplomatic Mission O f ~The unltecTstates To Russia in The Year 1917
(Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1918), 23-28, Here
inafter cited as America *s Message.
4 1 "Mission Log," 27-28.
42America's Message, 29-34.
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destroying the fundamental basis of enterprise."

43

Following a luncheon at the National Hotel as
guests of the City of Moscow, Root met with the Procurator
of the Holy Synod of Russia.

The conversation almost

immediately shifted from the Russian Church to Russian
politics.

Root was pleased to hear the conservative

leader say that the government would be able to pursue
44
the war vigorously.
on June 24, their last day in Moscow, the Mission
occupied itself with seeing the sights of the city, in
cluding the Kremlin and Sparrow Hills, and attending a
choral concert.

They then boarded the train for the
45
return to petrograd.
An.American newspaper reporter
who accompanied the Mission to Moscow felt that the group
left there with a "distinct sense of encouragement" and
46
now viewed the situation with "greater optimism."
The Mission arrived in petrograd in midafternoon
on June 25, following a twenty-hour train trip.

After

resting a few hours, Ambassador Root, General Scott, and
the military members of the Mission boarded their special
^America's Message, 40-41.
4 4 "Account of a conversation between Mr. Root and
Mr. Lvov, Moscow, June 10/23, 1917," Elihu Root Papers,
Box 136.
4 5 "The Mission Log," 28.
4®The New York Times, June 27, 1917, 1.
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train once more, this time bound for the Russian General
Staff Headquarters at Mogilev under the command of General
Brusilov.

47

General Scott and the military personnel

planned to continue the journey to include a visit to
the Russian Front.

48

Minister Tereshchenko accompanied the Mission,
thus giving Root an excellent opportunity for uninterrupted
discussions with him.

Thus far, Root's chances for con

ferences with Tereshchenko had been limited, since the
Foreign Minister had become ill shortly after the group
arrived in Petrograd and had been confined to bed for two
weeks.

AQ

Root remained at Headquarters for less than

twenty-four hours.

During that time Brusilov stressed

the need for immediate aid, especially railway equip^ 50
ment.
Root was impressed by the General's plea or per
haps by the unrecorded conversations he and the Foreign
Minister had during their two days of travel.

Shortly

after his return to petrograd, Root held a conference
during which he outlined Brusilov's estimate of his needs
4 7 "Mission Log," 28-29.
48Described in Chapter on Military.
49"Russell Diary," June 25, 1917; and The New York
Times, June 30, 1917, 1.
50"Address of General Brusiloff at Stafka, June
14/17, 1917," Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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and for the first time agreed that the united States should
extend new credit for additional engines and freight cars.
He was also pleased to inform the members of the Mission
that Brusilov planned a military offensive for the near
future.

51

it was decided at this conference that they

would leave petrograd for home on July 9.

This would

allow General Scott ample time for his tour of the
52
Russian Front and his trip to Rumania.
The day following Root's return, reports reached
members of the Mission that the government anticipated
problems in connection with demonstrations and parades
which were planned for Sunday, July 1.

Major Washburn

had been informed by a secretary in the Foreign office
that the Mission's special train would be made ready
and that the government desired the group to visit
Finland on Sunday.

Root agreed, but was opposed by

Russell and Duncan who felt that this channel of infor
mation was not official.

Furthermore, their sources of

information indicated that the planned demonstrations
would be peaceful.

53

The Mission decided to inform the government that
51"McCormicX Diary," June 28, 1917.
5 2 Ibid.

53"Russell Diary," June 30, 1917; and Russell,
Bare Hands and Stone walls, 360.
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they had already made appointments for the following day
and would prefer to remain in Petrograd.

The matter

remained undecided until the evening of June 30, when
Tereshchenko told Root that he would like the members to
remain if they chose, since he anticipated no trouble.
Had he felt otherwise, he would not have planned to be
54
absent from the capital.
Therefore, only Root accom
panied the Foreign Secretary.

They left Petrograd on

the evening of June 30 and returned the following evening
after a brief visit to Tereshchenko's dacha in Finland.
Sunday proved to be quite uneventful.

55

Although the citi

zens of Petrograd turned out in large numbers to parade
and demonstrate, there was no violence.

56

Following his visit to Finland, Root remained in
Petrograd until his departure for the United States on
July 9.

During this week he continued his appearances

before various organizations and his daily conferences
with both Russian officials and Allied diplomats.

Ready

to end their stay, Root did so as soon as possible after
57
Scott's return from the front.
"McCormick Diary," June 30, 1917.
55,'Mission Log," 31-32.
"McCormick

Diary," July 1, 1917; and "Russell

Diary," July 1, 1917.
57"Mission Log," 32-36; and Elihu Root to Michael
Terestchenko, July 3, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St.
Dept.

CHAPTER VII
PINANCE
In trying to determine Russia's financial needs,
the Mission was continuing an established American policy.
Less than twenty-four hours after President Wilson presented
his war message to Congress in 1917, Secretary of state
Robert Lansing cabled the American Ambassador in petrograd
to "ascertain if financial aid or credit is desirable by
the Russian Government."

Ambassador Francis was instructed

to determine the amount desired and to what extent such
credit would be used to purchase goods in the united
States .1
Following conferences with Russian Minister of
Finance Shingarev, Francis informed the state Department
that the loan "would be highly appreciative by Council of
Ministers and all Russians."

He also quoted the Minister

as saying that all of the money would be used "in the United
States by direct purchases and not through British inter
vention as heretofore."

The Russian government expressed

a need for $500 million,

"provided tonnage . . . can be

secured."

The Russian Minister understood that both

■^Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, April 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/131, St. Dept.
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England and France were to receive loans of that amount
and that anything less "would be injurious to the new
government and humiliating to Russia."

2

Francis strongly supported the loan.

He thought

it "advisable from every viewpoint of policy" and "absolute
ly" backed by Russia's "boundless forests, immeasurable
deposits of ores and oils, and immense areas of tillable
lands."

3
two

weeks later the Ambassador again urged his

government to extend credit and told the Secretary of the
Treasury that "Russia can undoubtedly meet all obligations.
On April 21, 1917, Lansing advised Francis that
Congress had provided three billion dollars for loans to
the Allied governments.

He pointed out, however, that

reports had reached the united States "of the /Russian7
Government being under the influence of extreme social
ist parties that aim at a separate peace."

Lansing

emphasized the bad effect of such reports in the United
States and added that the Ambassador should "widely inform
the Russian leaders . . . that measures should be taken in
order to redress the unfortunate bad impression produced
on the American people."

To prevent any possible

2

David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 6 , 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/133, St. Dept.
3 ib id.
^David R. Francis to William G. McAdoo, April 21,
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/135, St. Dept.
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misunderstanding of the position of the United States
Government, Lansing concluded his dispatch unequivocally:
"A separate peace would preclude the possibility of any
5
kind of assistance on the part of America."
On these orders from the secretary of State, Francis
conferred with Guchkov and Miliukov on the question of the
stability of the Provisional Government.

Pointing out to

them that he had done all he could to "assist the Ministry,"
Francis explained that he "felt considerable official and
personal responsibility concerning a stable Government in
Russia."

If the Ministry, however, was unable to give more

"satisfactory evidence" of its stability, the Ambassador
would be "compelled to advise /hi.&7 Government not to
extend the aid which /he/ had been continuously recommending."

The Russian ministers did not appear to resent

the implication,

in fact,

"Goutchkoff seemed very much

pleased at the statement" and suggested that Francis make
it public.

7

With this background in mind, it is not surprising
that one of the Root Mission's most important functions
was to ascertain the financial needs of the new government.
5Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, April 21, 1917,
quoted in Browder, Provisional Government Documents, II,
1053.
£
David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 8 , 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/4675%, St. Dept.

7Ibid.
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This assistance would presumably help persuade Russia to
remain in the war as well as enable it to prosecute it
more effectively.

Although Wilson never stated a policy

of "no war, no dollars," this policy was well-established
prior to the departure of the Root Mission and was never
neglected by the President's representatives during their
sojourn in Russia.
On the day of the Mission's departure, Root, in a
conference with Lansing and McAdoo, supported a policy of
immediate aid to Russia.

He asserted that "the need for

rolling stock in Russia is so urgent and so necessary to
the conduct of the war that it would be unwise for the
Government of the united states to wait until the Special
Mission . . .reaches petrograd before giving any aid in
Q
this respect."
Lansing and McAdoo agreed and arranged a
loan of $100 million to the Provisional Government on the
following day.

9

information concerning the loan was

released to the press immediately and added to the
prestige of the Mission in the United States .^*0
On the first full day of the Mission's voyage from
Seattle to Vladivostok, May 21, the topic of loans to
aElihu Root to William G. McAdoo, May 16, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
^William G. McAdoo to Elihu Root, May 16, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.

■^The New York Times, May 17, 1917.

Russia dominated the afternoon conference.

Root reported

that the Milner Commission of England had set $175 million
as the amount that could "properly be utilized, in view of
the congestion of the means of transportation," by Russia
in 1917.

He explained that the Russian Charg£ d ’Affaires

in Washington had given him "the distinct impression that
he was much disappointed that Lord Milner had thus arbi
trarily limited the amount to be loaned to Russia."

Despite

that complaint, Root warned the members of the Mission:

"We

. must be very careful in any recommendation we make which
would go beyond the $175,000,000 settled upon by Lord
Milner. "'L1
Both McCormick and Bertron, who would be most
directly concerned with Russia’s finances, appeared to be
more generous with their government’s money.

Bertron

questioned Root’s use of the Milner figures as a guideline*
"Will not the measure of the cordiality with which we are
received be determined by the amount in excess of
$175,000,000 which we recommend our government to appro
priate to Russia?"
another;

He answered his own question with

"is it not quite desirable that we should make

our recommendation cover a substantial sum in excess of
Lord Milner’s $175,000,000?"12

"McCormick Diary," May 21, 1917.
l2Ibid.
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McCormick next conceded that extension of $100
million in credit would create a favorable impression in
Russia.

He then revealed a vague understanding of the

Mission's purpose with his question,

"How far does this

commission have anything to say upon the question of
further loans?"

13

McCormick proposed that the Mission

follow one of two possible procedures.

They could wait

until their return to the united States to make any
specific recommendations, or they could "immediately cable
to the President" the financial needs of the Russian
Government.

McCormick obviously favored the latter

course, as he remarked that the first procedure "would
delay the application of any further money to Russia for
14
a period of say three months."
Root accepted the validity
of McCormick's argument but, more aware of the workings of
the Executive branch of the government, .:replied:

"I feel

that the line of natural action /for the Mission/ would
15
be a medium one between the two you have suggested."
Root's view prevailed and the Mission requested the exten
sion of limited credit while in Russia.

They delayed

further recommendations until they returned to Washington.
During the same conference McCormick introduced the
•L3 Xbid.
x4 Ibid.

L5lbid.
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topic of a commercial treaty with Russia.

Root briefly

explained the cancellation of the Russian-American
Commercial Treaty of 1832, indicating that this action
had resulted from considerable political pressure applied
to the Taft Administration by Jewish elements in America.
Root specifically referred to the action of Representative
William Sulzer of New York, who "took it upon himself to
frame a /congressional/7 resolution which in Its language
was roost insulting to Russia."

16

Root squelched any

desire McCormick and Bertron may have had to arrange a new
commercial treaty:

"I do not think it would be wise for

us to take up now in our interviews and negotiations any
question of the formation of a new treaty."

This in no

way implied that Root failed to see the potential of such
an agreement.

He felt, however, that any such negotiation

would "come up in its own way at the proper time. "^*7
During a conference a few days later, McCormick
again introduced the topic of a commercial treaty:

"I

have several interesting papers which the state Department
has sent me relating to the commercial treaty with Russia,
which expired by notice on January 1, 1913, and I submit
them to you, Senator, and to any other members who would
like to look them over."

16Ibid.
17Ibid.

As in his earlier discussion of
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a commercial treaty, Root pointed out, "According to our
instructions we have nothing to get from Russia.

There

fore, it is best that we say nothing about a commercial
treaty."

Root indicated the pitfalls in any attempt on

their part to discuss such a treaty and emphasized;
In fact we want to keep as far away as possible
from any assertion that we have come for any
commercial advantage whatever to the United states.
The charge has been made and will again be repeated
by those who are our enemies, or by those who are
ignorant on the subject, that the United States is
always after money: that it will do anything for
a pecuniary profit. This sentiment we have to
counteract.1 °
Pour days later, Root told the Mission of a request
from citizens in Nome, Alaska, that the Mission secure a"post for trading with Russia."

He intended to turn the

request over to Ambassador Francis and warned his
colleagues,

"We are not here on a business errand.

We

must keep clear of promoting American business or American
interest of any kind . . . .

we must not merely refrain

from suggestions of getting a benefit of any kind for the
United States, but we must avoid even the appearance of
19
such a thing."
That seemed to settle the matter of a
commercial treaty if not of loans.
On May 22, McCormick again -attempted to gain
information about the precise lending policy of the
^"McCormick Diary," May 26, 1917.
19 "McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
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American government.

He asked the chairman:

"is it a

condition precedent to the making of our loans to Russia
that the money provided to them shall all be spent by
them in the united States, or is any portion of the loan
to be available for the Russians for use in Russia?"
replied,

Root

"I understand that at least three-fourths of the

money provided by the United States is to be spent in the
United States for supplies to be sent to Russia."

20

It

is apparent from McCormick's questions and comments that
he was not altogether sure of the scope and limitations of
the Mission beyond the fact that he and Bertron were to
ascertain the financial needs of the Russian government
and report these to his own government.

Bertron had

conferred with secretary McAdoo prior to departure, yet
he appears to have been equally uncertain as to their
21
position.
In a conference on May 24, Admiral Glennon sug
gested the possibility of making "some direct contribu
tion to the zemstvo organizations to strengthen their
hands."

Root replied that he felt the Mission should not

"distinguish in . . . financial arrangements between two
different branches of the Russian government's operations,"
2 0 "McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
21Samuel r . Bertron to William G. McAdoo, July 2,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.

171
and that "all financial arrangements should go through one
22
channel."
On May 30, General Scott asked the members if it
were not possible that they would "be asked pointedly as
to what kind of co-operation we are proposing?
bring to Russia men or money?"

Are we to

Root answered:

It was clearly pointed out to us by the President
that we have no authority to make any proposition the
acceptance of which would be a contract on the part
of the united States . . . . We are not carrying to
Russia a bunch of propositions . . . /although /7 if
they have any definite suggestions or any wishes we
will hear them. ^
On May 31, Bertron read to other members of the
Mission "some figures with regard to the finances of
Russia."

The New York banker pointed out that the

Russian debt, which had stood at nine billion rubles
before the war, had now reached a figure of twenty-eight
billion.

During the same period the annual budget had

risen from two and eight-tenths billion to four billion
rubles,

in a somewhat optimistic tone he stated that

"after the war /financial 7 matters will adjust themselves
to the former normal conditions."

Senator Root's reaction

expressed exactly what he had warned them against voicing
openly:
^"McCormick Diary," May 24, 1917. Glennon did
not indicate to which "zemstvo" organization he referred.
2 3 "McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
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As I think over the question of Russia's finances,
with the richness of its mines and the wealth of its
agriculture, I feel that ample American capital is
ready to come to Russia to help in its development if
onely /sic7 one question could he settled, and that
is the stability of the present government.
That is2 *
the only menace I see to Russia’s future prosperity. 4
Russell, sounding more like a banker than a social
ist, responded to Bertron1s summation of the Russian
financial situation with a question:

"What are the chances

of Russia's returning the money that we lend? . . .

it

seems significant that no advance on the eastern front has
been made— no effort in fighting has been made since the
revolution."

This caused Russell to "wonder how badly

Russia wants the money from the United States."

Duncan,

pointing out that the United States should not expect the
Russian Army to make any immediate military advance due to
problems of establishing a sound government, was confident
that "as soon as the government is in working order . . .
you will see discipline and action and results.'

25

Dissatisfied with this explanation, Russell won
dered why the Russians had "not utilized their forces to
make any attempt to go forward against the. enemy" if the
Revolution had not affected the Russian military potential.
Root concluded the discussion with the statement that the
Russian military potential was one subject they would

24"McCormick Diary," May 31, 1917.

173
attempt to measure,

it was quite natural, he said, that

"the united States cannot put in its money unless it is
for the very best interest of Russia."

26

The railway trip from Vladivostok to petrograd had
given all members of the Mission the opportunity to gather
firsthand information on conditions in Russia.

Because

of their special interest in Russian financial problems,
McCormick and Bertron were particularly interested in
the reports of representatives of International Harvester
Company who joined the train on its journey across Russia.
At the request of McCormick, August Held joined
the group in Vladivostok on board the Buffalo and accom
panied them for a brief time.

Although Held was primarily

concerned with the cause and the eventual course of the
Revolution —

a matter which he thought depended almost

entirely "upon the question of the military" —

he was

able to provide illustrations of the effect the Revolu
tion had had on business.

To Held, the major problem

for Russian business was the uncertainty of a labor force
even with the inflated wages. He felt that time would
solve the problem, since "a majority of the business and
workmen are tired of the present situation and the pre27
vailing disorder."

2^"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
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When Lieutenant Riggs joined the group in Vladi
vostok/ his observations and impressions were concerned
primarily with the war effort, but he also offered
suggestions with regard to Russian finances and American
loans.

He first noted it would be wise to explain to

the Russians that the sending of a Mission to ascertain
need in no way indicated reluctance on the part of the
United states to extend aid to the Russian government,
in particular, Riggs advised the group that the United
States should not "be too particular about the terms"
for granting aid.

"To ask a definite promise from the

ministry that they would continue the war," he said,"would bring a speedy acquiescence, but what is the
promise of a ministry worth that is subject to change at
any moment?"

Riggs thought it possible that the loan

would not be repaid in full, but "the need is so impera
tive that we must make the advance, even if we charge a
large share of them /loans~7 to profit and loss later
28
on."
Root agreed with Riggs and probably spoke for the
Mission when he remarked,

"If the Russian soldiers will

not fight, then the united States must quit giving them
large suras of money; but we can afford to take great
chances on the question of their fighting —

28"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.

I should say
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chances of ten to one would be reasonable."

2Q

a

few days

in Russia hardly equipped Root to handicap the Russian
Revolution.
On June 9, McCormick was met at Novo-Nikolaievsk
by representatives of International Harvester.

Business

conditions in this area were unstable as a result of the
Revolution.

McCormick learned that although the company

had granted forty-five per cent wage increases to its
employees, approximately half of them had quit.

The

company had received a letter from one of its customers
saying he "supposed all machines belonged to the govern
ment . . . and that would release him from the necessity
of paying the note he owed."

The Harvester official felt

that the letter "was not written in a spirit of trying to
defraud us, but from an ignorance of the conditions, and
from a supposition on the part of the peasants that now
everyone could do as he liked."

30

Although officially excluded from consideration,
the topic of post-war commercial relations inevitably
crept into discussions of the Russian situation.

Smith,

an interpreter attached to the Mission, had been in Russia
for seventeen years.

Most of this time he had been con

nected with English mining interests.

Smith, pointing out

29"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
30"McCormick Diary," June 9, 1917.
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that Germany "had always been more active than any other
nation in seeking Russian trade," felt that Russian com
merce would again be dominated by the Germans once the
war was over, "unless there is a strong law passed pro
hibiting German trade."31*
The same position was taken by the international
Harvester representative at Ekaterinburg.

When McCormick

asked him about the "effect of German trade" after the
war, he replied,

"I believe the Germans will come into

Russia in strong force . . . trying to capture all the
trade which they had before."

He suggested that "the

United states will have to join together in concert with
Russia if they intend to prevent Germany from resuming
32
the large share of the trade aftorthe war."
On the last day of the trip to petrograd, E. A.
Brittenham, manager of international Harvester in Russia,
joined the train and conferred with Root and the other
members of the Mission.

Root found his evaluation of the

situation "more hopeful" than that of other representa
tives of the company.

Brittenham pointed out, however,

that industrial production in Russia had fallen off as
a result of the Revolution.

Using the Harvester works at

Lubertzy as an example, he explained that although wages

31Ibid.
32iiMccormick Diary," June 11, 1917.
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had increased in some cases as much as one hundred per
cent, production had fallen by twenty-five per cent.

He

was confident that, given time, the situation would
stabilize.

Brittenham said that the American loan of

S100 million had brought "a general feeling of great
relief and satisfaction" not only because the money was
desperately needed but because it allowed the Russians
to "feel a certain independence of England upon whom they
have heretofore been obliged to rely solely for their
financial support."

33

Brittenham supported other observers about the
advisability of a commercial treaty with Russia.

Satis

fied that the Germans would "make a great effort to
recover the supremacy in trade that they had in Russia
before the war,"he proposed an immediate effort "to get
some law which /wbuld7 make a discriminatory tariff in
favor of the Allies*
The Mission arrived in petrograd on June 13.
McCormick and Bertron were invited by Ambassador Francis
to lunch with Shingarev, Minister of Finance, on June 16.
Their first meeting consisted of a briefing on the general
nature of Russian finances.

To pursue the financial needs

^"McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917.
34Ibid.
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of Russia in more detail,

35

they met again on June 18 and

for two hours conferred with Shingarev and his assistant
Samen, who spoke excellent English.

The two Americans

left the conference with material pertaining to Russia's
financial situation and examined this the same afternoon.
They also carried away the impression that Shingarev
expected that further loans would be arranged while the
Mission was in Russia.

They noted that "he seemed dis

posed to hasten the procuring of all the information we
could ask for."3^
That Shingarev expected financial arrangements to
be made immediately was confirmed in a conference held the
following day.

When asked about the advisability of the

Mission's visiting various Russian cities, Shingarev
replied that the reception and usefulness of such a junket
would depend upon whether the Mission was prepared to
announce substantial loans to Russia.

McCormick replied,

"We are not a financial body, and we are not empowered to
make any loans."

He explained, however, that the Mission's

recommendations were to be used b y the American government
in reaching a decision on the subject.

Shingarev "showed

a great deal of concern at this statement" and asked if it
^"Memorandum ©f interviews Etc. by Cyrus H.
McCormick," Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject Pile
"Russia 1917-1920." Hereinafter cited as "Interviews
by Cyrus H. McCormick."
36"McCormick Diary," June 18, 1917.
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would be possible for the Mission to cable their recommen
dations, thus hastening the process.

McCormick said it

might be, but he must first consult with the other members.
To emphasize his position, Shingarev explained
that "all the people of Russia are waiting now to know
what America, which is now our friend, can do for us in
a financial way."

McCormick’s reply, designed to leave

"the ball in the other camp," was that "all the people of
America" were also waiting for the answer to a question:
"When will the Russian soldiers be able to make an advance
against their enemies /~?_7"

The Russian, shrugging his

shoulders, replied, "I wish I could answer that question,
but I am not able to do so."

37

The two Americans left

the Minister's office after being told that further finan
cial information which they had requested would be delivered
within the next two days.
Bertron and McCormick left Petrograd en route to
38
Moscow shortly before midnight on June 21.
They had
not yet received the information requested from Shingarev.
Upon reaching Moscow, they asked Root if they could call
the Embassy in Petrograd and ask that it secure the promised
information from the Finance Ministry.

Root strongly opposed

this action, feeling that "any indication of haste on our
37"McCormick Diary," June 19, 1917.

38"Mission Log," 26.
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part would be a sign of weakness."

"An inquiry upon

special.points made in such an unusual manner would almost
commit us later on toward recommending that our government
on these points at least should comply with the wishes of
the Russians."39

This was an indefensible position, since

one of the very purposes of the Mission was to gather
pertinent information so as to accurately assess Russia's
financial needs.
Finally, after a two-week delay, McCormick and
Bertron received from the Minister of Finance the informa
tion necessary to complete their evaluation of Russia's
40
financial needs^
The delay is difficult to explain.
Perhaps Bertron's opinion that the Ministry was "busy with
politics" and had given "little thought to how our services
can be applied in aiding them" was correct.41.
While in Petrograd Bertron and McCormick had con
ferences with Peshchechonov, Minister of Food and Supplies,
42
and Stephanov, Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry.
The few records of these conferences indicate that the
Americans held discussions on a rather general plane in
order to gather information for their recommendations to
3 9"McCormick Diary," June 22, 1917.
4 0 "McCormick Diary," July 5, 1917.
41*Samuel R. Bertron to Edward M. House, June 18,
1917, Edward M. House papers, Drawer 3.

42"Interviews by Cyrus H. McCormick.”
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the united States government.

On one occasion, however,

Stephanov's assistant showed Bertron and McCormick "in
genious charts" of proposed improvements in transportation.
Although the men were "favorably impressed" with the plans,
they "were not surprized /sic7" that they had not been put
into effect,

This was to be done in the "next few weeks."

43

in addition to the conferences with the Russian
Ministers of Finance, Food and Supplies, and Commerce and
Industry, Bertron and McCormick also held interviews with
other Government officials, Russian bankers and manufac
turers, and representatives of American business and
financial interests in Russia.

44

They limited their

inquiries to the more conservative elements of the Russian
financial community and on at least one occasion met with
45
a former financial advisor to the deposed Tsar.
All of the bankers whom they interviewed were opti
mistic, although to varying degrees, over the ultimate
establishment of a stable and responsible government.
The bankers criticized the Provisional Government for its
laxness in gaining control over the population, especially
the soldiers.

The president of the Azov-Don Bank, described

by McCormick as "one of the highest financiers in petrograd,"
43"McCormick Diary," June 28, 1917.
44"Interviews by Cyrus H. McCormick."
4 5 "McCormick Diary," June 17, 1917.
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suggested that Russia needed a dictator who would maintain
control until elections provided for a permanent govern46
ment.
He also informed Bertron and McCormick that
there had been a noticeable increase in subscriptions for
the Russian "Liberty Loan" in the past two weeks and
repeated this claim to other members of the Mission.

47

of

the three billion rubles guaranteed by banks, over onehalf had already been purchased by individuals and,

"not

withstanding this large subscription, the deposits in the
banks have also increased."

48

Two other bankers inter

preted the sale of the Liberty Loans as an indication of
a growing confidence in the government, as two-thirds had
been purchased by early July.

49

These figures failed to

impress the two Americans, and they later reported that
the total amount had not been sold and that less than onethird of one per cent of the Russian people had purchased
the bonds.
On vfaether America should attempt to aid in
stabilizing the ruble, Bertron and McCormick received
4 6 "McCormick Diary," June 19, 1917.
4 7 "McCormick Diary," June 17, 1917.
48"McCormick Diary," June 29, 1917.
4 9 Ibid.

50i'3ertron-McCormick Report," Appendix to "Mission
Report," Elihu Itoot Papers, Box 192. Hereinafter cited
as "Bertron-McCormick Report."
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conflicting advice.

A representative of the International

Bank wanted the United states to purchase rubles on the
New York market.

The president of the Russian Bank of

Foreign Trade opposed this approach.

He thought that such

a policy would "attract an indefinite supply of rubles for
sale."

in his opinion, the value of the ruble could be

restored only through increased confidence in the Russian
government and increased Russian exports.

This led him to

suggest that any American support should "be an economic
51
one and not artificial."
Bertron and McCormick sup
ported the latter's arguments.

Since the beginning of the

war the ruble had dropped from a par value of fifty-one
cents to twenty-two cents in relation to the American
dollar.

This was due in part to the tendency of "local

capitalists" to liquidate their assets and to "remove the
52
proceeds to foreign countries."
There is no evidence that Bertron or McCormick
discussed the question of a new Russo-American commercial
treaty, although it is quite possible that the topic arose
in the many unrecorded conversations with various repre
sentatives of Russian finance and industry.

That the

leaders of Russia's commercial interests were not only
willing but anxious to discuss the possibility of closer
51,,McCormick Diary," July 4, 1917.
5 ^"Bertron-McCormick

Report," 4-5.
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commercial ties with the united States is obvious,

on

the afternoon of June 21, Bertron and McCormick, accompa
nied by Root and other members of the Mission, attended a
special meeting of the Russo-American Committee, an organi53
zation created to promote trade with the United States.
In a speech before the assemblage, N. N. Pokrovsky,
President of the committee, advocated closer economic
ties with the United States.

He felt that the United States

had attained its current level of "economic development and
prosperity" because it had "not crushed personal initiative
and energy" but had "given it full freedom in developing
the natural resources of the country."

54

Thirteen short speeches delivered by representatives
of the various economic interests in Russia followed,

with

few exceptions the speakers followed Pokrovsky’s lead.
They pointed out that Russia's past form of government
had prevented a close economic relationship with the
United States.

Abdication of the Tsar, however, had re

moved any obstacle to the creation of closer economic ties .55
Although he apologized "for mentioning such prosaic
53

"Mission Log," 26.

54"Address Delivered by N. N. Pokrovsky, President
of the Russo-American Committee," Doc. N o . 763.72/7487, St.
Dept.
55"Speeches Delivered At The Special Meeting Of
The Russo-American Committee, June 21, 1917," Doc. No.
763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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business matters at such an exceptional occasion," E. S.
Karotygin, President of the Chamber of Export, suggested:
"Simultaneously with . . . the successful conclusion of
the war preparatory steps /should be made7 for the building
up of peaceful economic relations and the elucidation of
the mutual interests of the Allies in different branches
of trade and commerce."

The speaker indicated that the

United states could easily replace Germany as a source of
supply for manufactured products and could receive directly
from Russia "certain raw materials1' which heretofore had
been 'bbtained from Russia through Germany.”5®

The same

view was expressed by the president of the Association of
industry and Commerce.

Recognizing that currently assis

tance was limited to "the task at hand , 11 namely the
successful prosecution of the war, the speaker then stated
that there was "no reason to doubt that this collaboration
in warfare against the mutual enemy will prepare the road
for a more complete rapprochment in various economic
questions, from which both Allies can expect nothing but
advantage . 1,57
Senator Root, delivering the reply to the various
56"Address Delivered by E. S. Koratysln, President
of the Chamber of Export," Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
57"Address Delivered by N. N. Cutler, President,
Association of industry and Commerce," 2 Doc. No. 763.72/
7487, St. Dept.
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speeches, explained that '‘the Mission has no function to
discharge in respect to industrial and commercial life."
The topic had, in fact, been "intentionally excluded from
the scope of its duty."

He did suggest that after the

war "all those relations of industry and commercial life"
58
would no doubt result.
Bertron and McCormick supported
this viewpoint.

59

Throughout their stay in Russia, McCormick and
Bertron were anxious to hasten the process of securing
American loans for Russia.

On at least two occasions,

following interviews with the Russian Minister of Finance,
they asked Root to cable Washington to request additional
money.

Assuming that the Wilson Administration would extend

further credit to the provisional Government, they wished
to capitalize upon the favorable reaction which would
result.

The amount they usually mentioned was an addi

tional $100 million, though on one occasion Bertron
suggested a sum of twice that much.

This amount was

along the lines of the "medium" that Root had suggested
during their journey to Russia, yet Root opposed the idea
and offered different reasons on each occasion.

He first

objected because he felt that any request for money should
come from the Minister of Foreign Affairs rather than from
58 America1s

Message, 17-18.

59mBertron-McCormick Report," passim.
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the Minister of Finance.

He later argued that Germany

might overrun Russia and it would be like putting "money
60
on the sidewalk for Germany to pick up."
The last attempt of McCormick and Bertron to secure
an immediate loan to Russia occurred on July 7, two days
before their departure for the united States.

In a morning

conference of the Mission, McCormick proposed that a cable
be sent to Washington seeking an additional fifty or one
hundred million dollars credit to Russia.
supported by Russell.

They were

The other members supported Root's

view that requests for further credit should be delayed
until their return to Washington.

61

In an afternoon session of the Mission on July 8,
the day before their departure from Russia, Root informed
the others that he had received an urgent request from the
Minister of Foreign Affairs for an immediate loan of
seventy-five million dollars.

The money was needed to pay

Russian troops in Finland, where the Russian ruble was
unacceptable.

62

With the approval of the Mission, Root

and Ambassador Francis sent a telegram to bansing to
strongly recommend the loan.

They emphasized that the

6 0 "McCormick Diary," June 20 and June 28, 1917.
6 ^"McCormick Diary," July 7, 1917; and "Russell
Diary," July 7, 1917.

6^"McCormick Diary," July 8, 1917.
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existing government and Russia's military security would
be seriously endangered if the loan were not forthcoming.

63

Less than twenty-four hours after receiving the
request, Polk, Acting Secretary of State in Lansing's
absence, replied favorably.

He instructed Francis to

inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the seventyfive million dollar loan would "be made available imme
diately ."6 4

The Mission had left Russia before the reply

reached petrograd, and they were not informed of the
government's action until their arrival in the united
States.

This was the only specific request for immediate

credit made by the Mission during the trip to Russia, and
the prompt action of the State Department left the members
no room for criticism.

This loan, like other efforts

made by the united States during this period, did not
succeed in keeping Russia in the war or in stabilizing
the political situation.

Russia's problems were such

that the infusion of American dollars alone could not
solve them.

63Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, July 8 , 1917, Doc.
No. 861.00/154, St. Dept.
64Frank L. Polk to David R. Francis, July 9, 1917,
Doc. No. 861.00/157, St. Dept.

CHAPTER VIII
MILITARY
The Root Mission's roost important function was to
evaluate Russia's financial needs.

Another major chore

was to determine Russia's ability to remain effectively
in the war.

President Wilson tactfully avoided any

reference to this latter phase of the Mission's work in
his message to the provisional Government, but Russian
officials were well aware that American aid would be
contingent upon their ability to continue as an effective
force in the war against Germany.

Although each member

of the Mission would pay close attention to Russia's
military potential, this part of the Mission's work fell
primarily to two men, Major General Hugh L. Scott, and
Rear- Admiral James H. Glennon.
President Wilson's choice of General Scott, chief
of Staff of the united States Army, as a member of the
Mission is difficult to explain,

perhaps the selection

of Scott was intended to increase the prestige of the
Mission and flatter the Russians, but it removed from
Washington a man who should not have been spared at such a
critical time.

General Scott was unenthusiastic about his
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appointment to the Mission.

He later recorded that when

approached by Secretary Baker he had replied that he "did
not wish at all to leave the United States at that time
while we were preparing to go to war with Germany."

He

was, however, "completely at the disposal of the President"
and would "cheerfully" follow his wishes.

1

General Scott

accepted the president's decision gracefully, but Colonel
Judson wrote to his wife that he had the impression that
Scott did so reluctantly and suggested that "his coming
2
was doubtless arranged for more reasons than one."
The
implication was that the president utilized the Mission
as a means of removing Scott from Washington, D.C.
Apparently, the Chief of Staff viewed the trip with
some trepidation.

During the lengthy voyage from Seattle

to Vladivostok, Scott wrote his wife,

“I wish I knew . . .

what the war Dept., is doing— No doubt I would be surprised
3
if I knew some of the things being done."
Almost a month
later, he wrote her again that he had been "wondering a
great deal" about his position when he returned.

Realizing

that he might have been replaced as Chief of Staff, Scott
iscott, "The Russian Revolution," 2.
^William v. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, May 17,
1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4. Judson apparently
realized that Scott's appointment was being used to get him
out of Washington. When Scott returned to Washington, he was
immediately relieved of his position as chief of Staff.

3Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts, Library
of Congress).
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stated that "none of us" is indispensable and that "the
Secretary may have discovered this for himself."

4

Although Scott accepted the position with the Root
Mission unwillingly, he conscientiously fulfilled his duty
as a member.

Russell noted that during a stop at Spokane

the General was as "nervous as a school boy" for fear
their drive through the town would delay the Mission .5
Ibis was due perhaps to his years of military service in
which strict adherence to a prearranged schedule was essen
tial.

On one occasion, he complained to his wife that the

Mission’s agenda was too unstable to suit h i m .6

He later

commented that the Mission had "wasted enormous amounts of
the most valuable time waiting around for people to get
together . . . owing to lack of organization— it makes me
very cross sometimes but it is no use for me to get angry.
I have to swallow it and wait for the others long after
7
the appointed time."
His diary and letters reveal that
he was anxious to proceed with the business at hand during
his stay in Russia, and an examination of his schedule
^Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 27, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
5 "Russell Diary," May 19, 1917.
6Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).

7Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 24, 1917,
‘ Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
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shows that he utilized his time with a great degree of
efficiency.
Scott began the journey with an extremely pessimis
tic attitude and, unlike other members of the Mission who
might have had reservations about its success, voiced this
pessimism.

On the day of departure from Washington he

wrote a friend that from the available information,

"it

looks very much as if Russia is breaking up and we will be
too late."

He felt that "only a miracle" could prevent the
Q
Russian Army from "going to pieces."
In a letter to a

fellow officer he stated that in his opinion "Russia's
Army" was "crushed" and he was leaving Washington "with
9
very little hope of any successful results."
In his initial encounter with Russian authority,
Scott found nothing to change his opinion.

When, upon

arrival in the port of Vladivostok the Captain of the
Buffalo found anchorage with no assistance from any official
of the port, Chief of Staff Scott found this absurd .10
Scott interpreted the large numbers.of Russian soldiers
present at each train station as an indication that
8Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. H. L. Schelling, May 15, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 29 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
9Hugh L. Scott to General Elbert Wheeler, May 15,
1917, Hugh L. Scott papers. Box 29 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).

10Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.

discipline in the array had heen destroyed.
The day after they arrived in Petrograd, Scott
wrote his wife that the Russian situation was extremely
unstable.

"There is" he said, "no real force in the Govt—

the array is run by town meeting votes of soldiers who do
not obey their officers."

Approximately five million

Russian soldiers were absent from the Front, and "accord
ing to all the rules of the game Russia is out of the war."
For the first time, however, Scott qualified his pessimism:
The "great recuperative power of the Russian people" might
possibly enable Russia..to "pull herself together and fight
but no one has any money to bet on it . "

He cited the

Provisional Government's recent refusal to accept the
demands of the "dock men" and "socialist and German spies"
for political control of Kronstadt naval base as one of a
number of encouraging sig n s . ^
During his first two weeks in petrograd, Scott met
with the leaders of the Provisional Government, obtained
from the appropriate military leaders estimates of Russia's
needs in war material, and conducted a series of military
12
inspections in the petrograd area.
Scott met Foreign
■^Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 14,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).

^Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," /no date/,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 1, Folder 1 (Princeton university
Library, Princeton, N. J.).
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Minister Tereshchenko at a reception in the Foreign Office.
Following the reception, the military and naval members of
13
the Mission called on Kerensky, the Minister of War.
14
Tereshchenko spoke "excellent English,"
but Scott spoke
with Kerensky through an interpreter.

The General was most

favorably impressed with Kerensky, whom he described as a
"young man of great force and e n e r g y . S c o t t

explained

to Kerensky that he was primarily interested in determining
how the United States could best aid Russia's war effort.
Kerensky acknowledged the offer of aid and pleased Scott
by suggesting a visit to Army Headquarters in Mogilev to
be followed by a visit to the Front.^
The next day, Scott was presented to the Council
of Ministers.

Tereshchenko's reply to Root's address was

a disappointment to Scott, who felt that the Foreign
Minister had "failed to put the emphasis in the fighting
of Germany.”'
1'^

During a conversation after the speeches,

Tereshchenko warned Scott that he would encounter many
pessimists during his stay in Russia, but the Russian
13"Mission bog," 18-20.
■^Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 14, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
15"Scott Diary," June 14, 1917.
16"Mission Log," 20-21; and "Scott Diary," June 14,

1917.
17"Scott Diary," June 15, 1917.
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asked that the American "not believe them" and assured him
that Russia would be able to overcome its current diffi
culties. 18
Two days later Scott had a conference with Kerensky.
Again the Secretary of War impressed Scott as a "forcible
young man" whose words came from his mouth "like shots
19
from a gatling gun."
in the course of the conversation
Kerensky cited the vote of the Petrograd Council of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies in support of the government's
20
position in the Grimm case
as an example of the stability
of the Provisional Government.

Scott told Kerensky of the

success the French and English Missions had enjoyed in
"rousing the people"

in various American cities and

suggested that the Root Mission undertake a similar task
in Russia.

The Secretary of War, however, "seemed cold
21
but polite."
When Scott asked what he should avoid in
22

his visit to the Front, Kerensky replied,"PS'litlcs."

Both Tereshchenko and Kerensky impressed Scott as
men of energy and ability.

As was to be expected, both

19"Scott Diary," June 17, 1917.
20The Petrograd Soviet had upheld the action of the
Provisional Government in expelling Grimm, a Swiss diplomat,
because of suspected pro-German activities.
2 1 Ibid.

22Ibid.
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tried to persuade the General of the stability of the
Provisional Government.

Scott later described Kerensky
23
as "a bit too radically inclined to suit me,"
but his
diary and letters written at the time did not make this
distinction.
One of Scott’s major tasks during his stay in the
Russian capital was to obtain estimates of materials
sought from the United States by the various departments
of the Russian Army,

in order to facilitate the gathering

of this information, Scott arranged a conference for June
18.

Accompanied by colonels Michie, Judson, and Mott,

Scott conferred with General Manikovsky, Assistant to the
Minister of war, and the heads of the various military
departments. 24
Scott began the conference by briefly explaining
the purpose of the Mission.

He emphasized the need for

both America and Russia to continue the war against Germany
23

Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 14.

^ I n addition to General Manikovsky, the conference
was attended by the following Russian officers: Colonel
jakoubovitch, assistant to the Minister of war, General
Paltchinsky, Assistant to the President of the Metal
Conference, General Michelson, Chief of Management of
supplying troops from foreign countries, General Romanovsky. Chief of the General Staff, General Bozatko, Chief
of the Commissariat, General Lechovitch, Chief of the
Artillery Department, Admiral Kavin, Assistant Minister
of Marine, General Ovchinnikov, Assistant Chief of the
Military Technical Department, Colonel Yakovlev, Chief of
the Department of Aviation.
"Mission Log," 23-24.
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in order "to make democracy safe."

The Mission's, "one

object here" was to offer "cooperation and assistance" and
to determine how best this aid could be rendered.

25

Mani

kovsky expressed gratitude and assured Scott that with
American assistance "we are certain that . . .

we will

be able to crush Germany and the foes of democracy."

26

Since the Provisional Government had decided that
"all negotiations of a financial nature" should be con
ducted by the Minister of Finance, Manikovsky suggested
that they limit their discussions to the specific needs of
27
the various departments.
As these lists were presented,
General Scott and the other officers frequently asked for
clarification or more detailed information.

A tabulation

of the requests was eventually submitted to the state and
War Departments in both the Mccormick-Bertron Report and
in the report submitted by General Scott.

28

One point which the Russian officers emphasized
was that without immediate aid to the Russian railway system
25,transcript of Proceedings of Conference between
General Manikovsky, Assistant to the Minister of war, and
Officers, and General Scott, Chief of Staff and officers,
June 5/18, 1917," 1, Ellhu Root Papers, B o x 192. Herein
after cited as "Conference between General Manikovsky and
General Scott."
2 6 Ibid.

27"Conference between General Manikovsky and General
Scott," 2.
2 8 "Conference between General Manikovsky and General
Scott," 4-14.
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all other assistance would be useless.

General Michelson

explained that the military had been "keenly disappointed"
to hear that 500 locomotives and 10,000 freight cars
expected in July would not reach Russia until December.
Using the part of Vladivostok as an example, he pointed
out that material was being shipped from the port at a
rate of 150 cars per day.

This represented only twenty-

five per cent of the railroad's potential capacity if
sufficient cars were available.

He concluded,

"We will

hardly be able to avail ourselves of any other assistance
unless the rolling stock is given."

29

At the close of the conference Manikovsky again
brought up the question of assistance for the railroads.
He asked that Scott telegraph his government immediately
about the drastic need in that area.

Scott agreed to

arrange such a message after conferring with other members
of the Mission.

He pointed out, however, that his govern30
ment would ask if "the Russians intend to advance."
Scott later recalled that this question had the effect of
"exploding a bombshell in their midst" with the Russian^
31

"looking first at each other and then at me." *

Colonel

29"Conference between General Manikovsky and
General Scott," 3-4.
30

"Conference between General Manikovsky and
General Scott," 15.
3 1 Scott,

"The Russian Revolution," 16.
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Jakoubovitch then informed the Chief of Staff that the
Russian Armies intended to advance "in the shortest
possible time."

He emphasized the difficulty of accumu

lating material for an offensive because of inadequate
transportation facilities and explained that the advance
would occur in an area already well supplied where troop
morale was "improving all the time."

The advance was to

be a part of a gradual advance on all Fronts and was to
32
occur in no more "than ten days or two weeks."
Scott
found this information "most encouraging," and the con
ference ended on an optimistic note.
In addition to conducting interviews with offi
cials of the Provisional Government and conferences to
determine the needs of the Russian Army, General Scott
visited various military installations during his first
week.

Although he had been told that he would be able to
33
visit the Front almost immediately,
the days dragged by.
Scott became impatient and frequently wrote to his wife
34
complaining about the delay.
Later events suggest that
the Russian officials wished Scott to visit the Front at
3 2 "Conference between general Manikovsky and
General Scott," 15. The advance occurred on July 1, 1917,
twelve days later.
3 3 »gcott Diary," June 14, 1917.

34Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 14-24,
1917, Hugh L. Scott papers. Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
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the time of the July 1st offensive,

if this is indeed

true, it is not unreasonable to assume that the tours in
and around Petrograd were designed primarily to keep the
impatient General occupied.
Upon the invitation of General Polotsav, commander
of the Petrograd Military District, Scott and his staff
inspected the Guard Infantry Regiment and the First Regi
ment of the Don Cossacks .35

Scott was told that this

"crack Regiment" of the Guard had occupied the same barracks
for 160 years,

ibis led Scott to record in his diary that

"if we had been told the barracks had never been cleaned
36
during that time we would have believed it."
Nor did
the Cossack Regiment impress the General, who described
37
conditions there as "fully as dirty as the infantry."
Scott also noted the absence of such necessities as
adequate bedding, and that available he described as
"Rags."

He was appalled to find that the commanding

officer could not recall when the last drill had occurred.
Scott's impression of the Russian Army was not helped by
this inspection, which he later described as "a great
shock. ',38
3 5 Scott,

"Report to Secretary of Mission/" 2.

36"Scott Diary," June 15, 1917.

38Ibid.

The following day Scott and Colonel Michie visited
the Pavlovsky infantry School and the Mikhailovsky Artillery School.

39

These institutions, which Scott had been
40
told were "the two best military schools in Russia,"
were a disappointment to him.
at the lack of sanitation.

He was particularly amazed

Although the artillery school

was "a great improvement" over the infantry school, he
41
found neither to be "at all clean."
In an inspection of

a hospital in

a portion of the

Winter palace, Scott finally found something which he could
compliment.

The large reception rooms of the Palace had

been converted to wards to accommodate 1 0 0 men and were
"high and airy."

Scott found the men "well taken care of

*«

and cheerful."
On June 19, Scott toured the Putilov Steel Works
in petrograd.

The plant was producing

exclusively, and its normal
one of the largest in Russia.

munitions almost

work force of

30,000made it

Scott was disappointed to

find that the plant was producing at only fifty to sixty
2 ^Scott,

"Report to Secretary of Mission," 3.

40"Scott Diary," June 16, 1917.
41Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 16, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress); and "Scott Diary," June 16, 1917.

42,,Soott Diary," June 17, 1917.

per cent capacity.

The General attributed this situa

tion to worker absenteeism and observed that many of those
present were not working.

At one point in their tour,

described as five miles in length, they came to a room
where some workmen were holding a meeting.

General Scott

was prompted to suggest that this was "a fair sample of
what is going on everywhere . 1,44

on the same day Scott

toured an airplane factory where he saw many planes, mostly
45
French and German, but observed "none ready for flight."
Scott also accompanied other Mission members on a
brief visit to Moscow.

Although the General welcomed the

opportunity to see Moscow, since he felt that one had not
seen the "real Russia" if this city were omitted,
complained of having to wait for the others.

47

46

he

He was

obviously becoming increasingly anxious to tour the
Russian Front.

He had expected to go much sooner and

wrote that the "many disappointments" and "the exas48
perating delay would drive me to drink."
4 3 Scott,

"Report to Secretary of Mission," 4.

4 4 "Scott Diary," June 19, 1917.
45Ibid.
46Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 18,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).

47Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 24,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
48Ibid.
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The Mission left Moscow on the evening of June 24
and arrived in Petrograd the following afternoon.

49

Upon

arrival, Scott discovered that the long awaited visit to
the Russian Front was to begin.

After a ten-hour delay in

petrograd, Scott and Colonels Michie, judson, and Mott and
American officers assigned to the American Embassy boarded
a special train for the Russian General Staff Headquarters
at Mogilev.

Root and Tereshchenko were also on board the

train but planned to return to Petrograd after interviews
50
with General Brusilov rather than continue to the Front.
The train arrived at Mogilev at 9:00 p.m. on June 27.
Scott, Tereshchenko, and Root called on Brusilov immediately.
The Americans were invited to lunch with the Russian Com
mander the next day.

Scott was told that arrangements had

been made for him to leave for the Front after lunch.

51

Scott's brief visit to Mogilev was his first en
couraging experience with the Russian military.

None of

the criticism which characterized his earlier tours of
inspection occurs in his description of Brusilov's Head52
quarters, and his evaluation of the commanding officer.
49"Mission Log," 28.
5 0 Ibid.,

29.

51'»scott Diary," June 27, 1917.
52Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 27,
1917, Hugh L. Scott papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress); "Scott Diary," June 27-28, 1917.
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He described Brusilov as a “forceful man" whose command
seemed to have a “more businesslike air . . . than any
so far seen."„53
For the trip to the Front the Americans were joined
5'
by Colonel Navielskoy, assigned to them as a special aide.
The two-day trip was interrupted at one point by a bombing
attack by a German plane.

No damage or injury resulted,

although many members had no time to dress in their haste
to leave the train.

The group arrived at Tarnopol late in

the evening of June 29 and transferred to automobiles for
55
the remaining portion of the journey.
After a brief
visit with General Erdley at Eleventh Army Headquarters
in Ezerna, the group proceeded to Budilev where the Sixth
56
Corps Headquarters was located.
The Russian Chief of Staff of the Sixth Corps met
the group.

After explaining the next day's battle plans

he suggested that the party might wish to observe the
artillery bombardment already in progress.

Scott and his

aides welcomed this opportunity and proceeded on foot to a
Division Commander's observation post southwest of the
53lbid.
5^Scott,"Report to Secretary of Mission," 6.
5 5 Scott, “The Russian Revolution," 19; and Scott,
"Report to Secretary of Mission," 6 .

56“Scott Diary,” June 30, 1917? and Scott,
to Secretary of Mission," 7.

"Report
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village.

From this vantage point Scott and his aides could

observe the forty-mile section of the Front where the ad
vance was to take place.

After watching the artillery

assault for some time, Scott and his group returned to a
village eight miles to the rear to await the attack.
After a night's sleep on hospital cots reeking with
formaldehyde, the group returned to their observation post
shortly before 8:00 a.m.

The artillery barrage was lifted

and the Russian infantry began its assault at precisely
9:00 a.m.

Scott soon observed large numbers of men re

turning from the Front.

He assumed that they were

retreating Russians but soon discovered that they were
Austrian and German prisoners.

Scott and his aides re57
turned to Corps Headquarters at 4:00 p.m.
Thus, after

traveling thousands of miles and being absent from Washing
ton for almost three months, the Chief of Staff of the
United states Army visited the Russian Front for approxi
mately twenty-four hours and observed a combined artillery
and infantry assault which lasted three hours.
The visit, however, was far from insignificant.
Prior to this time Scott had shown nothing but concern for
the ability of the Russians to continue the war.

As a

result of these observations, however, Scott was impressed
57"Scott Diary," June 30-july 1, 1917; Scott, "The
Russian Revolution," 19-24; and Scott, "Report to Secretary
of Mission," 7-8.
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with the potential of the Russian Army and most enthusias
tic.

The American Press quoted the General as saying:
The Russian Army is going to fight, the spirit
among the troops everywhere is excellent, and the
/July lst7 advance . . . h a s every chance for
successful continuation . . . The precision and
exquisite working of the Russian machinery was a
marvel to me . . . there was not the slightest
sign of insubordination or reluctance among the
m e n .58
An American journalist in Russia wrote to his wife

that the Russian advance "was almost as if it had been
staged especially for Gen. Scott and his staff; they could
never have arrived at a better time.

Previous to their

arrival there was nothing doing on the Russian Front."

59

Whether by accident or design, General Scott had arrived
at a very propitious moment.

Years later, when asked if

the offensive had been designed for the effect it would
have in Russia or on the Allies, Kerensky replied,

60

"Both.”

Kerensky and the Russian General Staff, however,

did not stage the advance for Scott's benefit although
Allied pressure, especially French and British, on the
Provisional Government prompted an offensive at this time.
After the July 1st offensive, Scott and his aides
began the trip to Jassy, the temporary capital of Rumania.
33 The

New York Times, July 10, 1917, 3.

59Donald c. Thompson to Mrs. Donald C. Thompson,
July 8, 1917, quoted in Donald c. Thompson, Donald Thomp
son In Russia (New York* Century Co., 1918), 258.
6 0 Warth,

The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 176.
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The trip was delayed by a brief visit to the Eighth Army
Headquarters of General Kornilov at Czernowitz.

General

Scott was deeply impressed with Kbrnilov and later recalled
that he had come "to regard him as the hope of Russia."
After his death there was "no hope for Russia."

61

During

their brief conference Scott explained the purpose of the
Mission and told of the preparations for war being made in
America.

Kbrnilov outlined his plan for a proposed attack

against the Austrians.

He invited the American General to

return in four or five days, in order to observe the
advance of the Eighth Army, which consisted of about
200,000

men .6 2
The trip to Rumania was the result of a request

made by the Rumanian government through its Minister at
Petrograd.

Although Root was unable to visit Rumania,

he arranged for General Scott to go there after his in
spection of the Russian Front.

His mission was to assure

61Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 23-24.
6 2 "Memorandum of Conversation Between Gen. Kbrnilov,.,
Commanding the 8 th Army, and General Scott at Chernovitch,
July 2, 1917," Hugh L. Scott papers. Box 71 (Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress). General Korniloff also
told Scott of his task at the beginning of the Revolution
of placing the Czarina under arrest. One of General
Scott's aides would later recall that the General had an
"insatiable" curiosity about Russia prior to the Revolu
tion, and "questioned Baron Ramsey for hours on etid as to
every detail of Russian court-life." Mott, Twenty Years,

198.
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the Rumanian government of the "warm sympathy and friend
ship” of the United States and of America's intention to
63
"help hear the burdens of w a r . ”
General Scott's party arrived at jassy early on
the morning of July 3.

64.

Although the American legation

at Jassy had not been informed of the visit until the
afternoon before Scott's arrival, the Rumanian Government
aC
had prepared a full day's activities for the group.
Scott was met at the station by Vintila Bratianer, Minister
of War, General Prezan, Chief of Staff, and other Rumanian
officials.

66

■

The Minister of War accompanied the group to

the Palace of the Metropolitan of Jassy where accommoda
tions hcid been provided.

The morning was devoted to a

series of conferences which included both the Rumanian
Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Russian
a^
forces in Rumania.
Scott's most important conferences were those with
the Rumanian Prime Minister, Jean I. C. Bratiano, who
63Elihu Root to King Ferdinand and Queen Marie, of
Rumania, June 14-27, 1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 1,
Folder 5 (Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.).
^Sc o t t ,

"Report to Secretary of Mission," 8-9.

65Whiting Andrews to Robert Lansing, July 7, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/6109, St. Dept.
"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917? and Scott,
to Secretary of Mission," 9.
^Scott,

"Report

"Report to the Secretary of Mission," 9.
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explained that his government wanted to establish military
cooperation as well as an "intimate friendship with the
United States" after the war.

The prime Minister explained

that the loss of Rumanian territory had come about "through
the fault of our allies."

According to Bratiano, Rumania

had not wished to become a belligerent and had done so
only after the Allies "demanded with the greatest insistence
that we enter the war."

They had been told that there would

be a general offensive in which the Rumanian Army would be
opposed by ten or twelve divisions.

As no general offensive

developed, the Rumanian Army was opposed by thirty-seven
divisions and was, therefore, unable to hold the lines.

69

In his request for military aid the Prime Minister
stressed the strategic position held by the Rumanians.
Rumania had ten divisions already equipped and five more
which could be used on the Front if proper supplies were
made available.

The united States would require ten times

the amount requested to supply and transport an equal
number of men to Europe.

70

The Prime Minister also pointed out that a great
demand for non-military goods such as farm machinery would
6 8 "Memorandum of Conversation Between Mr. Bratiano,
Prime Minister of Roumania, and General Scott," July 3,
1917, 1. Elihu Root papers. Box 71 (Division of Manu
scripts, Library of Congress).
6 9 Ibid., 1 - 2 .

70Ibid., 3-4.
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develop as Rumanian territory was evacuated by the Germans.
Bratiano introduced in more than one instance the possi
bility of trade agreements between the two countries.

At

one point he stated that the United States would "make no
mistake from any point of view in helping Roumania# not
only during the war# but in the time to come after the
war."

71

Scott hesitated to discuss "anything commercial,"

as the Americans wished to "keep our skirts clear of every
ulterior purpose."

After the war# however# such "questions"
72
would no doubt "be welcomed" by the united States.
In Scott's opinion, transportation presented the
major problem.

Bratiano assured Scott that the material

could be handled When it reached the Rumanian border#
though he readily acknowledged that any aid to Rumania
was tied to the problem of transportation in Russia.

73

Although Scott was unable to make any specific
promises# his sympathetic reception to the needs of
Rumania was encouraging to the Prime Minister.

There was

one problem# however, which might delay or possibly pre
vent American aid.

The failure of the Rumanian government

to grant full civil rights to Rumanian Jews could lead to
opposition from Jewish-Americans.
7 1 Ibid.. 6
7 2 Ibid.,

.

6-7.

73Ibid., 6.

The Prime Minister
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assured Scott that a decision had already been made to
"remove all the inequalities of civil rights" between Jews
and other Rumanians.

This was later confirmed in a conver

sation Scott had with the Rumanian Queen, who said that
the decision had the "warm approval" of the King.
The prime Minister explained that the decision had
been made for two reasons:

Rumanian Jews had supported

the war effort, and Jews living in areas of Rumania then
controlled by Austria had full civil rights.

These rights

could not be taken away when the territory was reacquired
by Rumania.

Scott suggested that it would be well for

these reforms to take place immediately, but the Prime
Minister explained that it would be extremely difficult
to accomplish the required constitutional changes due to
the occupation of large areas of Rumania by foreign troops.
He agreed, however, to furnish the American State Depart
ment with statements from prominent Rumanian jews indi
cating their acceptance of the necessity of delay,

such

letters could then be used by the state Department to
influence American public opinion.

74

At 1:00 p.m. General Scott and his aides were pre
sented to King Ferdinand and Queen Marie, who entertained
them at a luncheon.
74

If the luncheon had been intended to

,

' "Memorandum on The Jewish Question In Roumania,"
104, Elihu Root papers. Box 71.
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serve any purpose other than a courtesy to the Americans
it was a complete failure.. Scott failed to record any
reference to this meeting with the King except for one
sentence in his diary in which he stated that he was not
impressed with the Monarch.

He found the Queen to be "a

beautiful woman" and described her as being "far more
intelligent than the King."

75

That afternoon the group was received by the
Rumanian Senate with "a wild ovation."7^ General Scott
77
delivered the major address of the day.
He restricted
himself to a description of the war mobilization in the
United States, but his audience received the impression
that the General would strongly recommend generous aid
78
for their country.
Scott's translator had trouble
following the rapid flow of figures and suspected that
if the General had ever given a speech before it had been
in Indian sign-language.

79

"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917; Colonel Mott and
Judson both agreed with Scott's evaluation of the Royal
Couple. Mott, Twenty Years, 200; and William V. Judson
to Mrs. William V. Judson, July 9, 1917, William V. Judson
papers, Box 4.
76

Scott,

77Scott,

"The Russian Revolution," 24.
"Report to Secretary of Mission," 9.

^Translation of an editorial, "American Mission,"
from the independent Roumaine of June 22/july 7, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 71 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
7^Mott, Twenty Years, 198-199.
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The Prime Minister was favorably impressed and
remarked that the General's speech had "produced a
tremendous effect" and "was exactly what our people
80
„
needed to hear.”
The acting American charge d'affaires
said that Scott's speech made "a most excellent impression"
and his visit aided • '.'enormous/ly/ in raising . . . their
morale.”

He added:

It gave the Roumanians the idea that the united
States would give them everything they asked for.
This last result of General Scott's speech may
possibly in the near future cause the united States
some embarrassment. The Roumanians are saying
that . . . G e n e r a l Scott made them concrete
promises.3 '
1.
Later in the afternoon Scott accompanied the
Rumanian King on an inspection of a contingent of the
Second Rumanian Division which was stationed in Jassy.

82

Following dinner with the Prime Minister, Scott and his
aides boarded the train, ending their brief visit to the
83
Rumanian capital.
The lengthy trip to petrograd was interrupted by
brief visits to the Headquarters of General Kornilov at
czernowitz on July 4 and General Brusilov at Mogilev
80Mott, Twenty Years, 199.
31Whiting Andrews to Robert Lansing, July 7, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/6109, St. Dept.
32"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917; and Scott,
to Secretary of Mission," 9.

33"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917.

"Report

214
three days later,

in order to "keep faith with Mr. Root,"

Scott reluctantly declined invitations to return to the
Russian Front but was assured by both officers that the
offensive was advancing as planned.

By July 8, Scott

and his party were back in petrograd, and the Mission
84
departed for the united States on July 9.
The real significance of General Scott's brief
tour of the Russian Front lies in the fact that it gave
him a false impression of the military situation in
Russia.

Up to the time of his visit General Scott had

failed to see anything in Russia which indicated a stable
military situation.

The brief assault that he viewed on

July 1, he interpreted as an indication of what the
QC
Allies could expect from the Russian Army.
Scott
thought he detected an improvement in the morale of the
Russian troops after July 1:
As a result of this offensive it has been gen
erally noticed that the Russian soldiers are imbued
with a much better spirit and apparently desire to
get to the front, on many troop trains passed by
us on our return from Jassy it was observed that
the soldiers were singing and apparently enthusiastic
34"Scott Diary," July 4-9, 1917; and Scott,
to Secretary of Mission," 9-10.

"Report

35General Scott was not alone in this impression.
Colonel judson described the battle of July 1st as "re
markably successful and spectacular." William V. Judson
to Mrs. William v. Judson, William V. judson Papers,
Box 4.
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on the prospect of their being taken into action.86
On July 8, Scott recorded in his diary,

"We are leaving

the Russians fighting which seemed impossible a great
87
part of our stay in petrograd."
The Russian offensive of July 1st on the Galician
front about which Scott was so optimistic was of short
duration.

The early success of the offensive came be 

cause the attack was against Austrian rather than German
troops and the Russians had a large numerical superiority.
The offensive, which at best lasted only two weeks, was
halted as soon as German troops were brought up.

The

ambitious advance was turned into a rout, with the defeated
38
Russians burning and pillaging as they retreated.
This
was the Russian Army's last major military offensive,

it

proved that the Russian Army was incapable of any major
offensive operation and precipitated the political demon
strations in Petrograd known as the "July Days" which
caused the reorganization of the Russian cabinet.
General Alfred Knox, the British military attache
who was also observing the advance, returned to petrograd
on July 4.
86

Knox cabled his government that the Russian
Scott,

"Report to Secretary of Mission," 10.

8 7 "Scott Diary," July 7, 1917.
88chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 163-64.
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Army was "irretrievably ruined as a fighting organization."8®
As late as July 9, however, Scott remained extremely opti
mistic about the advance.
It is impossible to understand how Scott maintained
his faith in the July offensive,

perhaps because it was

his first opportunity to observe modern warfare, he was too
impressed by the initial success he witnessed.

More im

portant, however, is the fact that Scott spent only a few
hours at the Front and was on board the train or in Rumania
for the next few days.

He was, therefore, out of touch with

the actual situation from July 1 through July 8 .

These

factors alone do not explain the General's failure to
understand the military crisis in Russia.
conclude that the "old Indian

One can only

fighter," unlike General

Knox, was incapable of grasping the significance of the
military situation he was sent to observe.
In addition to a report on the Russian Army, Presi
dent Wilson also sought information about the Russian Navy.
Naval personnel assigned to the Mission were Rear Admiral
James H. Glennon, representative of the president with the
rank of Minister, Captain N. A. Mccully, naval attache,
and Lieutenant Alva D. Bernhard, aide to Admiral Glennon.
89 Warth,

90

The Allies and The Russian Revolution, 112.

90"personnel of Special Diplomatic Mission of the
United states of America," Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
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Glennon's role was to determine the needs of the Russian
Navy and to appraise its potential under the new govern
ment.

Glennon learned of the Navy's needs in a series of

conferences with naval officials in Petrograd and, in
visits to three fleet headquarters, observed conditions
91
existing in the navy.
Lieutenant D. Fedotov White,
assigned as aide to Admiral Glennon during his stay in
Russia, was among the various officials who greeted the
92
Mission upon its arrival in Petrograd.
During his first three days in the capital Admiral
Glennon was presented to the Provisional Government and
conferred with naval authorities there.

At the first

major conference, held on June 17, Admiral Glennon and
his aides met with Captain Dudorov, the newly installed
Vice Minister for Marine, and Vice Admiral Kedrov, who
had recently retired from that position.

Kedrov stressed

the "urgent necessity of vessels of war" for the protection of shipping in "Russian Northern waters."

93

As

German submarines were the major threat to Russian
shipping there, it was suggested that "American destroyers
94
would be of the greatest possible assistance to Russia."
^ " M i s s i o n Report," 7, Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
92"Mission Log," 18.
93 "Glennon Report," 1, Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
94Ibid., 2; Ehe Russian Naval Attach^ in Washington
had made similar requests earlier to secretary Daniels.
Cronon, Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 132, 145-46.
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Glennon learned that there were no destroyers available
to the White Sea Fleet, that England's promise to provide
such vessels had not yet been fulfilled, and that the two
Russian destroyers attached to the Fleet were being re
paired in England.

The presence of American war ships

would not only minimize the dangers from German submarines,
but would also have a "moral /sic7 effect on the Russian
people, especially the soldiers and sailors."

95

Other vessels requested, in addition to the des
troyers, were nine patrol boats capable of speeds of not
less than ten knots and armed with three-inch guns, and
96
seventeen trawlers similarly armed.
The Russian Navy
asked for guns of various sizes, large amounts of ammuni
tion, and articles needed primarily for repairs.

The

total estimate presented by Admiral Kedrov at this first
meeting came to approximately $50 million.

97

on the

following day Admiral Glennon again conferred with the
Russian officers, at which time he received more requests.

Q Q

95"Report of Interview With Naval General Staff In
Regard To Naval Needs," 3, appendix to "Glennon Report,"
Elihu Root Papers, b o x 192; and "Glennon Report," 2.
98"Report of interview With Naval General staff
In Regard To Naval Needs," 5, appendix to "Glennon Report,"
Elihu Root Papers, b o x 192.
9 7 "Glennon Report," 2.
98A four-page appendix to Glennon*s Report contains
a detailed statement of the requests of the Russian Navy,
"Recommendations of Board of Naval Construction For
Russian Navy," Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
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Unlike General Scott, who remained in petrograd
for over two weeks before visiting the Russian Army in the
field, Admiral Glennon and his aides began the first of
three trips to inspect the Russian Fleets on June 17, only
three days after their arrival in Petrograd.

Before

leaving petrograd, white took Admiral Glennon on a tour
of the Naval Gun Factory at obukov, a few miles from
Petrograd."

After a pleasant trip up the Neva, they

arrived at the obukov Gun Works, a large plant which
100
employed approximately 1 2 , 0 0 0 workmen.
Admiral Glennon was favorably impressed and
described the plant as "most remarkable."

He was some

what surprised to find that the plant was operated com
pletely by Russians without "a single foreign engineer."*'0 '1*
He found the workers "intelligent and capable."

102

His

experience was quite unlike that of General Scott, who
found labor problems in the munitions plant he visited,
in one of the shops Glennon made a brief speech, after
which the workers "cheered lustily for America and the
Americans."

This surprised his Russian aide who described

" "Mission Log," 21? and white, Survival, 146.
i°0l,Visit to Obkhoff Gun Factory, petrograd," appen
dix to "Glennon Report," Elihu Root papers, Box 192.
;L0 :LWhlte, Survival, 147.
102"Visit to obkhoff Gun Factory, Petrograd."

the workers' mood as "quite beyond my expectations."
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It was White's opinion# quite possibly correct# that
Admiral Glennon received a false impression of Russian
104
industry from this one visit.
Glennon's first trip of inspection was to the
Black Sea port of Sevastopol where he was to meet Admiral
Kolchak, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

105

White

secured the use of Kerensky's railway car for the trip
and stocked it with food and liquor obtained from the
106
cellars of the Winter Palace.
The three-day trip to
Sevastopol was comparatively uneventful, although the
group suffered some minor discomfort when they exhausted
their supply of soda water and had to substitute an in-,
ferior local product .1*07
Approaching Sevastopol on the morning of June 20,
the group learned from persons leaving the port city
that on the preceding day the local Council of Soldiers,
Sailors, and Workers had, for all practical purposes,
assumed control of the Black Sea Fleet.

Unlike the revolts

which had occurred in the Baltic Fleet during March, the
1‘0 '^White,

Survival, 147.

lQ4 Ibid.
lOSi'Qiennon Report," 2; and White, Survival, 145.
106 White,

Survival, 145.

107Ibid., 147-48.
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seizure of power was not accompanied by the murder or
3.08
execution of any of the officers.
Admiral Kolchak had
been relieved of his command and was replaced by Admiral
Lukine, and all officers had been forced to surrender their
weapons.
The party decided that, regardless of the events
of the past two days, it would continue into Sevastopol in
order to witness conditions firsthand.

Shortly after

breakfast the train pulled into the Sevastopol station,
where the group was met by a delegation consisting of
Admiral Lukine, two members of his staff, and two repre
sentatives of the Executive committee of the local
Soviet.

109

White immediately began making preparations

for attaching their car to the next train for petrograd.
He did not want to prolong their stay any longer than was
necessary.
Glennon began his tour of the Fleet.

He visited

two battleships and watched as the crews went through
gunloading drills.

The drills were "voluntarily given by

the men, a fact which they desired to be understood.
in the afternoon Glennon and his aides attended a
108"Giennon Report," 2; and White, survival, 149.
The Secretary of Navy erred.when he later wrote that a
hundred officers were murdered. Josephus Daniels, Years
of W a r , 60.
109"Glennon Report," 2-3; and White, survival, 149.
11°"Glennon Report," 3.
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meeting of the Sevastopol Soviet.

Following several

speeches, the visiting admiral was asked to address the
group.
navy.

Glennon spoke to the gathering about the American
He told his listeners that, although its organiza

tion was baaed on democracy, a certain amount of discipline
was necessary for its proper functioning.

Turning to the

question at hand, the American admiral asked the sailors
to fight for their new freedom but stressed the need for
discipline.

Glennon praised Admiral Kolchak and asked the

men to remain loyal to their commander and return the side111
arms to the officers of the fleet.
Glennon's Russian
aide later described the incident as "an instance unique
in all naval history . . .

a foreign officer made a speech
112
which helped to quell a mutiny."
Although Glennon*s
accomplishment was exaggerated,

113

it helped to persuade

the Sevastopol Soviet to rescind by a vote of sixty to
three all of its actions except the removal of Admiral
, ^ n M 4
KOlchak.

The group returned to petrograd on the evening
train.

KOlchak and his Chief of Staff, captain M. X.
"Glennon Report," 6 ; and White, Survival, 153-54.
■^^White, Survival, 154.

H 3The Hew York Times, June 25, 1917, 1; Russell,
Unchained Russia, 99-101; and Josephus Daniels, Years of
W a r , 60.
114"Glennon Report," 6.
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Smirnov, boarded the same train for the capital.

This

gave Glennon the opportunity to discuss the naval situation in more detail.

115

Prom their conversation they

developed the idea of a Russian naval mission to the united
States.

Headed by Admiral Kolchak, this visit took place

later in the year.
Admiral Glennon and his party arrived in petrograd
on June 23.

After a brief conference with the vice Minis

ter of Marine to discuss the situation in Sevastopol and
a meeting with Ambassador Francis, Glennon began preparations for a tour of the White Sea Fleet.

117

Accompanied

by Crosley, McCully, Bernhard, and White, Admiral Glennon
left Petrograd on the evening of June 24 en route to
Archangel.

The party reached its destination on the
]_]_Q
evening of June 26.
They were met by Captain Petrov,

Chief of the Russian Naval General Staff at Archangel, who
^^White, Survival, 154.
■L3*6warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution,

109-10; White, Survival, 155-58; ancf Daniels, Years of
W a r , 60.
117

"Glennon Report," 6-7. After conferring with
Admiral Glennon, Ambassador Francis wired the Secretary
of State in his usual optimistic tone.
"Discipline restored
in Black Sea Fleet Glennon goes Archangle tonight." David
R. Francis to Robert Lansing, June 24, 1917, Doc. No.
861.00/414, St. Dept.
HSiij^epQrt from W. S. Crosley office of the Naval
Attach^, to Francis, subject— Visit to Archangel, Russia—
30 June 1917," William v. Judson Papers, b o x 4; and
"McCormick Diary," June 30, 1917.
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represented captain Vilrorsk, the commanding officer.
Since Archangel was a major port of entry, Glennon
was especially concerned with its facilities and its
ability to handle cargo.

Upon his return to petrograd,

Glennon reported to Francis that two German submarines
had been sighted laying mines near Archangel the day
before their arrival there.

Shipping had been halted

temporarily to enable trawlers to clear the area of mines.
Glennon believed "this condition clearly shows the . ne
cessity for destroyers or other suitable fast vessels in
120
Russian northern waters."
Ambassador Francis cabled
home Glennon1s recommendations that "at least six of our
destroyers be sent /to7 Archangel immediately."

1.21

In a conversation with another member of the Mission,
Admiral Glennon described the situation in Archangel as
"fairly satisfactory," as he had "found everything at
122
Archangel in ship-shape order."
White did not share
the Admiral’s viewpoint.

He commented that while the

officers at Archangel did not live under an "immediate
apprehension of murder," conditions there were "about as

119ibia.
1,20"Glennon Report," 7.
121
David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, July 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5854, St. Dept.

I22"McCormick Diary," June 30, 1917.

bad as at other seaports."
On the evening of July 1, Glennon and his aides set
out for Helsingfors, on the third and last of their tours
124
of the Russia Fleets.
En route to Helsingfors the
group stopped at Revel, a Russian naval base an. the
southern shore of the Gulf of Finland.

Glennon spent the

entire day inspecting ships and the shore batteries which
guarded the entrance to the Gulf.
Gausal.

Next, they went to

There they boarded a Russian destroyer for their

trip to the northern port of the Gulf where the fleet was
125
anchored at Roggekuel.
Admiral Glennon reported that
"the condition of material and spirit of personnel on
these vessels was the best seen in any Russian Fleet."
126
The "ships and men were ready for battle."
That afternoon Glennon inspected a shore battery
of four twelve-inch guns which commanded the southern
entrances to the Gulf,

captain Knuepfer, commander of the

installation, guided the group on the inspection tour.
According to Glennon, there was "no sign of friction or
disaffection among his men, who . . . seemed to be under
good discipline."

The inspection was interrupted briefly

i2 3 White, Survival, 158.
124"Mission log," July 1, 1317? and "McCormick
Diary," June 30, 1917.
1,25"Glennon Report," 8 .

126Ibid.
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by a raid by a squadron of German planes.

No damage was

done and one observer felt that Glennon enjoyed the excite
ment . 1,27
On July 4, Glennon's grog? traveled to Helsingfors
for the last important stop of their tour.
they found to be "very b a d . "

Conditions

Admiral Glennon had again

managed to arrive at the precise moment of an insurrection
led by local radicals.

Admiral Verderevsky, Commander of

the Fleet at Helsingfors, therefore requested that the
American officers make their visit as brief as possible,
128
which they did.
They left for Petrograd that same day
and arrived there on July 6 .

Admiral Glennon utilized

the time left in conferences with various Russian naval
officials.
While in Russia, Admiral Glennon saw little to
give him a favorable impression of the Russian Navy.

At

best, on a few occasions he saw adequate vessels in
service.

Twice, however, he had observed local Soviets

supersede the authority of commanding officers who had
the approval of the petrograd government,
so than any other member

perhaps more

of the Mission, Glennon had

seen the power of the Soviets.

There is no indication

that he fully appreciated the significance of this power.
1*27 White,

Survival, 160.

128"Glennon Report," 9-10; and White, Survival,
162-64.

In his formal report, Glennon did not see fit even
comment on it.

CHAPTER IX
THE SOCIALISTS
A third major area of concern for the Mission was
the growing strength of the socialist parties in Russia.
Charles Edward Russell, a well-known American socialist,
was chosen by President Wilson to establish contact with
these groups.
twofold.

Russell conceived of his task as being

He was to serve as a link between the Mission

and Russian socialists, and he was to explain to them why
they should support vigorous prosecution of the war.
Russell informed his colleagues that he did not
know any of the Russian socialists personally but had
obtained several letters of introduction from American
socialists in order to offset this liability.^

Russell's

work with the Russian socialists would be further compli
cated because he had been dismissed from the Socialist
party of America when he had accepted an appointment from
a "capitalist" government.

He believed that a conspiracy

of "pro-German" socialists led by Morris Hillquit had
caused his dismissal and felt that this group would do
1"McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917. Volume 7 of the
Russell Papers contains several such letters, including
ones from Allen L. Benson, A. M. Simons, and "Comrade"
Rose pastor /stokes7.
228

229
everything possible to discredit the Mission.

According

to Russell, Hillquit was "writing letters to his friends
in Russia warning them that this commission is a capital
istic propaganda for the commercial exploitation of
2
Russia."
Because of his strong support for the Allied war
effort, Russell had no trouble reconciling his belief in
socialism with the idea of vigorous prosecution of the war
against Germany.

His first opportunity to explain his

position to Russian socialists came in the remote Russian
3
town of Irkutsk.
He was sought out by two socialists who
explained that they "thoroughly disbelieved in war" yet
were "urged to go on with this one."

Russell replied that

he, too, hated war but was forced to support this one,
since it was between the forces of democracy and autoc
racy.

More specifically, he told his visitors that if

Russia were to withdraw from the war the principles of
4
both democracy and socialism would be destroyed.
This
brief statement contained the premise on which Russell
based his frequent arguments of the next few weeks.

He

supported vigorous pursuit of the war in order to insure
the democracy that he considered an essential preliminary
^"McCormick Diary," May 26, 1917.
^"Mission Log," 14.

4 "Russell Diary," June 7, 1917.

to the establishment of socialism.
Upon his arrival in Petrograd, Russell began work
immediately,

on the afternoon of June 14, when the members

of the Mission briefly called on Tereshchenko,
was disappointed.

5

Russell

He believed that the Mission was out of

touch with realities.

He contrasted-their "long-tailed

coats" to the Foreign Minister's "sack coat and soft
collar."

Russell thought their "regalia" looked "stupid"

and was completely out of place in a nation where "the
red flag floats from one end of the country to the other."
The following day, when the Mission was presented
to the entire membership of the Provisional Government,
Russell talked informally with various members of the
Cabinet.

He recognized Kerensky as the unofficial leader

and described him as the "coming man in Russia . . . the
most popular member of the cabinet."
"our plea

Russell felt that

for immediate action on the front rests first

of all with' him."

7

He was somewhat disappointed in his

conversation with him, however, and described their talk
8
as "little more than the flub-dub of such an occasion."
on June 19, when Russell attended a luncheon given
by Ambassador Francis, he and Duncan had the opportunity
S "Mission Log," 18-19.
6 "Russell Diary," June 14, 1917.
7l,Russell Diary," June 15, 1917.

8lbid.

to discuss at length the situation in Russia with M. I.
Skobolov, i. G. Tsereteli, and V. M. Chernov, Ministers
of Labor, Posts and Telegraphs, and Agriculture, respec9
tively.
Again he thought he detected a hesitancy on the
part of the ministers— "Socialists of the most amiable
kind"— to accept the necessity of continuing the war.

When

asked whether they agreed that "the safety of democracy in
the world depended upon the defeat of Germany," they did
so "without enthusiasm."

Russell asked,

"What can America

do that will most effectively help Russia?"
reply was:

Their unanimous

"induce the Allies to agree to revise all their

treaties and agreements of alliance and cooperation so as
to eliminate imperialistic aims."

Ambassador Francis

replied that the united States was not a party to these
treaties and therefore could "do nothing in this matter."
Russell thought that this viewpoint had "never occurred
to any of the three."

During the course of the same con

versation, Duncan explained America's entry into the war
and its tremendous military potential.

Again Russell was

disappointed in the reaction and "noted that our three
Ministers showed no enthusiasm about the united states
whether for its disinterested motives or the extent of its
resources
^"Mission Log," 25; and "Employment of Charles
Edward Russell." Skobolov and Tsereteli were Mensheviks
and Chernov, a Socialist Revolutionary.
10"Russell Diary," June 19, 1917.
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No doubt influenced by the disappointing interview
with the Socialist members of the Provisional Government,
Russell recorded in his diary:
. . . the masses of the people are sane and rea
sonable, and committed to a practicable conception
of democratic government.
But they are sick of the
war, dead sick and weary. At present, they can see. no
reason why they should go on with it. What we have
to do is to reach them with the adequate reason.
Until we do that we are wasting time talking to this
government,
it isn't the power that will decide
whether the Russian armies continue to fight. The
masses of the Russian people will determine that.
I am sure we give too much heed to the existing
government and exaggerate its importance . 11
This proved to be a very perceptive observation.

Apparently,

Russell was the only Mission member who correctly inter
preted popular sentiment toward.the war or the ineffective
ness of the Provisional Government.
Russell attributed this tendency of the Mission to
think only in terms of the Provisional Government to the
fact that Americans were accustomed to dealing with estab
lished governments which could speak and act decisively.
Such was not the case in Russia,

"if anyone thinks this

government is in any such situation . . . how huge is that
12
blunder! And what consequences may depend upon it I"
Thus, soon after his arrival in Russia, Russell became
convinced that the members of the Provisional Government,

ILIbid
12Ibid
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or "Bureau Chiefs" as he usually referred to them, were
without sufficient power to determine policy for Russia,
and he increasingly turned his attention to other areas.
From the first day of his arrival in the Russian
capital, Russell had been aware of the potential power of
the masses in Revolutionary Russia,

upon returning to

his quarters in the Winter Palace long after midnight on
the day of his arrival in Petrograd, he stayed up until
three o'clock recording his impressions.

He had traveled

around petrograd for several hours and was overwhelmed
by the "literally hundreds" of public meetings in parks
or on street corners which were attended by "great crowds
silently listening."

While he thought that this might be

nothing more than the result of the Russian's
new-found freedom/77 a voice tells me it is some
thing more . . . Here /jls7 a new and tremendous power
unleashed and what do we know of it? If the crowds
were not so silent we could think we understood its
but vast, inexpressive throngs listening and thinking
and gathering power, nobody knows what they may
mean.
This revolutionary fervor of which Russell was so
aware found its voice in the petrograd Soviet which was
created immediately before the Abdication.

Shortly after

the Petrograd Soviet was formed, similar groups sprang up
throughout Russia.

With a membership of almost 3,000 dele

gates, the petrograd Soviet was too unwieldy to function
)________________________

13"Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.

234
effectively.

Therefore, most of its power was delegated

to an Executive Committee,
too large.

in time, this committee became

Finally, most of the decisions were made by a

group of twenty-four men who were members of the various
political parties represented in the Soviet.

In June,

delegates of the various Soviets met in petrograd to form
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

This meeting was in

session when the Root Mission arrived in petrograd.

It

was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the
Mensheviks.

The Bolsheviks controlled less than twenty

per cent of the votes.

Thus, the Congress, in which the

petrograd Soviet had a disproportionate influence, main14
tained a relatively moderate character.
Russell did not understand many of the events
which were taking place in Russia.

He did, however, recog-

15
nize the necessity of contacting the All-Russian congress.*
On June 15, he made the first of several attempts to
communicate with the Congress,

on that day and three days

later he sent a messenger to the presiding officer of the
Congress to request an interview.
unsuccessful.

Both attempts proved

He then requested assistance from members

of the Provisional Government in order to obtain a pass
to the meetings.

When the pass was not forthcoming, Russell

14

Chamberlin, Russian Revolution I, 109-14; and
Treadgold, Twentieth century Russia, 146.
^Throughout his diary Russell referred to the group
as the "National Council of Workers*, Soldiers* and peasants'
Delegates.“
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called to remind the Ministers of their promise.

He was

told that the pass would be brought to him that afternoon
by members of the Labor Department with whom he had an
appointment.

The officials arrived without the pass but

promised it would be sent the next morning.

Russell felt

the delay was "merely characteristic of the race, which is
essentially oriental and cannot see any occasion for haste
and few for observing a promise"— an excellent example of
Russell's superficial evaluation of the Russian character
and his somewhat patronizing attitude.

Although he b e 

lieved the delay "means nothing else," he was disappointed,
as he saw "that the National Council is the real power
here and we have not touched it."3-^
Disappointed over his interviews with members of
the provisional Government and unable to establish con
tact with the All-Russian Congress after a week's efforts,
Russell became, despondent.

He described the morning's

work of June 21 as "wasted time . . . which is the usual
thing" and believed that "if this commission is to accom
plish anything besides looking pleasant and eating copiously
17
the fact has not yet been established."
That afternoon Russell attended a reception given
by the Russian American Committee.

He described it as a

16"Russell Diary," June 20, 1917.

n

"Russell Diary," June 21, 1917.
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"function calculated to produce weariness and tears" with
a guest list made up of "agents and employees of the inter18
national Harvester Company."
As he was leaving the
reception, Russell was approached by Arno Dosch-Flevrot,
correspondent for The Mew York World.

Dosch-Flevrot had

heard Soot's address at the reception and described it as
"so absurd it made me angry."

The reporter sought to find
19
someone who could understand his sentiment.
After a
brief conversation with Dosch-Flevrot, Russell decided
not to accompany the Mission to Moscow but to remain in
20
Petrograd in order to "try to break into the Council."
The following day Russell attended his first
session of the All-Russian Congress.

He never explained

how he gained admission after such a long delay.
it was due to his meeting with Dosch-Flevrot.

Perhaps

The reporter

later wrote that in an attempt to show that the Root
Mission "was not altogether 'bourgeois,' the American news21
paper correspondents in Petrograd took Russell to. it."
While at the meeting Russell was approached by a Russian
1 8 Ibid.

^ A r n o Dosch-Flevrot, Through war to Revolution;
Being the Experiences of a Newspaper Correspondent in War
and Revolution, 1914-1920 (London: John Lane, 1931),
16^-63^
20"Russell Diary," June 21, 1917.

^Dosch-Flevrot, Through war to Revolution, 163.
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jew named Rabitsch, who stated that he had heard Russell
speak in New York.

Rabitsch offered to assist Russell in

making arrangements to address the Congress.

Russell

accepted this offer but was not too pleased with the
situation and recorded that "he would be a simple person
that would depend much upon this son of Israel, for in
his face is guile and in his eyes . . .

lurks deception."

22

perhaps because there was no one else to rely upon, Russell
allowed Rabitsch to make the arrangements for his speech.
For two days Russell returned to the congress
expecting to deliver his address.
formed that it had been postponed.

Each time he was in23

When he arrived on

the morning of the third day Rabitsch told him that the
Executive Committee had decided it would be better if he
limited his address to "a few words of greeting and cut
out all . . . that dealt with the war," since such
references might cause a riot.

Russell agreed to comply

with these instructions, although his views on the war
were well known.

He was sorry, however, to see that the

Russian democracy had adopted a policy of censorship.
Rabitsch left Russell for a few minutes, presumably to con
fer with the Executive Committee,

upon his return he

explained that it might be best if Russell did not speak
2 2 "Russell Diary," June 22, 1917.

23"Russell Diary," June 23-24, 1917.
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at all as he represented the American government and not
the American Socialist party.

Rabitsch then suggested

that Russell cable the Socialist Party in the United States
for credentials.

Russell replied,

"it would be a cold day

when I stood hat in hand at the door of any body on earth
asking permission to spe a k . "

if the Congress did not want

to hear him it could "go to h e l l . "
Dosch-Flevrot and Shepherd, another American news
paperman, prevented Russell from leaving, and Dosch-Flevrot
went to confer with the Executive Committee,

in a few

minutes Skobolov and another cabinet member appeared and
told Russell that the Committee

"had never made nor enter

tained the slightest objections" to his address.

Russell

was "perfectly free" to discuss the war or any other
issue and was extended a formal invitation to speak that
evenxng.

24
In Russell's mind there was no doubt that this

episode represented an attempt b y pro-German socialists
in the United States to prevent him from addressing the
Congress.

He referred to the incident as "a little tribute

from the East Side of Ne w York and men that used to call
themselves my friends" and added that Rabitsch had "admitted
to Shepherd and Dosch-Flevrot that he was a friend of Morris

24"Russell Diary," June 25, 1917.

239
Hillquit."
story.

25

Dosch-Flevrot does not substantiate this

When he wrote of the incident he recalled that

"the committee of control said it was useless to have him
/Russel3.7 speak" since "America was so closely associated
with Russia's other imperialist allies."

According to

Dosch-Flevrot, Russell was allowed to speak because the
newsmen "put it on a personal basis with some of the
leaders . . . / W h e y let him speak then, for no better
reason than as a personal favor to us."

26

Regardless of the reasons for delay, Russell finally

spoke on the evening of J u n e 25 before what represented to
him the true voice of the Russian Revolution.

In an

obvious and naive attempt to associate with his audience,
Russell wore "the reddest red ribbon in petrograd" and "a
27
flaming scarlet tie."
Before he began his speech he
held aloft "the red card of the Socialist party of the
United States" and his membership card in The international
Typographical union.

28

In the first portion of his address, Russell
25Ibid.

^Dosch-Flevrotf Through War To Revolution, 162-63.
27Bessie Beatty, The Red Heart of Russia
Century Co., 1918), 39-40.

(New York:

2 8 "Address of Charles Edward Russell of The Ameri
can Commission Before The Council of Workmen's Soldierte
and peasants' Delegates, June 12/25, 1917," Charles Edward
Russell Papers, Vol. 7.
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explained that he came "from the plain people of America,
the workers, the radicals, the American Socialists, the
champions of democracy . . .
women of Russia."

to greet the freemen and free-

Russell praised the recent Revolution

and told his audience that as news o f the events reached
all parts of the world "it was as if in the darkest night
a new planet had suddenly arisen greater than the sun."
The Revolution was

"the grandest event in /the? human

history" o f "the emancipation of man."
Proceeding to his favorite topic, the need for a
renewed effort in the war,
United States was doing.

Russell emphasized what the
The united States had for

several years "clung to the illusion that . . .

there

could be some other solution than the use of physical
force."

It was only after-the Americans "perceived that

autocracy was bent upon the destruction of liberty on
earth" that we "took up the sword."

once the decision

was reached, however, America "plunged with all its might
and resources" into the contest and was now in the process
of raising "an army of millions."
He then turned to the question of American war
aims and told his audience that the united States "makes
war that we may have peace."

Russell went well beyond

Wilson's idea of making the world safe for democracy:
Without democracy there can never come socialism,
never come peace, never come the emancipation of man.
We see that without democracy we can never right the

241
ancient wrongs of labor, never gain for the producer
the just fruits of his toil, never free men's hearts
and lives from the frightful blight and cold horrors
of the competitive system.
Only in his closing paragraph did Russell specifi
cally urge the Russians to continue the war.

In words

better suited to encourage an emotional American rather
than a war-weary Russian, Russell told his audience that
"our word to you" is "Lead on.

You know the road . . .

Lead on, and. Russia and America, bound by the same great
purpose will drive th^ last oppression from its seat and
beat the last shackle that binds the limbs on the minds of
29
men into emblems of liberty, progress, and light."
Russell believed his speech had been effective,
in his diary he wrote that when he spoke of the need to
continue the war "the right and center roared and cheered
enthusiastically," although "the extreme left, headed by
the strange figure Lenine /si c/, sat still and did not
applaud,"

He also mentioned that his interpreter de-

scribed the presiding officer's response as "pleasing."

30

Russell's impression of his reception was relayed to the
united States.

Readers of The New York Times were told
31
that Russell's speech "was cheered to the echo"
and that

30,1RuBsell Diary,"

July 25, 1917.

31The New York Times, June 27, 1917, 1.
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"he was received with a warm welcome by the Congress and
his speech was loudly applauded."

32

An American newspaperwoman who heard Russell's
speech, however, recalled that "they listened to his
message, but it had no meaning for them.

He had come to

Russia to help make Russia fight, and the dream of the
Russian revolutionist was not only to stop Russia from
fighting, but to put an end to all wars."

33

Another news

paper correspondent, Robert C. Long, described a speech to
the Congress made by an unspecified member of the Root
Mission in which the speaker was unaware of the attitude
of his audience because of the deliberate deception of
his translator.

When a member of the congress told the

speaker that "he did not know what he was talking about"
and that the united States should "mend her own affairs
before advising Russia," the translator "omitted half of
this, and toned the other half, down."

The result was that

the American "went away under the impression that he and
America had been paid pleasant compliments; and that the

32Herbert Bailey, "Russell Foils Trick of Socialist
Here," The New York Times, June 29, 1917, 2.
3 3 Beatty,

The Red Heart of Russia, 40.
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Council was solid with him."34
Russell was correct in his evaluation of the Bol
sheviks' reaction.

A few days after his speech, Pravda

criticized the speaker for claiming to represent American
socialism when he had in fact been expelled from the
party.

The Bolshevik organ described Russell as "the

lackey of America's financial aces . . . _/aZ bourgeois
renegade and the traitor of the working people."

The

newspaper denied that the American people had "of their
own initiative entered into this cruel war" which had
instead been forced upon them by "Morgan & Company."

35

Following his address to the All-Russian Congress,
Russell attended its sessions virtually every day until

, 36
it adjourned two days before the Mission left petrograd.
With the assistance of Alexander Gumberg, an American
traveling in Russia, he met with members of the
34Robert Crozier Long, Russian Revolution Aspects
{New Yorks
E. P. Dutton, 1919), 286. warth says the
speaker referred to was Russell.
Long, however, only
says that the speaker was a member of the Root Mission
and that the speech occurred in June,
warth*s assumption
no doubt resulted from his belief that Russell was the
only Mission member who spoke before the Council.
Warth,
The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 103.

^"Protest in the Pravda of June 18/July 1, 1917,"
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Jjept.7 also found in Charles
Edward Russell papers, Vol. 7.
3 6 "Employment of Charles Edward R u s s e l l , a n d
"Russell Diary," J u n e -26-July 7, 1917.
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Congress.

37

on the evening of July 3, Russell met with

three members of the Congress Committee of Economics.

He

joined "the three for a meal of black bread, sausage, and
tea in the cellar of the Congress building and began to
explain the Stevens Plan for improving the Russian rail
roads.

The members of the Committee admitted that they

had never heard of the plan but agreed that transportation
was the key to Russia's economic problems.

Russell left

the conference after midnight, returned to the Winter
palace with a great degree of satisfaction, and recorded
that the three "with greatest enthusiasm and apparent
sincerity1' had "promised to put the plan before the
38
Council at the earliest possible moment."
on the
following day Russell returned to the Congress and "had
the satisfaction of hearing" one of the three men present
the Stevens Plan to that body.

Russell believed this to

37

"Russell Diary," July 3, 1917. Alexander
Guniberg, who would later serve as a link between the
American colony and the Bolsheviks following the October
Revolution, was of great assistance to Russell, serving
both as an interpreter and as contact with socialist
elements. After leaving petrograd, Russell thanked
Guniberg for his "extreme kindness and invaluable assist
ance." Charles Edward Russell t o Comrade Alexander
Guniberg, July 20, 1917, Raymond Robins Papers, Box 12.
Also, in his letter of introduction to Stevens, he said
Guniberg was "of the greatest possible assistance."
Charles Edward Russell to John F. Stevens, July 9, 1917,
Alexander Guniberg papers. Box X (State Historical Society
of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin).

38"Russell Diary," July 3, 1917.
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39
be "the first direct and tangible result of our labors."
Russell never named his contacts in the congress and he
made no mention of their party affiliation.

It would

appear, however, that they were insignificant members of
a rather moderate socialist party, perhaps the Socialist
Revolutionary.
On another occasion Russell was able to obtain
financial information from the Treasury Department
because of his contacts with the Congress.

McCormick and

Bertron had been promised certain reports by the provi
sional Government on which they would base recommendations
for a loan to Russia.

When two weeks passed without their

receipt, Russell suggested that he speak with his con
tacts in the Congress.

The following day Russell "told

the whole story" to his "committee friends in the
cellarage."

The upshot was that the Treasury Department

was told to turn over the material within "24 hours" or
"the whole matter would be laid before the Council and
summary action demanded."

Bertron and McCormick received

the information in the allotted time, and Russell was even
more convinced that this was "the way to get things done
in Russia."

By now, Russell was totally convinced that

"all the time spent upon Ministers" was wasted.
you want is right and good . . .

"If what

go to the Council . . .

39"Russell Diary," July 4, 1917.
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sit down in the cellar . . .--/an<i7 you can get it every
time . 1,40
In addition to holding conferences with the members
of the Provisional Government and working with the AllRussian Congress, Russell attempted to contact other Russian
socialists,

several times he went to Gorky's newspaper

office to see him.

Each time he failed,

once he visited

the office of Pravda in an attempt to find a printer who
was a member of his union in New York,

unable to find him,

he struck up a conversation with a young couple who had
recently returned from America,
Russell's opinion.

"to make trouble" in

He also met Trotsky and had "a cordial,

rather joshing talk with him."

Obviously unimpressed with

the future Bolshevik leader, Russell described him as a
"hot-headed Utopian Jew:

bushy haired, sanguine, highly

strung, excitable, and a gifted talker."
40

41

"Russell Diary," July 7, 1917.

41,"Russell Diary," June 27, 1917; When Russell met
Trotsky at the Pravda office on June 27, Trotsky was not a
member of the Bolshevik Party. At that time he headed a
"left-wing anti-war Menshevik" faction known as the "inter
district group." if not a party member, why was he in the
office of the Bolshevik organ? The explanation is that
Trotsky, although not an official member of the Bolshevik
party, had told Lenin that he accepted Lenin's "April
Thesis." The two men then agreed that Trotsky should avoid
affiliation with the Bolshevik party until he could bring
the "Interdistrict group" and certain other left-wing
Mensheviks into Lenin's party. When Trotsky officially
joined the Bolshevik Party in August, 1917, this "only
formalized three months of close collaboration." There
fore, Russell's assertion that he had met Trotsky under
the circumstances described in his diary can be accepted.
Daniels, Red October, 35-36.
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Marie Spiridonova, an old socialist revolutionary,
was another person Russell sought.

He later stated that

he wished to see her more than any other person in
42
Russia.
After several attempts, he located her in "an
old schooUiouse" which had been provided for the use of
returning exiles,

it was soon apparent that she had a

hostile attitude toward Americans and everything American.
When asked why, she explained that "America was a country
wholly given over to selfishness, the pursuit of sordid
wealth and material aims."

She had received this impres

sion during her years in prison when, in an attempt to
learn to read English in order to study about America, she
had requested an American magazine or newspaper.

The

Review of Reviews was the only available American publica
tion, and after eleven years of reading it she had found
America to be "cold, selfish, materialistic, interested
in nothing but money."

Critics of the contemporary

American scene, many of whom contributed to The Review,
would have agreed with'(her.

Had Miss Spiridonova spent

the same eleven years learning English from a different
American periodical (the Ladies' Home Journal, perhaps?)
her opinion might have been different.
Russell began "to analyze" for her "the forces and
elements in America for progress."

After a lengthy

42Russell,.Unchained Russia, 211.
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conversation he felt "the ice was broken" and they had "a
grand time predicting the remaking of the world and the
emancipation of the worker everywhere."

43

Russell may not

have been as effective as he believed, but the experience
confirmed his belief as to the extent of misinformation
which Russians had about America.
Three days before leaving Petrograd Russell made
44
a major speech before a convention of Trudoviks.
As so
often in the past, Russell argued that democracy was
necessary for socialism.

If democracy were to survive the

forces of autocracy, Germany had to be destroyed.

In

emphasizing the need for socialism, Russell went much
further than before.

He described a world which had

been "blighted, darkened and cursed with the capitalist
system" but commented that all this would change "if only
the capitalist system were abolished."

45

This statement

would have been most upsetting to other Mission members
as well as to the President who had appointed Russell.
4 3 "Russell Diary," July 2, 1917.
4 4 "Employment of Charles Edward Russell."
4 5 "Address Delivered by Charles Edward Russell At
The Convention Of The Trudoviks, or Moderate. Socialists
At The Hall Of The Medical Academy, July 6 , 1917," Charles
Edward Russell papers, Box 3. Duncan, who was present at
the convention, probably had this speech in mind when he
told Ambassador Francis that Russell's "Only-object is
socialistic propaganda." See David R. Francis to Robert
bansing, July 7, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5798, St. Dept.
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On the same day Russell addressed the members of
"the old British and American colonies" at a meeting held
in the Astoria Hotel.

The meeting was organized by the

British suffragette Emiline Pankhurst to promote the
participation of Russian women in politics.

Russell

warned "against trying to teach these people anything or
looking down upon them from a height of superiority" and
suggested that they "pay attention to the National
Council as the only power in R u s s i a . A n

American

newspaperwoman who was present recalled that Russell
deviated from the program to uplift the women of Russia
and "spoke at length on the Soviet."

She described his

speech as "socialism, from beginning to end."

47

In order to gain insights, Russell, who understood
no Russian, spent a considerable amount of time observing
parades and listening to street corner orators with the
aid of interpreters.

Mast significant, perhaps, was his

observation of the reactions of the Russian people to the
July 1st offensive.

Although the newspapers in Petrograd

issued extra editions, Russell perceived that the popular
response was "nothing to be exhilarated about," a fact he
found "ominous."

"The Russian advance is a direct result

4 6 "Russell Diary," July 6 , 1917.
47Florence Macleod Harper, Runaway Russia
York, Century Co., 1918), 164-65.

(New

250
of our visit, and now that we have it, I don't know, by
Jinx, whether it is good or bad."

48

Russell was incorrect

in his belief that the Mission's visit was the cause of
the offensive.

He accurately interpreted the political

unrest to be a result of dissatisfaction with the military
offensive, an opinion which no other Mission member held.
Two days later Russell wrote:
They are dead sick of the war . . . . /T7he psycho
logical effect of the recent Russian advance is some
thing that ought to give' us a jolt if we are willing
to reflect upon actualities and what they mean. Out
side of the minority that is bent upon carrying on
the war anyway, there is no exhilaration.
He described the street demonstrations supporting the advance
as "feeble" in comparison to the one of July 1 which opposed
it.

Pravda, as well as Gorky's newspaper, called for a

diplomatic offensive rather than a military one.
discouraging sign,

The most

however, was the All-Russian Congress's

vote tocongratulate the Army.

The votes

inopposition

to

the resolution included all the Bolsheviks, significantly
49
joined by more than one hundred non-Bolsheviks.
In the

last few

somewhat optimistic,

days of his visit Russell became

on July 5, he obtained the promise

of Minister Skobolov to support the Stevens Railroad plan.
On July 7, the Executive committee of the Congress asked
4 8 "Russell

Diary," July

2, 1917.

4 9 "Russell

Diary," July

4, 1917.
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him to ‘'intervene" in a threatened strike at a factory
operated by Americans,

on his last day in Petrograd he

was sought out by a "committee of soldiers" from the
National congress, who requested his aid in establishing
50
a newspaper to oppose Pravda.
Russell believed these
events indicated that the "bitter prejudice" which had
existed upon their arrival had finally disappeared.
am , 11 he wrote,

"I

"overwhelmed with the thought that we are

going away just as the prospect opens before us of oppor51
tunlty and power to do good."
Russell's personal diary contains many passages
in which the American Socialist revealed his awareness
of the power of the Soviets and the weaknesses of the
Provisional Government.

It is difficult, therefore, if

not impossible to understand why he was heartened by the
relatively minor events which occurred during his last
few days in petrograd.

Russell repeatedly referred to the

Soviets as the sole power in Russia.

Yet, in his personal

report to the state Department;, no mention was made of
these frequent observations.
of a very serious omission.

He was, therefore, guilty
Wilson's hand-picked Social

ist, like the more conservative members of the Mission,
5 0 "Employment of Charles Edward Russell,1'; and
"Russell Diary," July 5-9, 1917.

5:L"Russell Diary," July 7, 1917,

failed to present to the American Government anything
approaching a realistic picture of Russia in the summer
of 1917.

CHAPTER X
LABOR, RELIGION, AND PROPAGANDA
in addition to its major considerations, the Mission
focused on three minor areas:
propaganda in Russia.

labor, religion, and American

It will be recalled that Samuel

Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor,
suggested James Duncan as the representative of American
Labor on the Root Mission.

Duncan was respected by and

popular with his fellow Americans on the Mission.

With the

exception of John Mott, Crane considered Duncan to be the
"ablest and wisest man on our commission,"1' and one military
2
aide described him as "an absolute joy."
Unfortunately, the Russians did not hold this view.
A Russian naval officer attached to the Mission found all
of the members somewhat patronizing in their attitude
toward Russia but singled out Duncan as"a stupid and vulgar
person practically devoid of manners."

3'

John Reed, American

radical and famous chronicler of the Bolshevik Revolution,

Charles

•••Charles R, crane to J. C. B., July 12, 1917,
. Crane papers.

r

2 Mott,
3 White,

Twenty Years, 195.
Survival, 139.
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contended that Lenin's party viewed Samuel Gompers as
"more reactionary that j. P. Morgan" and "simply ignored"
4

James Duncan, as did even the moderate socialists.
Duncan set for himself the difficult task of con
vincing Russian labor that it must accept a conservative
view of its political role,

in a discussion about the two

types of strikes in use In Russia, those associated with
worker grievances and those caused by political reasons,
Duncan emphasized his task of differentiating between the
two.

He planned to do this with the help of Russian

workers who had lived in America and, for this purpose,
had brought a list of people to contact.

In words some

what out of character for a labor leader he stated, "One
of the most difficult things we have to do with foreign
workingmen is to get them to be tolerant of their
5
employers."
Duncan believed, however, that the strike as
a political weapon had been borrowed from the socialist
movement in Russia and he thought it would be extremely
difficult "to disentangle the socialist . . .
trade unions."

from the

6

Duncan and other Mission members obviously thought
4 John Reed, "Memorandum, Russia, The Soviet Govern
ment, 1918," Alexander Gumberg Papers, Box I.

5 "McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.
6 Ibid.
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that Russian labor could be easily persuaded to accept the
goals and methods of American labor.

This was highly un

likely as the Russian labor movement differed drastically
from that in America.

Prior to 1905 there were very few

labor unions in Russia, and from 1905 to 1917 the movement
was extremely weak,

in 1917, however, union membership

multiplied and by 1918 slightly more than one-half of
Russia's four million industrial workers belonged to some
type of trade union.

A struggle for the support of labor

ensued and, as was true of the political struggle, the
contest was primarily between the Mensheviks-Socialist
Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks .7

The result was that

Russian labor divided itself into two factions after the
March Revolution:

the trade unions, which were usually-

dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries,
and the factory committees led by the Bolsheviks.

The

Bolsheviks obtained their strongest support from the in
dustrial workers, and their support enabled the Bolsheviks
to obtain a majority in the petrograd Soviet in August.
Upon his arrival in Vladivostok, Duncan conducted
"a somewhat hurried conference" with representatives of
the local Soviet.

After extending greetings and congratu

lations to the Russian workers, he briefly described the
accomplishments of American labor and offered to provide

7Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 265-67.
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information pertaining to the movement in the united
States.

He also took advantage of the opportunity to
8
urge strong support of the war effort.
On several occasions during the journey from Vladi
vostok to Petrograd, Duncan made brief addresses to groups
of Russians in the various railroad stations.

His speeches

followed a pattern; greetings, congratulations about the
9
Revolution, and a plea, for strong backing of the war.
His first lengthy conference occurred on June 12
at Viatka, a suburb of Petrograd, with Alexander Samrov,
representative of the railroad and electrical power plant
workers in that area.

Through Samrov, Duncan made arrange

ments to address the Petrograd union.

In the address

Duncan underlined "the possible necessity" of establishing
two or three work shifts in the essential industries in
order to achieve full industrial capacity as well as to.
obtain the eight-hour workday strongly advocated by
Russian l a b o r . ^

The workers of petrograd had already won

an eight-hour day immediately after the March Revolution.
Soon afterward, industries in other Russian cities offered
this concession.13*
9 "Duncan Report," appendix to "Mission Report,"
Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
9 Ibid., 1 - 2

.

I0Ibid., 3.
11Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 267-69.
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Duncan's first conference in petrograd was with
Minister of Labor Skobolov on June 15.

Duncan presented

messages from President Wilson, the American Secretary of
Labor, and Gompers.

The Russian Minister was primarily

interested in Duncan's description of the way the Depart
ment of Labor aided in settling labor disputes without
resorting to "official government interference."
During the next three weeks Duncan met with
Skobolov severa? times.

They usually discussed the role

of the American Department of Labor as mediator in labor
disputes,

on one occasion Skobolov sent men from his

department to Duncan to obtain government reports on labor
and material on Workmen's Compensation Laws.

The eight-

hour workday with three shifts per day was frequently
discussed.

Toward the end of his stay in petrograd,

Duncan received Skobolov's assurance that his department
would "use all its influence" to see that this plan was
implemented in Russia.

Duncan's last conference with the

Minister of Labor ended "with profuse thanks . . . for
the advice I had given, which had been . . .

to some
12
extent put into use and was showing good results."
in addition to conferring with members of the
Provisional Government, Duncan also spent a considerable

amount of time with various labor leaders in Petrograd and

12"Duncan Report," 3.
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Moscow,

in these meetings Duncan first explained the

history of the labor movement in the united States.

He

then distributed material which served to explain the
organization of labor along craft lines and strongly sug
gested that the Russians follow the same pattern.

He

also stressed the necessity of establishing shifts for
workers who were engaged in the production of war materials
and# in general# counseled labor leaders to support the
Provisional Government and the Russian war effort.

13

On the evening of June 29# Duncan appeared before
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and delivered his
"principal address" in Russia to approximately 800 dele14
gates and 4#000 spectators.
Russell had assisted in
making the arrangements for the speech and was present.
He recorded that Duncan devoted most of his attention to
the "problems and demands of labor."

15

Duncan did discuss such topics as equal pay for
women, public education# child labor# the right to strike#
the eight-hour workday# and other issues of interest to all
workingmen.

He explained that American Labor wished to

furnish "information about our own progress" in order to
I3 Ibid.
■^Although Russell's address to the All-Russian
Congress is frequently referred to by historians, they
appear to be unaware of the one delivered by Duncan.
Warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution# 103.

^"Russell Diary#" June 29, 1917.

259
assist the Russians and encourage them to follow the
pattern set by American Labor.

A careful examination of

the speech reveals that his strongest appeal to the
workers was to encourage them to supply adequate labor
for war industries and to provide support for the Pro
visional Government and the Allies.

He strongly defended

the eight-hour day and explained the use of two or three
eight-hour work shifts to increase production.

Duncan

felt that the production level essential for war could
be maintained through the use of work shifts, but if a
"very great emergency" arose the workers should tempo
rarily suspend hour limitations and follow "the example of
our workers in America."

He discussed the strike as a

"God-given privilege" which should be used sparingly and
only "when more friendly methods of adjustment have
failed.
Duncan believed his speech had been "well received,"
especially by the soldier deputies who were "exceedingly
pleased" by his appeal for support for the war.

He

failed to mention an interruption by one delegate who
objected to his speech.

17

Like the other members of the

Mission, Duncan spoke no Russian and was at the mercy of
^"Address Delivered By James Duncan Of The special
Diplomatic Mission to Russia, Kedetsky corpus, petrograd,
June 29, 1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root
Papers, Box 192.
17l'Duncan Report,’*; and "Russell Diary," June 29,

1917.
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his interpreter who probably did not give a literal trans
lation of the delegate's remarks.
On the following day Duncan delivered a speech to
approximately 3,500 persons at a mass meeting at Pavlovsk
in the suburbs of Petrograd.

The meeting was held to honor

a regiment leaving for the Front.

The program included

Russian folk music and dancing, which the Americans greatly
enjoyed.

18

in this speech Duncan devoted little attention

to labor but emphasized the need for stronger backing of
the war.

At one point he stated that the united States

"expects that the Russian armies will move forward."

Another

time he exceeded the Mission's authority by saying that it
might be possible "to place the Stars and Stripes of the
united States of America alongside of your own revolutionary
19
flag on the fighting front."
Shortly before leaving petrograd Duncan made a
final appeal to Russian Labor.

The occasion was a meeting

of the All-Russian Trade union Convention, which consisted
of 388 delegates representing twenty-nine labor organiza
tions.

He restricted his remarks almost entirely to labor

issues and advocated the creation of a labor movement
■^"Duncan Report,"; and "Russell Diary," June 29,
1917.
19"Address Delivered By James Duncan At Pavlovsk,
Russia, At A Meeting Held There Under The Auspices of The
Pavlovsk Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, Saturday, June
30, 1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root
Papers, Box 192.
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similar to the one in the united States.

20

It is evident from his speeches as well as his
official report that Duncan attempted to encourage Russian
labor to give strong aid to the war effort.

He hoped to

influence the labor movement to progress along the lines
developed by the American Federation of Labor.

This was

an ambitious objective at a time when Russian workers were
being told that they should take over all the means of
production and indeed were doirgso.
Duncan was extremely optimistic as they left
Russia.

He described their visit as having had "excellent

general results" and was "sure that the labor and soldier
combination . . .

is in much better condition than when we

arrived in Russia."

21

It is impossible to understand this optimism,

only

a few days before the group left Petrograd, large numbers
of workers and citizens demonstrated to demand that all
power be placed in the hands of the soviets.

Approximately

one week after their departure, similar demonstrations, the
July Days, resulted in the overthrow of the First Coalition.
Why was Duncan so completely ignorant about the true senti
ments of Russian Labor?

The only possible explanation is

20

"Address Delivered By James Duncan To The All
Russian Trade Union Convention, Petrograd, July 5, 1917,"
appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root papers, b o x 192.

’Duncan Report," 6.
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that he saw only what he wanted to see.

During his visit

to Russia, Duncan spent roost of his time with officials
of the Provisional Government and union leaders.

There is

no indication that he met with or, in fact, even knew
about the Bolshevik-dominated factory committees.

Thus,

like others of his group, he was so accustomed to insti
tutions similar to those in the United States that he
neglected all others.
Although most members of the Mission were primarily
concerned with eitherppolitical or military developments
in revolutionary Russia, Crane and John Mott devoted their
attention to changes within the Russian Church.

Crane was

in Russia when the members of the Root Mission were being
selected and had cabled the State Department to suggest
that, in addition to persons trained in law, politics,
and finance, someone "of the greatest spiritual wisdom and
authority" should also be included.
22
the logical choice.

He suggested Mott as

Mott was subsequently appointed and Crane tele
graphed him about the great changes that were being made
in the Russian Church.

Although the Church had "had no

part in /Ehe7 Revolution," there was a revolution "going on

22Charles R. Crane,
Charles R. Crane Papers.

"Memoirs, Russia 1917," 185,
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23

in /the7 church."

Crane remained in Moscow until June 10 and left
24
in time to join the Mission in Petrograd on June 13.
Both Crane and Mott were present at the initial meetings
with representatives of the Provisional Government hut
25
left Petrograd on the evening of June 16 for Moscow.
They arrived in Moscow on the tenth day of a
convention being held by the Russian Orthodox Church.
Crane erroneously referred to this meeting as the National
Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Actually, the con

ferences in Moscow consisted of church leaders from all
parts of Russia who were making preparations for the
coming church session, the All-Russian Church Council
(Sobor) which convened in August, 1917, and was the first
26
such meeting since 1681.
This provided an excellent
opportunity for the Americans to bring the Mission's
Charles R. Crane to John R. Mott, May 16, 1917,
Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 26. The revolution in the
Church to which Crane referred centered around the meeting
of the Russian Orthodox Church in June, 1917, in Moscow.
For Mott's evaluation of the changes occurring in the
Russian church, see his “Letter . . .Regarding Recent
Religious Developments in Russia," in John R. Mott,
Recent Experiences and impressions in Russia, Extracts
from Correspondence and Addresses of John R. Mott, member
of the Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States to
Russia (Private Printing, 1918), 15-26.
2^Madding Summers to Robert Lansing, June 7, 1917,
Doc. NO. 763.72/6099, St. Dept.
25,,Mission Log," 22.
^Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 127.

message to the group of over 1 , 0 0 0 representatives of the
Russian Church from all parts of the country.
Mott was invited to address the conference, a sin
gular honor for a Protestant.

His speech was read by a

church official prior to its delivery, and the Americans
were surprised by a recommendation that they place more
emphasis on the need

for vigorous pursuit of the war.

Mott and Crane asked

the church leader to clarify the

When

position of the church with regard to the war, he replied,
“The church is for the war and is doing everything possible
to sustain the army."

27

Therefore, on June 19, Mott delivered an address
which was interpreted by Father Alexandrov whom he had
known in San Francisco

28

and which underlined the need for

the Russians to continue the war.

Mott reviewed Russian-

American relations and stated that there had always been a
bond of friendship between the two countries.
audience that the united
the Russian soldiers
battles for us.”

He told his

States“recognize/sT" that . . .

and people have been fighting our

The people of the United States “are

also deeply grateful because of what you are proposing and
planning to do to continue this struggle to a successful
^Crane,

"Memoirs, Russia 1917," 185.

28MDtt, Recent Experiences, 18.

29

issue."

Mott then described the preparations for war being
made in the United States and told his audience that "the
United states is with you in this conflict to the very
end.”

in conclusion, Mott appealed for support for the

war and asked the representatives of the Russian Church
to "go back to all your parishes . . .

Tell them to stand

firmly behind the Provisional Government . . . Russia and
her allies must continue steadfast to the end . ”'*0

Mott

believed that his address was received with "sympathy and
enthusiasm" and recalled that on several occasions the
"entire audience arose," which he interpreted as "a sign
31
of most signal approval."
The reaction of the churchmen
revealed their conservative leanings.

The more reactionary

members of the clergy, especially those who had been
closely associated with Rasputin, had been removed from
their positions in the Church soon after the March
Revolution.

But the majority of the church leadership was

Conservative and supported the Provisional Government.
Later, like most conservative Russians, many of the clergy
29"Address of John R. Mott Member of the Special
Mission of the united States of America to Russia, at the
Great Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow, June 19,
1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root papers,
Box 192.
3 0 Ibid.

31-Mott. Recent Experiences, 18.

spoke out in favor of General Kornilov.

32

Mott and Crane were joined in Moscow by the
others.

They returned to Petrograd with them on June 25.

33

Two days after their return, Mott and crane were invited
to a session of the Cossack Congress which was in session
in the capital.

The 300 delegates who represented the

twelve Cossack Armies in the Russian forces heard Mott
compliment them for their determination to continue the
war against the Central powers,

in language even more

direct than in his address before the Conference in
Moscow, Mott strongly urged a vigorous prosecution of the
34
war.
He complimented the Congress on its resolution
calling for "an immediate offensive '1 and stated that
their rejection of a separate peace was "precisely what
we had expected from you."

Matt pointed out that strong

and loyal support of the Provisional Government was
essential to the military effort.

He referred to the

"intrigues of the enemy within your gates" and suggested
that "to wage a triumphant warfare at the front you must
35
have no untaken forts in the rear."
This remark reflects
-in

Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 135-38.

33,lMission log," 28.
34Samuel R. Harper, who translated the speech for
Matt, expressed the view that the speech'Was hardly the role
of the secretary of the Y. M. C. A." Harper, Memoirs, 102.
35"Address of Dr. John R. Mott Before The Cossack
Congress, Petrograd, June 27, 1917," appendix to "Mission
Report," Elihu Root papers. Box 192.
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an attitude shared by many of the Allied representatives
in Russia.

It gave voice to a belief that the Provisional

Government would have to do something to suppress growing
opposition to the war.
On Sunday, July 1, a special religious service
was conducted at the Kazan cathedral in petrograd in honor
of the American Mission.

Those present included members

of the Mission as well as representatives of the Stevens
Commission and the American Embassy.

The service, pre

sided over by Archbishop Ploton, lasted three hours.

Father

Alexandrov delivered the sermon in English, and in it he
compared the united States to the Good Samaritan.

36

Mott and crane then returned to Moscow in order to
witness the election of Archbishop Tikhon, who had served
for several years as Bishop of the Russian Church in
America, as the new Metropolitan of Moscow.

They had been

invited to attend the service by the unanimous vote of the
delegates to the conference and were presented with sacred
ikons by the Archbishop of Moscow.

37
'

in addition to conferring with the leadership of
the Russian Orthodox Church, Mott also met with the leaders
of other religious groups in Russia.

These included the

36Mott, Recent Experiences, 22-24; "McCormick Diary,"
July 1, 1917; and Gibbs, "Russian Trip Notes," July 1,
1917.

37Mott, Recent Experiences, 21.
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Archbishop of the “Old-Believers," a conservative group
within the Russian Orthodox church, Dr. Keen of the
"British and Foreign Bible Society," Dr. Simons of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, a representative of the Roman
38
Catholic Church, and Russian and Polish Jews.
They
discussed the progress being made toward reform within
the Russian Church, and the leaders were quite hopeful.
Up to the time of Mott's visit, the y.

m

. C. A.

had been limited to working with prisoners-of-war.

Mott

was keenly interested in expanding both its work and its
influence in Russia.

As he traveled across Russia en

route to petrograd, Mott discussed the possibility of
expanding Y. M. C. A. work to include the Russian soldiers.
In conferences with both Y. M. C. A. officials and Russian
citizens, Mott gained the impression that facilities were
needed to provide the Russian soldier with constructive
39
ways in which to spend his leisure time.
Mott was impressed by the large numbers of soldiers
who were "not occupied at all with activities relating to the
war" or were "devoting themselves to aimless and unprofitable
40
political discussion."
Like the other Mission members
38Mott, Recent Experiences, 26; and "outline of The
Activities of John r . Mott," appendix to "Mission Report,"
Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
•3Q

Mott, Recent Experiences, 308; and "McCormick
Diary," June 7 and 9, 1917.

40Mott, Recent Experiences, 4.
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Mott found the concept of soldiers holding political dis
cussions completely foreign to his idea of proper military
discipline.

This provides another example of the Mission's

practice of comparing the situation in Russia to American
customs.

if the practices differed greatly, they were

assumed to be worthless.
Although he frequently referred to the need of
spiritual leadership for the Russian soldier, his major
desire appears to have been to help the soldiers become
more effective in the war.

The solution lay in organized

activities which would occupy their leisure time.
I do not fear for Soldiers when they are fighting
or when they are drilling.
The time concerning which
I have anxiety is their leisure hours . . . Shall
these hours be spent in idleness, in dissipation,
and in unprobatable agitation; or shall they be
spent in helpful recreation . . . and in unselfish
service among one's fellows?41
These were noble, Christian sentiments, indeed!
A number of Y. M. c. A. officials attached to
prisoner-of-war camps had already begun work with the
Russian soldiers.

Mott supported these activities which

should "be reproduced on a large scale" throughout Russia.

4:

"Speech by Dr. John R. Mott Member of the Special
Mission of the United States of America to Russia at a Dinner
given by Mr. Emanuel Nobel at his home in Petrograd June 6/21,
1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root Papers, Box
192.
42,,Outline of Activities of John R. Mott," 3, appen
dix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root papers, Box 192.
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His suggestion was endorsed by Root and other members of
the Mission, who strongly urged the establishment of Y. M.
43

C. A. facilities along the Russian Front. ^
Mott interviewed a number of Russian officials
about expanding Y. M. C. A. activities.

Prince Lvov and

Tereshchenko responded favorably, as did other Russians.
Before departing, Mott assigned ten Americans to work with
44
the Army.
Both Crane and Mott left Russia secure in
their belief that changes within the Russian Church would
have a profound and beneficial effect throughout the
country.
The third minor area of interest was propaganda.
Prior to his arrival in petrograd Russell had decided that
the united States should create an official or unofficial
press bureau in Russia which could explain the purpose of
the war to the Russian masses.

Russell was obsessed with

the idea that the Russian people would continue the war if
thqr could be reached with an appeal.

His attitude had

been formed in conversations with Russian and American
observers who had accompanied the Mission between Vladi
vostok and the capital.

By the time the Mission reached

its destination, Russell had assumed the dual responsibility
43Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 17, 1917,
Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.

44Mott, Recent Experiences, 6.
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of establishing contact with the Russian socialists and
attempting to establish an adequate press or propaganda
bureau.

45

the same,

Actually, Russell saw the tasks as one and
on the one hand, he personally would explain

the position of his government to the socialist leaders
in Petrograd.

on the other hand, the press bureau would

do the same to the Russian masses.
Upon his arrival in petrograd Russell immediately
took up the task.

During his first few days in petrograd

he gathered information and opinions about the proposed
press bureau.

46

Aided by Stanley Washburn, he acquired an

automobile on the day of his arrival and drove "all about
Petrograd looking up publicity men and conferring with the
British and other representatives" until well after mid
night.

He called on Ambassador Francis, whom he found to

be "wholly sympathetic with our idea of a propaganda
campaign," and he invited local and foreign newspapermen
to a press conference to be held by Root on the morning of
June 15.

47
Russell soon concluded that the Allied approach to

4 ^"Employment of Charles Edward Russell, of the
Special Diplomatic Mission of the united States to Russia,
while in petrograd," 1, Charles Edward Russell papers. Vol.
7. Hereinafter cited as "Employment of Charles Edward
Russell."
46Ibid.; and "Russell Diary," June 13-18, 1917.

47"Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.
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propaganda was entirely wrong.

The French and British

tactic was to persuade the Russians to continue the war
by "appeals to Russians to keep faith and carry out the
national agreements on treaties."

To the American

socialist, this was "worse than useless," as the Russians
associated these treaties with the deposed Tsar and there
fore did not consider them binding.

Russell singled out

for particular criticism the use of war films of "British
troops being shot to pieces," which he described as "in
teresting but entirely worthless as propaganda."

In his

opinion, the Russians "knew too much about battle lines"
and needed instead "a living reason why they should offer
48
themselves to be shot."
The united States would do well
to take an independent course with emphasis on the "peril
to Democracy."

49

Russell had little trouble convincing the Mission
of the need for a press bureau, although at first some
members felt that the united States would be wise to join
50
with the Allies in a concerted propaganda campaign.
Root
cabled the State Department recommending the formation of
a press bureau.

The Mission believed that "the people of

4 8 Russell, Bare Hands And stone Walls, 366; and
"Russell Diary," June 28, 1917.

4 9 “Russell Diary," June 21, 1917.
50"Russell Diary," June 16, 1917.

Russia, particularly the soldiers, are going to decide
whether Russia stays in the w a r ” and it was mandatory to
"get at them in some way."

51

They, therefore, had "taken

steps for the immediate distribution of information which
will cost about $100,000."
Mission all agree

He stated,

"We members of the

that the business of disseminating
CO

information should be taken up on a much larger scale."-'"
The figure which he suggested was five million dollars.
The money would be well spent if it could keep five million
Russian soldiers in the war.

Without going into detail

Root explained that the money would provide "a supply of
newspapers, printing and distribution of posters, leaflets
and pamphlets, employment of numerous lecturers and moving
pictures to go to the front."

The work would "be done

with the approval of the Russian Government," and would
53
"not be conducted in the name of the united States."
Russell was pleased with Root's dispatch, which
'Set forth the supreme necessity of propaganda" as well as
the plans he and Washburn had proposed.

He was somewhat

surprised, however, at Root's opinion that the State
Department might be reluctant to authorize the full
53*Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 17, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5425, St. Dept.
52Ibid.

53Ibid.
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appropriation.

He recorded in his diary:

"I don't see

how /the state/ Department can fail to approve, but Root
, ,
54
seems doubtful."
Events were to prove the former Secretary of State
correct.

Almost two weeks later the Mission received

Lansing's reply,

it proved far from satisfactory,

only

at the end of his dispatch did the Secretary of State men
tion the request for appropriations:

"The matter of estab

lishing an efficient agency for publicity is receiving
55
careful consideration."
According to Root this could be
"translated" as meaning "your suggestions about publicity
are hereby disapproved."
The reply was a disappointment to Russell as well
as to the other members of the Mission.

Anticipation of

State Department approval had led Root, Bertron, and
McCormick to sign personal notes for $30,000 to pay for
the circulation of messages to the Russian people from
Wilson and Root.57
The Mission again attempted to gain authorization
for the proposed bureau.

in a message to the Secretary

54"Russell Diary," June 17, 1917.
^ R o b e r t Lansing to Elihu Root, July 27, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5782E, St. Dept.
56"Russell Diary," July 2, 1917.
57"McCormick Diary," July 7, 1917.

of the Treasury# Bertron stated that it was "the unanimous
opinion of the commission that an extensive educational
publicity campaign be undertaken in Russia."

it would "be

supervised by Ambassador Francis '1with "the approval of
/the7 Russian Government."

Bertron reminded the Secretary

of their discussion of the subject before the Mission left
Washington and urged that they be given a "prompt and
definite answer . " 5 8

on the same day# Root sent Lansing a

dispatch requesting an answer to their plans.
the urgency he wrote#

To emphasize

"I beg you to realize Germany is now

attacking Russia by propaganda and is spending millions . .
. to capture the minds of the Russian people."

A German

victory "can be prevented only by active and immediate
counter attacks by the same weapons.

The state Depart

ment replied that President Wilson "approves in principle
of educational campaign . . . the question of further outlay
and a comprehensive plan is receiving the careful attention
SO
of the Department."
Russell had been disappointed about the brief
period of time the Mission planned to spend in Russia.
58Samuel R. Bertron to William G. McAdoo# July 2#
1917# Doc. No. 763.72/5693# St. Dept.
59Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, July 2, 1917#
Doc. No. 763.72/5795, St. Dept.
, 80Frank L. Polk to David R. Francis, July 7# 1917#
Doc. No. 763.72/5693# St. Dept.
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After ten days in Petrograd he was convinced he would have
to remain in Russia after the Mission's departure if any
results were to be derived from his efforts,

in a wire to

the state Department he stated that "contingencies may
arise" which would make necessary for him to remain in
Petrograd longer than the others.

He requested permission
6 1_
from Lansing and president Wilson to take this action.
Lansing referred the matter to Wilson and recoinmended that permission be granted.

ft2

He later wired

Russell that "the President and I heartily approve of your
remaining in Russia as long as you believe you can be of
ft3
service.This

message never reached Russell.

Ambassa

dor Francis withheld the wire and replied to Lansing that
unless he received "further instructions ’1 he would withhold
the message, since he and Root were of the opinion that "no
party of the Mission should remain retaining diplomatic
character."

64

If Russell were allowed to remain,

"it should

be as private citizen or for some specific duty not related
to diplomatic mission."

Francis had found that Russell was

61Charles Edward Russell to Robert Lansing, June 22,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5553, St. Dept.
^ 2Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, June 28, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5553, St. Dept.
63Robert Lansing to Charles Edward Russell, June 30,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5553, St. Dept.
®^A11‘diplomatic notes to the Mission were sent in
care of the American Embassy in Petrograd.
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"in thorough touch with Workmen and Soldiers Deputies
maintaining that they have the power.

He talks of Pro

visional government disrespectfully and openly, conse
quently, if he remains in any capacity he might make
trouble.
Two days later, Francis further informed the state
Department that Russell had asked the Mission to recommend
him for the position of director of the proposed publicity
bureau.

Root had already explained to Russell that the

bureau would be under the direction of the American
Embassy, and the Mission "would not formally recommend
anyone to the Embassy."

Francis made it clear that he did

not want Russell to remain.

He informed the State Depart

ment that “six of the members of the mission /5re7 secretly
unfavorable to his employment" and that Duncan believed
66
"Russell's only object is socialistic propaganda."
Upon receiving this recommendation, Acting Secretary
of State Polk consulted with the President,

67

and notified

Francis that the state Department agreed with him.
"Russell should return with /the/ diplomatic mission ."8 8
85David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, July 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5579, St. Dept.
88David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, July 7, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5789, St. Dept.
®^Frank L. Polk to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5680, St. Dept.
68Frank L. Polk to David R. Francis, July 7, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5680, St. Dept.

278
Inhere is no evidence that Russell was ever aware that
Francis and Root and not the state Department opposed his
remaining in Russia.
As late as July 6, three days before departure,
Russell again introduced the topic of a press bureau and
suggested that he be allowed to remain and “work on propa
ganda.'1 Root's reply was that the Mission "could not
entertain any such suggestion."

Furthermore, because of

Lansing's“cryptic remarks" about their publicity proposals,
the Mission "was done with the subject of publicity" which
"was now up to Francis and the State Department."

69

Russell asked what the "commission's attitude" would be
if the Ambassador requested that he remain.

Root replied

that "such a request would receive no answer."

He added

that if any member of the Mission remained in Russia, such
action “must be taken strictly as an individual."

The

Mission “could not have anything to do with such a
70
decision."
Russell was keenly disappointed and “strongly moved"
to remain in Russia., even without official sanction.

His

decision to return with the others was based on his opinion
that he was "under the State Department's orders" and was,
therefore, not a "free agent."

As he had requested specific

69"Russell Diary," July 6, 1917.
7°Ibid.

permission to remain and thought that the State Department
had "failed to give that permission,“ he felt that he had
no choice but to return to the united States with the
Mission.

71

For all practical purposes this ended the

Mission’s concern with a press bureau, although their
recommendations were repeated in their official report as
well as in a supplementary document.
Like Russell, all the other Mission members were
obsessed with the idea that the Russian people would pursue
the war if properly informed, thus solving the problem of
retaining Russia as a belligerent.

There is no way, how

ever, to determine whether the proposed Propaganda Bureau
would have had any effect.

The Bolsheviks had seized

power before Wilson's representative of the Committee on
Public information finally arrived,

in view of the

rapidly changing political events in Russia, it is most
unlikely that such a bureau would have had any impact at
all.

71Ibid.

*

CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
Prom the beginning, Root had been anxious to keep
the length of the Mission trip to a minimum.

Following his

visit to Stavka, he grew anxious to return to the united
States.

Had it not been for the delay in General Scott's

tour of the Russian Front, the Mission would have left for
the united States earlier than it did.

On June 30, Root

informed the state Department of his plans to leave PetroL
grad on July 9.
Scott had been instructed to return to
Petrograd by that time so as not to delay the departure
date.

When Scott confirmed his return by July 9, Root

notified the Russian Foreign Minister so that arrangements
for the departure could be made.

Root explained to his

host that he could "best promote the interest of both
2
countries by returning to Washington without delay."
Root was also prompted to leave petrograd by the
hesitancy of the State Department to respond favorably to
his request for the creation of a propaganda bureau.
&

Colonel

^Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 30, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5771, St. Dept.
2
Elihu Root to Michael Tereshchenko, July 3, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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Mott Later recalled that Root, anxious to start for home
as soon as Scott returned from the Front, had stated, "We
receive no replies to our telegrams and our staying here
under such conditions is useless,

perhaps by going to

Washington in person we can get some action."

3

Charles F. Crane remained in Russia to observe the
changes in the Russian Church and to attend the F.ussian
Constituent Assembly, due to meet in the fall.^
Judson also remained behind.

Colonel

Disappointed at what he con

sidered the too brief trip, he had requested permission to
stay .5

After consulting Root and Ambassador Francis, Scott

relieved Judson from duty as military attache to the Mission
and assigned him to the American Embassy in the same capac
ity.^
On its last day in petrograd the Mission made a
round of farewells and took photographs.
3 Mott,

Some of the

Twenty Years, 208.

^"McCormick Diary," July 9, 1917.
^William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, June 2,
1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4.
6Judson was to serve as chief of the American Mili
tary Mission to Russia as well as the military representative
in connection with American supplies to Russia. Hugh L.
Scott to Secretary of War, July 9, 1917, William V. Judson
Papers, Box 4; and Hugh L. Scott to William V. Judson,
July 9, 1917, Hugh L. Scott papers, Box 1 (Princeton, Univer
sity Library, Princeton, N. J.).

members bought souvenirs and gifts,

others enjoyed a visit

to the Alexander H I Art Gallery, which was opened especially
for the members of the Mission.

7

Shortly before midnight,

twenty-seven days after their arrival in the Russian capital
the Mission gathered at the terminal where they boarded the
0

same train which had brought them to Petrograd.

For the

next twelve days the Tsar's special train returned along
the same route it had traveled four weeks earlier.
For the most part, the journey was uneventful and
afforded each member of the Mission time to prepare the
reports requested by their Chairman.

The one notable break

in the routine occurred on the second day near thd town of
Viatka.

When the group arrived on the morning of July 11,

they learned that there would be a short delay, as a bridge
five miles ahead had been destroyed by fire.

The stop,
g
first estimated at twelve hours, stretched to thirty.
After spending the night on a siding, the group
witnessed an incident the following morning when a fire
destroyed a frame ice house near the main line of the
track.

Some members of the group mentioned the possibility

that both fires were the work of German agents who wished
to delay their return to the United States , 10 but admitted
7 "McCormick Diary,” July 9, 1917? and "Russell Diary
July 9, 1917.
8 "Mission Log," 36.
9 Ibid.,

37.

10"McCormick Diary," July 12, 1917.

that they had no proof of this .11

At the time of the in

cident, Russell wrote nothing in his diary to indicate
that he thought it was part of a conspiracy.

Years later,

however, he attributed the incident to radicals and stated
that "the Bolsheviks . . . burned a bridge in front of us
with the pious hope that we should be wrecked, and when we
were blocked at Viatka by this incident, tried to set fire
12
to the train."
This provides a good example of the way
in which Russell and other members of the Mission recog
nized the Bolshevik threat only in retrospect, long after
the November Revolution.

The incident allowed members of

the Mission to visit Viatka and provided a brief reprieve
from their travels.

McCormick and John Mott hired a

"droshky" for some sightseeing and entered what they took
to be a monastery in search of a cup of tea.

To their

embarrassment, they found that they had in fact entered
a nunnery. 13
As the imperial Train made its way across Siberia,
the group utilized the frequent stops to make speeches to
gatherings and delegations of various officials.

The

11Cyrus H. McCormick to Frederick Corse, July 11,
1917, Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject File "Russia 19171920"; and Elihu Root to Erving Winslow, August 28, 1917,
Elihu Root Papers, Box 138.
•^Russell, Bare Hands and Stone walls, 370.

■L3,*McCormick Diary," July 11,1917.
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speeches were usually given by Root and followed the same
pattern he had used earlier:

Congratulations on the new

freedom of the Russian people, expressions of friendship
from the united States, and encouragement to continue the
war effort,

on July 14, Root spoke to a group of soldiers

in the village of Nazuveskaya.

He compared the recent

revolution in Russia to the fall of the Bastille,

perhaps

because of the remote location of the village or his spon
taneous enthusiasm, Root's remarks were less conservative
than usual and impressed the socialist member of the
14
Mission as "surprisingly radical."
By July 19, the train had reached the Manchurian
border.

Customs officials found that someone had hidden

20,000 rubles worth of opium aboard the train.

There was

some concern that this would cast a "reflection" on the
Mission.

However, the border officials explained that

almost all express trains carried such smuggled cargo, and
the Mission moved on without further delay.

Shortly before

noon on July 21, the trip came to an end at Vladivostok.
Root consulted with the American Consul, sent a parting
message to Tereshchenko, and the group boarded the Buffalo
X6

for the return to the United States.-

^"Mission Log," 38; and "Russell Diary," July 14, 1917.
15"McCormick Diary," July 19, 1917.
16"Mission Log," 38-39; "McCormick Diary," July 17,
1917; and Elihu Root to Michael Tereshchenko, July 21,
1917, Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
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Before their departure from the united States, Root
had discussed with Secretary Lansing the possibility of
visiting Japah on the return trip.

Lansing originally

favored such a trip, and Root left the united States with
the impression that they were free to go.

17

During the

stay in petrograd, Root cabled the State Department on two
occasions to ask for further instructions on the Japanese
visit but received no reply.

18

This led some members to

conclude that the State Department was ignoring their re
quest in the way it had their recommendations for a propaTQ

ganda bureaa.^

The State Department had in fact decided

that the Mission should return directly to Washington.

The

Department indicated that such a trip would delay their
20
report and therefore should not be taken.
The truth was
otherwise.

Lansing had decided that "the possible diver

gence of views" between Root and the administration made
it "unwise for him to represent the Government" in Japan.

21

Root did not receive Lansing's instructions
17Robert Lansing to Aimaro Sato, imperial Japanese
Ambassador, May 15, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4677%, St. Dept.
18Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 17, 1917, and
July 2, 1917, Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
19"McCormick Diary," July 16, 1917.
20Elihu Root to Baron Kaneko, July 21, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.; and The New York Times, July 12,
1917, 6 .
21Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5737%, St. Dept.
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pertaining to the Japanese visit until July 19, only two
days before their arrival in Vladivostok.

The message,

forwarded to the Mission by the American Consul at Vladi
vostok, informed Root that the state Department considered
a trip to China or Japan "inadvisable" and instructed them
to return home directly.

22

The Mission also learned from

the consul that an American Red cross Commission headed by
Dr. Frank Billings was due to arrive the following day.

Root decided to meet with the group and offer information
23
which might be helpful in their work.
When Root learned
that the Commission would arrive later than expected, he
decided to delay their return no longer and left a letter
24
for the chairman of the Commission.
The two weeks required to make the voyage from
Vladivostok to Seattle offered the Mission an opportunity
to complete their notes and to prepare the final draft of
their reports.

The trip was without incident.

The only

delay occurred on July 23 when heavy fog required the vessel
to drop anchor for approximately eight hours until the fog
2 2 "McCormick Diary," July 19, 1917; and Robert
Lansing to Elihu Root, July 7, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5425,
St. Dept.

23"McCormick Diary," July 18, 1917.
2^"McCormick Diary," July 21, 1917; and Elihu Root
to Dr. Frank Billings, July 21, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/
7487, St. Dept.
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lifted.

25

on Sunday, July 29, the Buffalo crossed the
26
180th meridian.
After two weeks at sea, the lights of
Seattle were spotted

at 9:00 p.m. on August 3.

later the vessel was

at anchor inthe port. '

An hour

The following morning the members of the Mission
were given a tour of the city followed by a luncheon with
the Seattle Chamber of Commerce.

27

When asked if the

Mission--would be permitted to accept such an invitation,
the State Department had left the decision to Root .28
The Mission boarded a special train on the after
noon of August 4 for

the last legof their trip and arrived

in Washington on the

morning of August 8 .

They

were metat

the station by Polk of the state Department and retired to
hotels where they rested briefly before presenting their
OQ
reports that afternoon. ^ Secretary Lansing had a "long
conference" with Root and another with the entire Mission
that afternoon.

Later in the same day, the group met

25"Mission Log," 39-40; and "Russell Diary," July
23, 1917.
28|,McCormick Diary," July 29, 1917.

27"Mission Log," 41-42.
28Prank L ‘
. Polk to Senator Miles Poindexter, July
26, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5966, St. Dept.

29,,Mission Log," 42; and "McCormick Diary,"
August 8, 1917.
30"Lansing Diary," August 9, 1917.
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with President Wilson for approximately two hours and
presented their evaluations to him.

31

The written report of the Root Mission, signed by
all members except Crane who had remained in Russia, was
submitted to Secretary Lansing shortly after their arrival
in Washington.

Although the document was twenty-nine pages

long, a large portion was devoted to their journey and, to
a certain extent, duplicated the "Mission Log."
impressive feature of the report —

One

and one thing that

impressed Secretary of State Lansing - was its extremely
optimistic tone.
cessful.

Root felt that the Mission had been suc

He believed that the group had "contributed

materially to strengthening the provisional government,"
and he concluded that "the situation is certainly much
„
32
more stable and hopeful than it was when we arrived."
Root and his colleagues directed their.attention
to four basic areas:

the problem of transportation, the

ability of the Russians to continue their military effort,
the political stability of the Provisional Government, and
the recommendations of the Mission.

The report recognized

3*"Hugh L. Scott to William V. Judson, August 14,
1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4; and Samuel R.
Bertron to Edward M. House, August 13, 1917, Edward M.
House papers, Drawer 3.
32Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, July 10, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 1 {Princeton University Library,
Princeton, N.J.).

the necessity of improved transportation as "the fundamen
tal material need of Russia for the prosecution of the War.
Root realized that there were not enough vessels to carry
the necessary war material from the united States to Russia
"The supplies to be actually furnished by the United States
to Russia cannot possibly be more than a small part of the
total amount called for."

The report directed Secretary

Lansing's attention to the problem of rail transportation
within Russia, an area to be investigated in more detail
by the Stevens Commission.

The report explained, howevey,

that without exception, all requests from Russian civilian
and military leaders were prefaced with the plea that some*

thing be done to secure equipment for the Russian rail
system.

Basing their opinion on their own observations

and on conversations with members of the Stevens Commission
members of the Root Mission agreed that assistance to the
33
Russian railway system should be given first priority.
As to whether or not the Russian government would
continue the war, the report contained no doubts whatso
ever:

"We are satisfied' that the provisional Government

of Russia intends to c o n t i n u e the war and has no intention
34
of making a separate peace."
Mission members recognized,
however, that a question of political stability existed,

33"Mission Report," 8-13.
34lbid., 15.
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and it was their conclusion in this area which proved to
be totally inaccurate.

The report briefly described the

political events of the past two months but concluded that
the Provisional Government had been able to stabilize its
power.

in summarizing their view of the political ques

tion, the Report stated:
It is the unanimous opinion of the Mission that
the Russian people have the qualities of character
which will make it possible to restore discipline,
and coherent and intelligently directed action,
both in military and civil life . . . _/w/e have
little doubt that they will be able to establish
and maintain successfully free self-government on
a great scale.
Such a development, however, cannot
be accomplished in a day; time is essential; but
they are moving now with a rapidity which is quite
extraordinary.35
The report did not make specific recommendations
for financial assistance to Russia.

It did, however,

strongly advise "giving substantial aid to Russia in a
large way."

It gave as justification the following ob 

servation:
With such aid /there/ is a strong probability of
keeping Russia in _the war and the Russian Army in
the field . . . /r/here is little prospect that
Russia can be kept in the war and the Russian Army
in the field without such aid . . . . The benefit
of keeping Russia in the war and its army in the
field will be so enormous that the risk involved
in rendering the aid required should not be
seriously considered .36
in addition to the .major report which was submitted
3 5 Ibid*,

23-24.

3 6 Ibid..

26-27.
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by the entire committee, three additional reports which
dealt with the Army, the Navy, and financial conditions
were presented.

General Scott prepared a report on the

military situation in Russia and submitted it to the secre
tary of war.

Scott began with the observation that the

most serious problem which the Russian Army faced was that
of railway transportation.

He explained that all Russian

military leaders with whom he talked began their discussion
with a plea for the immediate shipment of locomotives and
railway cars.
and stated,

Scott agreed with the urgency of the request

"Unless the railroads be soon rendered more

efficient, Russia's military strength will no longer be
of much avail in this war."

37

General Scott explained that upon their arrival in
Russia the Mission members were shocked at the military
situation.

They were amazed by the large crowds of sol

diers standing, with no apparent purpose, around train
stations.

Scott felt that this was a result of the sol

diers' desire to test their new-found freedom.

He described

the situation as "individual liberty run mad, an orgy of
*38
do-as-you-please."

He also reported his observation that

upon his arrival in Russia, more troop trains were traveling
away from the Front than toward it.

Along the same route

six weeks later, however, he witnessed a "considerable

37"Scott Report," 2.
3QIbid., 9.

change."

He observed "fewer men in uniforms crowding the

stations and the trains going toward the front were frequent and filled with men returning to their duty."

39

This change he attributed to "orders and appeals from the
government."

Recognizing that the situation was not yet

ideal the General believed it "important to note that
these orders are being increasingly obeyed."

40

included

in his report was his observation that the nearer one came
to the military Front, the greater the degree of military
discipline one observed, and "the further one went from
the workmen and their committees the better conditions
became."
The question of desertion from the ranks he recog
nized as a serious one.

Scott placed the estimate at

one and one-half million desertees.

Nevertheless, he

was optimistic and stated that they were "slowly filtering
b a c k . 1,41

in his opinion, the answer to the desertion

problem rested with the government's ability to enforce
its authority, and Scott thought that "the tide /Had7 now
set in that direction and if not checked by some new in
fluence /would7 slowly grow stronger ."4 2
3 9 Ibid., 1 0 .
4 0 Ibid.
4 1 Ibid., 1 1 .

42Ibid.

To Scott, the

most significant indication of the political and military
stability was the Russian advance of July 1st.

He saw

the advance as a test to determine whether the Russian
troops would obey their commanders or retreat.

He ex

plained that "the most they expected was /to7 prove to
Russia and to America that the army would and could fight.
If this were indeed true, the July advance served its
purpose.

Scott returned from the Front confident that

the Russian Army was capable of maintaining its position
along the Eastern Front.
In concluding >:his report, Scott emphasized the
need to retain Russia as a belligerent:
If she remains in, the war will be all of a year
shorter and our victory assured.
If she goes out, no
one can predict how long it will take to conquer
Germany, and there arises a clear possibility that
it cannot be done at all . . . I therefore believe
it is worth to us a great sum of money to keep
Russia even passively in the war . . . for the
dangers attending her withdrawal are too great for
any haggling to be admitted .4 4
Admiral Glennon also submitted a report of his ob
servations.

Unlike General Scott, Glennon found little

that encouraged him.

He described the conditions in

Sevastopol as "far from satisfactory."

Glennon reported

that each ship was controlled by committees which included
officers but which were dominated by the seamen who
4 3 Ibid.,

15.

44Ibld., 30-31.
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outnumbered their officers by a ratio of approximately
five to one.

in theory, these committees dealt with the

"internal life of the ship" and had "no control over
military matters."

Glennon found, however, that "officers

dare not give orders to their men" and that "all drills
and preparations for battle have ceased except to the
degree desired by the men."

The result was that "a con

dition of profound distrust exists between officers and
men," with many of the "ablest officers" refusing to accept
the responsibility of their positions.

45

It was Glennon's opinion that conditions in other
Russian ports were not as bad as in Sevastopol.

Though he

refrained from making judgment on what he had observed,
nothing in his report indicated that he had been encouraged
by anything he had seen.

Even when listing the requests

made by the Russian Navy, Glennon made no personal recom
mendations ,4 6 but his omission of any encouraging remark
made his report unique.
Bertron and McCormick reported on the financial
situation, which they described as "undoubtedly serious."
The total indebtedness of Russia stood at twenty-nine billion
rubles, and government expenses for 1917 were estimated at
27,900,000,000 rubles.

With a revenue of only four billion

46"Glennon Report," 2-6.
46lbid., 11-13.
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and

a Liberty Loan of three billion, the resulting deficit

would run to over twenty billion.

47

They also stated that

the value of the ruble had declined to such extent that
it was worth less than one half its par value.

They men

tioned the fact that England was attempting to raise the
value of the ruble by purchases in the international money
markets.

They felt that this was of no lasting consequence

and advised the United. States government against a similar
action .4 8
The most important part of their report consisted
of a list prepared by the Minister of Finance of seventyeight items requested by the Russians.

The items would

cost an estimated $1,276,000,000 and would require approxi
mately three and one-half tons of cargo space,

in view of

the shortage of available cargo vessels, the Minister of
Finance had listed the items according to preference.
Bertron and McCormick recommended that their government
carefully review and grant these requests if it expected
Russia "to maintain an effective fighting force. . . .
7r7he action our Government takes in this question will be
an important factor in maintaining the present Provisional
49
Government."
47

"Bertron-Mccormick Report," 1-3.

4 8 Ibid.,

3-4.

49Ibid., 5.
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The report of the Root Mission was one of extreme
optimism.

A careful reading of the document leaves the

impression that the Provisional Government would maintain
a position of control in Russia.

Secretary Lansing was

amazed at the report and the day after receiving it re
corded a lengthy evaluation in his diary:
The Root Mission, excepting Charles R. crane, have
arrived and I had a long interview with them yesterday
preceded by one in the morning with Mr. Root alone.
I am astounded at their optimism.
I cannot see upon
what it is founded. When I expressed doubts as to
Kerensky's personal force and ability to carry through
his plans in view of the strong opposition developing
against him, they assured me that everything would
come out all right and that Russia would continue the
war against the central Powers with even greater
vigor than under the czar.
X hope they are right and I presume they know more
about it than I do, and yet in spite of What they say
I am very skeptical about Kerensky. He compromises
too much with the radical element of the Revolution.
From the first X have felt that the attempt being
made to harmonize the radicals and moderates in Russia
would be a failure, but X confess that the confident
tone of Mr. Root and colleagues has shaken, thought
it has not removed, my doubts . . . in my judgment
the demoralized state of affairs will grow worse and
worse until some dominant personality arises to end
it all.
I may be all wrong about this.
I hope I am. Mr.
Root and his colleagues may be entirely right.
I
hope they are. The present Government may develop
into a constitutional democratic government; it may
become stronger, suppress radicalism, and make society
safe from lawlessness. Yet the logic of events in my
opinion does not warrant such hopes.
I naturally hesitate to set up my judgment against
so experienced and wise a statesman as Elihu Root,
especially after he has been on the ground floor and
in contact with the forces at work in Russia, but even
taking his statements as accurate I cannot agree in the
conclusions which he reached.5

50"Lansing Diary," August 9, 1917.
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Root did not include in his report the recommen
dation for a comprehensive propaganda bureau, although
the creation Of such a bureau was the one thing for which
there was unanimous support from the Mission.

Without

exception# they felt that this was the most constructive
thing which could be done to assist Russia and the war
effort.

When Root submitted the report, h'e explained

that he would not repeat recommendations already made.
He later told his biographer:

"I was in doubt as to whether

to put in my report what was in the dispatches, but I felt
that I shouldn't make a record against the president who
51
appointed me."
Root was probably reluctant to suggest
the bureau again, since repeated dispatches to the State
Department had brought no authorization to begin work in
that area.
Finally, and at the request of President Wilson,
Russell and John R. Mott prepared a supplementary report
describing such a bureau.

52

Their report included the

major points that had already been suggested and proposed
S3
an annual budget of five and one-half million dollars. J

The President turned the report over to George Creel,
51-jessup,

Ellhu Root, II, 367.

5 2 Baker,

Wilson Letters, VII, 208; and "Russell
Diary," August 13, 1917.
5 3 "Russell Diary," August 13, 1917.

Chairman of the Committee on Public Information.

Creel

drastically reduced the project in size and suggested a
budget of $810,000.

He eliminated many of the Mission's

recommendations with such remarks as "this is a half-baked
suggestion" and "this suggestion is interesting in theory
but mighty dangerous in practice."

in concluding his

evaluation, Creel stated that the project "lies entirely
within the province of the Committee on Public informa
tion . . . .

I do not think the State Department should

have anything to do with it at all."^5

The President

agreed with Creel, and the task of establishing a propaganda bureau was delegated to his agency.

56

There was

considerable delay in sending a representative of the
Creel Committee to Russia.

Edgar c . Sisson was finally

sent, but he arrived after the Bolsheviks had seized
power.

57
Wilson's decision to place the proposed Russian

54"Russell Diary," August 17, 1917? and George
Creel to Woodrow Wilson, /August 267, 1917, George Creel
Papers, Box 3.
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of
Congress).
^Ge o r g e Creel to Wbodrow Wilson /^ugust 207,
1917, George Creel Papers, Box 3.
56Edgar Sisson, one Hundred Red Days; A personal
Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution (Hew Haven, Conn.:
Yale university Press, 1931), 4.
57George creel, Rebel at Large; Recollections
of Fifty Crowded Years (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1947),
176.
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propaganda agency in the hands of Creel removed it from
the jurisdiction of the State Department.

The members of

the Root Mission had assumed that any such project would
be handled by the State Department and were disappointed
by Wilson's decision.

Apparently, there existed a degree

of distrust between the Chairman of the Committee on
Public Information and the head of the State Department
which made it difficult for the two men to work together
harmoniously,

in a note dated June 29, George Creel

indicated the degree of hostility that existed between the
two m e n :
Mr. Lansing, a dull, small man, bitterly resented
my chairmanship of the committee, and made himself so
unpleasant at the first meeting that I never called
another. As a consequence, he refused to work with
the Committee, and did everything that he could, in
his mean, cheap way, to hinder and embarrass.53
Following the presentation of their reports and
the assignment of their propaganda recommendations to
George Creel, the work of the Mission finally ended.
Secretary Lansing continued to confer with various members
of the Mission,

59

but as the days passed most of the mem

bers began to feel that their services were no longer
desired and, in fact, were resented.
Root wrote:

Years later, Elihu

"Wilson didn't want to accomplish any thing.

53George creel papers. Box 1.

"Lansing Desk Diary," August 9-30, 1917.
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It was a grand-stand play.

He wanted to show his sympathy

for the Russian Revolution.

When we delivered his message

and made our speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he
^
„60
wanted."

Before examining the failures of the Mission, it
is well to note the extent to which the group accomplished
what it was sent to do.

A major purpose of the Mission

was to extend to the Russian people congratulations upon
their recent revolution and to assure the Russian govern
ment of American goodwill as well as material support.
Ambassador Root and other members of the Mission took
every conceivable opportunity, whether before a small
group of soldiers gathered at some remote Siberian siding
or before a gathering of the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets, to speak to the Russian people and deliver their
President’s message.

Today, one can easily see that a

war-weary Russia would not be receptive to such speeches,
which had as their major theme a plea for the continua
tion of the war.

There is no evidence, however, that

President Wilson or the State Department found any fault
in what the men said, and the speeches of Root and his
group sound much like the speeches of President Wilson
and other, government officials of that period.
60Elihu Root to Philip C. Jessup, September 16,
1930, quoted in Jessup, Ellhu Root, II, 356.
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There is little to criticize with respect to the
Mission's attempt to determine and report the material
needs of the Russian Government.

Members of the Mission

held long and frequent conferences with Russian civilian
and military leaders to determine these needs anddily
presented the Russian requests to the American govern
ment.

Nor can Root or any other member be censured for

a lack of enthusiasm or for any reluctance to perform
his task to the best of his ability.

Rather, the evidence

reveals that every member of the Mission appreciated the
seriousness of the task.
These minor successes are overwhelmed by the
Mission's shortcomings.

The most serious failure of the

Mission was its evaluation of the stability of the pro
visional Government and the ability of that government to
keep Russia in the war.

It would be unrealistic to expect

that Root and his colleagues could have altered in any way
the course of the political movements in Russia.

It is

not unreasonable, however, to have expected a more accurate
evaluation of events in Russia.

That these men were unable

to provide such information was primarily the result of
President Wilson's method of handling foreign affairs and
his personal choice of Mission members.
The Root Mission provides an excellent example of
Wilsonian Diplomacy in action.

Many of the weaknesses
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attributed to Wilson, the diplomat, are revealed in this
study.

Two problems confronted the Root Mission, and both

were beyond their control.

The first difficulty was the

official policy of the United States toward the Russian
Provisional Government.

It was an unrealistic policy

with little hope of success.

The second factor was Wilson*s

attitude toward revolutions in general.

61

Historians who have studied President Wilson in
his role as diplomat have found several serious flaws in
his technique of conducting foreign affairs,

one such

deficiency was his tendency to rely almost exclusively
upon special commissions, thereby bypassing the State
Department and revealing distrust of the diplomatic corps.
In dealing with the Provisional Government, Wilson utilized
three such groups,

in addition to the Root Mission, he

sent the Stevens Commission to determine the railroad
needs of Russia, and a Red Cross Commission.

These over

lapping commissions taxed a government already faced with
the very difficult and time-consuming task of consolidating
its control.

It also led to misunderstandingsbetween the

Root Mission and the Stevens Commission.
Apparently, Wilson relied upon missions to indulge
his penchant for the dramatic.

Although he ostensibly

sent out missions to obtain vital information, he conveniently
S^-See chapter I above.
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ignored and usually failed to act upon their reports and
/

recommendations.

This was especially true with respect

to. the Hoot Mission's advocacy of a large-scale propaganda
bureau,

in addition, the President also tended to ignore

Mission members after receiving their initial reports.
Possibly his greatest failing was his apparent
inability to explain in a satisfactory manner the purpose
of the Mission.

Root conferred privately with Wilson

prior to his departure for Russia, but it is perfectly
obvious from the conversations between Root and his colleagues
that there was never a thorough explanation of what the group
was expected to accomplish.
To these defects in Wilson's conduct of foreign
affairs must be added the selection of the members of the
Root Mission.

Historians have deemed the choice of con

servative Republican Elihu Root as chairman of such a
group as a most unwise decision which is difficult to
explain .6 2

Both the French and British governments had

selected socialists, who were also cabinet members, to greet
the new Russian government.

While it is irrational to expect

Wilson to have selected a socialist, it is perplexing that
he ultimately chose a man whose political views were
62Warth, Allies And The Russian Revolution, 98;
Kennan, Soviet American Relations',' I, £l; and William
Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-1947
(New York:
Rinehart and Company, 1952),87.

304
considerably more conservative than were his own.

That

Root's ideas differed greatly from those of the Adminis
tration is revealed in a letter to President Wilson from
Secretary Lansing.

Lansing strongly suggested that Root

be denied the opportunity of consulting with the Chinese
government on the return trip., since his views were not
representative of the Administration.

Thus arises the

question of whether Root should have been chosen to sym
bolize the Wilson Administration in any capacity.
Probably, Root was selected in order to give a
bipartisan character to the Mission.

Wilson was not

unaware of the frequent suggestion that he create a
coalition cabinet for the duration of the war, as the
British and French had done.

The selection of such a

prominent Republican to head the Mission was perhaps a
gesture in this direction.
Root's ability.

Few Americans questioned

Many Russians, however, looked upon

Wilson's selection of Root as an affront which, inciden
tally, was pointed out by one American socialist even
before the Mission left America.

Root's political con

servatism no doubt rendered him incapable of comprehending
the significance of the Russian Revolution.
The other Mission members were also inappropriate.
General Scott was probably chosen in order to vacate the
position of Chief of Staff and provide Wilson the oppor
tunity to fill it with a more competent man.

In doing
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this, however, the President sent to Russia a raconteur
who entertained his colleagues with anecdotes about the
American West but who was totally incapable of under
standing the Russian military situation.

Admiral Glennon

was the other representative of the military.

Unfortunate

ly, his major qualification seems to have been that he was
inferior to Scott in rank.

He was, however, equal in his

inability to perceive the crisis confronting the Russian
military.
Cyrus McCormick was no doubt selected because of
his many contacts throughout Russia, the result of exten
sive investments during recent years by International
Harvester Company.

His personal friendship with the

President also played a part.

McCormick's business con

nections in Russia afforded him the seemingly distinct
advantage of calling upon international Harvester personnel
for advice.

With regard to the worth of their opinions,

however, the Mission would have been better served had
this source of information not been available,

in view

of McCormick's quite sizable financial investment in
Russia, the possibility of a conflict of interests presents
itself.

An example is provided in the list of items re

quested by the Russians in the report prepared jointly by
McCormick and Bertron.

Agricultural equipment, including

harvesters, was near the top of the list of seventy-eight
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items arranged in order of their priority, enumerated
even before weapons and ammunition.
Charles Crane's reputation, apparently undeserved,
of being well-informed about Russian institutions and
therefore capable of understanding the Russian situation,
led to his appointment.

Crane, however, was so emotionally

committed to the leadership of the First Provisional Govern
ment, especially Miliukov, that he was blind to the possi
bility of Russia's being effectively governed by any other
group, and could foresee nothing but chaos if Miliukov's
group lost control.
Duncan, the representative of American Labor, was
also an unfortunate choice.

The aging labor leader spent

all of his time trying to persuade his Russian counterparts
to withhold or delay labor demands, a singularly absurd
approach.

Although well in touch with the sentiments of

American labor, he failed to recognize the growing
radicalism of Russian labor, and, consequently, made no
effective attempt to deal with it.
Charles Russell, emissary of American socialism,
was also a poor choice.

Not only was he out of step with

the group he was chosen to represent, but had been ousted
from the party by the time the Mission arrived in Russia.
There is no evidence to indicate that banker Samuel Bertron
or Y. M. C. A. President John Mott were any more or less
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capable than were their colleagues.

Thus did President

Wilson round out a roost distinguished though incompetent
delegation.
It is woefully apparent that President Wilson and
Secretary of State Lansing selected men who were unprepared
and consequently unqualified for the task which lay ahead
of them.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Mission

presented a report Which recognized some degree of political
instability but concluded that the Provisional Government
would be able to maintain political power and continue as
an effective belligerent.

Yet, three months later, the

Bolsheviks seized control in petrograd and drove from the
capital that government in which Hoot and his colleagues
had expressed almost complete confidence.
Years later, Robert Lansing insisted that the Bol
shevik Revolution "did not take the Department of State by
63
surprise."
He explained, however:
In view of the favorable report of the Root Mission
and the convictions expressed by the American Com
missioners that the Kerensky Government was sufficient
ly stable to deal successfully with the situation . . .
there was no practical course for this government to
take other than with loans, experts, and publicity to
assist Premier Kerensky in his endeavors to keep con
trol and bring order out of disorder .®4
Thus, the optimistic report of the Root Mission failed to
indicate to the state Department the true conditions in
Russia and gave no warning of the Bolshevik takeover.
6 3 Lansing,

War Memoirs, 338.

64Ibid., 338-339.

Yet,
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even after the Mission's report proved invalid, Lansing
continued to defend its members as "very able men" who
were "as capable of judging the situation and giving
advice as any thxs government could have sent out."
This leads to only one conclusion.

65

If the members of the

Mission were incapable of making a valid judgment, and
they obviously were, the responsibility for their selection,
and the method by which they were selected, belong to
President Wilson and secretary of State Lansing.

The

failure of the Root Mission was also the failure of the
Wilson Administration.
One serious problem which the Mission faced while
in Russia was the lack of a sufficient number of inter
preters.

Although the Mission staff included a large

number of clerks, none spoke Russian.

This was the

fault of the state Department and did not result from a
shortage of suitable applicants for the positions.

State

Department files as well as the private papers of Mission
members contain hundreds of letters of application from
apparently qualified persons.

Breckenridge Long of the

State Department was in charge of arrangements for the
group and handled appointments as well.

Unfortunately,

the staff was chosen because of political connections, not
facility in Russian.

It is impossible to state accurately

65"Lansing Diary," December 7, 1917.
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how this lack of sufficient translators hampered the work
of the Mission although several of its members complained
bitterly about this' problem,

on some occasions, they

felt that their speeches had been altered deliberately.
More than once, Russell felt that an interpreter whom he
had hired in petrograd had, for political reasons, de
liberately misquoted him.

Another possible motive might

have been that the Russians were reluctant to repeat un
pleasant remarks to their American guests upon whom so
much depended.

That the interpreters were remiss in their

duties can be seen in numerous reports from American
journalists living in Petrograd.
perhaps the most serious error made b y the Mission
was its tendency to limit conferences to representatives
of the Provisional Government and to the conservative
supporters of that government.

During their first few

days in Russia, the Mission came in contact with Russian
and American army officers and businessmen, all of con
servative hue.

When they arrived in petrograd, most of

their contacts were still with the conservative elements.
Because of his official position and his attitude as to what
constituted correct procedure, Root restricted his dis
cussions almost exclusively to officials of the Provisional
Government and personnel of the American and Allied embas
sies.

In addition to government officials, McCormick and

Bertron met with a large number of conservative bankers
and businessmen who gave strong support tc the Provisional
Government.

For the most part, Mott and Crane met with

conservative church leaders, whereas Glennon and Scott con
ferred with military officers of the same political per
suasion.

Even Duncan, the representative of American

Labor, had no contact with the radical factory committees.
Charles Russell was the only Mission member who deliberate
ly sought out and tried to understand the petrograd Soviet.
It is significant that Russell alone detected the very real
power which was possessed by that revolutionary body.

It

is also evident that he comprehended the provisional Govern
ment's weakness,

one searches in vain, however, for any

evidence that he came close to a true understanding of the
"dual power" shared by the Provisional Government and the
Soviet.

Russell was clearly the only member of the Mission

who made any attempt to understand the revolutionary bodies
in Russia and came far closer than did any of his colleagues
to an understanding of the situation.

Unfortunately and

inexcusably,Russell failed to emphasize any of this in his
written report, and there is no evidence that his observa
tions were reported to the State Department in any way.
It is difficult to understand how the group could
have remained in the Russian capital for almost one month
and yet have received such a distorted view of the realities

of the situation.

Several factors, however, partially

explain the situation.

The Provisional Government obvious

ly tried to shelter the group from actuality.

The lengthy

and useless official receptions, which led more than one
member to conclude that they were wasting their time, were
designed to give the illusion of stability and occupy the
members’ time.

It is significant that American journalists

who were living in Petrograd in the summer of 1917 wrote
of the difficulty of obtaining enough food and emphasized
that the food shortages could present serious problems
for the Provisional Government.

But the Mission, well-

provisioned with food and drink, was evidently unaware
that there was a shortage of bread in the Russian capital.
The group should have obtained some insight about the
situation from Ambassador Francis,

unfortunately, Francis

was as unaware of what was going on as was the Root
Mission.

Their mutual ignorance tended to reenforce the

misconceptions which all held,

only after the Bolshevik

Revolution did Francis fully comprehend the situation.
Another error committed by all members of the Mission
was their tendency to compare Russia with the United States.
Duncan, when speaking before the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets, attempted to explain how the American labor move
ment functioned.

For example, he suggested that labor

could obtain its ends by placing "union" labels in consumer
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products, as American labor did.

Thus, the vice-president

of the American Federation of Labor was trying to intro
duce selective buying as a means of strengthening labor at
the same time the Bolshevik party was working through the
factory committees to seize control of the manufacturing
plants.
Probably the greatest error the Mission made in
comparing Russia with the United States was their belief
that the Russians would be as enthusiastic as the Ameri
cans were in pursuing the war.

For example, the suggestion

to tour several Russian cities was

prompted by a recent and

successful tour of American cities by representatives of
the French and British governments.

Having just entered

the war, Americans responded enthusiastically to the
Allied representatives.

Members of the Root Mission

expected the same response from the Russians.

Apparently,

Russell was once more the only one who realized that the
i

Russian people were sick of the war.

He was also alone

in his realization that the public demonstrations on July
1 supported the Soviets far more enthusiastically than
they did the provisional Government,

one can only surmise

that Russell's failure to include such pertinent observa
tions in his individual report resulted from a reluctance
to contradict the Mission report.
Another factor which perhaps helps explain why the
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Mission had such a distorted view of the Russian condition
was the very timing of their visit.

When the decision to

send the Root Mission to Russia was made, the original
members of the Provisional Government were in power,

on

the day the group left the United States, a new cabinet,
the First Coalition, was formed.

This government remained

in power throughout their stay in Petrograd, a period of
relative calm, and was replaced by the Second Coalition
several days after the Mission left Petrograd.

Strangely,

this shift in power in no way led the group to question
the stability of the Provisional Government but, on the
contrary, had the opposite effect,

perhaps it was because

they had been told by virtually every observer upon their
arrival in Russia that the Cabinet changes, especially the
elevation of Kerensky to Minister of War, would enhance
the war effort.

During the course of their visit, vir

tually every Mission member was impressed by Kerensky
who, they felt, could save Russia.

Consequently, as they

traveled across Siberia en route to Vladivostok and learned
of the creation of a new cabinet following the July Days —
a cabinet, incidentally, in which Kerensky was the Prime
Minister —

they thought this a good sign.

The members of

the Root Mission interpreted Kerensky's subsequent action
against the Bolshevik Party,»as evidence of his willingness
to suppress the radical anti-war forces and felt that this

would bring about a politically stable situation.
Perhaps most difficult to understand is the
Mission's optimistic report on the military situation.
General Scott based his report almost entirely upon the
July 1st offensive.

Up to that time, his diary and letters

make it obvious that Scott was extremely disappointed in
what he had seen of the Russian military.

After his brief

visit to the Russian Front on the first day of the offen
sive, however, he altered his viewpoint drastically.

After

July 1, Scott's diary and letters reflect his optimism.
Since this was the first time Scott had witnessed modern
warfare, he can perhaps be pardoned for not realizing
that he had seen a limited success which would be reversed
in a few days.

It is impossible, however,.to even specu

late as to why he insisted six weeks later in his report
to the Secretary of War that the Russian army was in good
condition.

By then, it was apparent to all that the July

offensive had been broken after only a few days and that
the German armies had regained all the territory tempo
rarily lost.
From the beginning, Mission members labored under
the misconception that all that was necessary to strengthen
the Provisional Government, and through it the Russian war
effort, was an explanation to the Russian people of the
necessity of pursuing the war.

T^his solution was always

stressed in the dispatches from petrograd and in the final
report as well as in the diaries and letters of the members.
Charles Russell perhaps placed more faith in this technique
than did anyone else.

Hi is idea eventually evolved into a

recommendation that the united States government finance
an agency in Russia to publicize and promote a vigorous
prosecution of the war.

Without exception, all the members

felt that if the Russian people were told why they should
continue the war, all agitation for an early or separate
peace, which they considered to be German inspired, would
cease.

The establishment of a "propaganda bureau" became

an obsession with some of the Mission members.

They were

so sure that this must be done that they could not under
stand how anyone could even question it.

Consequently,

when Lansing responded to their first request for such a
bureau with the vague reply that it was being carefully
considered, the members were sorely disappointed.

When

the President turned the suggestion over to George Creel,
it seemed to the disappointed members of the Mission that
their most constructive, suggestion had been cast aside.
one would think that in the many pages of the
lengthy reports, in the hundreds of letters, and in the de
tailed diaries that somewhere, even if by accident, some
member would have recorded a prediction that would prove
to be true.

Such is not the case.

Of what value, then.

was the Mission?

Very little, if any.

The lengthy reports

were outdated when they were finally presented and were
immediately questioned hy the Secretary of State,

with the

exception of obtaining limited credit for Russia, which the
United States would have extended anyway as long as the
Russian army was in the field, the Mission achieved nothing.
There is no evidence that the Mission influenced American
foreign policy in any way.

The report of the Root Mission

succeeded only in creating a false impression of the stability
of the Provisional Government.

Thus, when the Bolshevik

Revolution overthrew the government, the state Department
was in an even poorer position to deal with the realities
of Russian politics.

Because of the way the State Depart-:

ment was misguided in its attempt to establish an effective
policy toward Russia, it would have been preferable had the
Root Mission never made the journey.
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